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Abstract
The application of credit scoring techniques to assess the credit worthiness of
borrowers is a well-established practice in consumer credit. However, the use of
credit scoring to provide credit decisions for mortgage loans is a new application of
this method of assessment. This thesis is concerned with whether the application of
credit scoring to a mortgage loan portfolio affords business benefits.
A review of the literature relevant to both credit scoring and mortgage default is
presented. Following a review of the literature, the methodology and research design
are described. Thereafter this thesis reports the findings of a range of empirical
research.
Chapter Four reports the findings of the initial industry survey, which examines
mortgage credit scoring. Chapter Five reports the findings of the interview
programme conducted to augment the survey. Chapter Six describes a case study
undertaken, which facilitated the development of a bespoke mortgage scorecard. The
development and subsequent performance of the scorecard are examined. Chapter
Seven provides the findings of a pilot study in which mortgage lender performance is
benchmarked.
This principle conclusions of this thesis are; (i) A range of organisational factors
require to be controlled if scoring is to afford the risk, process and cost benefits
sought by those who adopt it either as an alternative to judgmental evaluation, or to
augment such a system, (ii) Subject to those controls being in place, credit scoring
can outperform judgmental evaluation in predicting mortgage default.
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"Credit scoring is an empirical technique that uses statistical methodology to predict
the probability of repayment by credit applicants", (Hsai, 1978). The credit
scorecard provides the lender with an empirically derived risk ranking. Risk is
defined as "chance of loss....exposure to loss", (Oxford English Dictionary, 1997).
The particular risk considered by this thesis, is the risk of an applicant for mortgage
credit failing to repay the debt. Credit scoring is used to create empirical decision
making tools, which are acknowledged to outperform judgmental loan evaluation
when applied to personal loans and credit cards. However, the application of
scoring technologies to mortgage loans is a recent development in the UK financial
services market. This thesis is concerned with the application of credit scoring in
order to assess applicants for residential mortgage loans in the UK.
1.2. Aims of the Thesis
This thesis examines a new application of credit scoring; the application of scoring
to the mortgage loan. In doing so, this thesis intends to identify whether credit
scoring can offer benefits to those lending organisations, which choose this method
of decisioning. Additionally this thesis aims to identify how credit scoring must be
used within the operating environment if the benefits achievable are to be delivered.
Finally, this thesis intends to identify whether credit scoring can outperform
judgmental evaluation of mortgage loans.
In order to introduce the subject area, both the credit decision and the mortgage loan
are now considered in more detail. The layout of the thesis is then presented.
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1.3. The Credit Decision
According to Myers and Forgy, (1963), "The problem of determining credit risk has
been with the businessman, since he first consummated a business transaction
without receiving immediate paymentfor his goods and servicesIt is interesting to
note that forty years hence, the problem of managing credit risk continues to
consume the lender. The management of credit risk has gained even more
prominence over the past decade, and this is evidenced by developments both in
industry and in academia. Within lending organisations credit risk has now attained
functional status, and credit risk departments are now commonly found alongside
other more traditional departments such as finance and human resources. The
management of credit risk at acceptable levels has gained prominence, and within the
financial press evidence of lenders debt levels and thus credit quality is posted as one
indicator of the value of the firm. Within academia, a body of research has
developed which examines the techniques by which credit risk can best be identified
and minimised.
The nature of credit decisioning has undergone a fundamental change over the past
twenty years. The traditional lending environment was one in which a customer,
who wished a credit facility, called in person to a "local" bank or building society
branch and met either the manager or a senior member of staff. The decision as to
whether or not to lend was then made subjectively based on what were traditionally
called the 4 C's of credit. These were a subjective assessment of the applicant's
character, collateral, and capacity to repay, combined with economic "conditions"
which prevailed at the time of application. This method of lending served the banks
well, and they maintained a prudent approach to lending with a focus on minimising
bad debts, and ensuring that all monies advanced were repaid in full.
Developments in banking at the end of the twentieth century, required that lenders
revisit their lending policies and procedures. Described as a "New Retail Banking
Revolution" by Gardner, Howcroft and Williams (1999), a combination of increased
competition, technological innovation, increased customer service demands, and
reduced customer loyalty forced the banks to endeavour to become more efficient.
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The entry into the UK retail lending environment of American competitors, and the
demutualisation of traditional building societies presents the banks with new
competitors who can maintain low cost structures, and are able and willing to accept
lower profit margins on a variety of products. Additionally, the introduction of
telephone and Internet banking means that many customers no longer require an
interface with a local office or local manager.
In combination, these changes forced the banks to reduce costs, and also to offer
lending products via remote lending channels. These trends resulted in lenders
adopting credit scoring technologies, which have been described as one of the most
successful applications of statistical and operational research approaches to
management ever. Credit scoring allows lenders to predict likely loan outcomes
based on the use of statistical techniques, which allow objective predictions as to
whether a loan will produce a good or bad outcome. The predictive capacity is
derived from analysis of data representative of the lenders own previous lending
experience. The scoring models are used to compare the characteristics of each new
applicant to the characteristics of previous applicants. Those who present the same
characteristics as previous bad applicants, are identified as being likely to be bad, and
those the same as the good are considered likely to be good.
Credit scoring offers many benefits to both lender and borrower. The assessment of
each application is wholly objective. Credit scoring complies with the requirements
of six UK acts of parliament namely, the consumer credit, sex discrimination, race
relations, fair-trading, employment protection and data protection acts. This
ensures that applicants for credit are not discriminated against. It is this "fairness",
that led to the suggestion that "all lenders should be encouraged to establish and
operate a workable credit-scoring system. Such a system, if universally in use,
would remove many of the problems of the present system" Church of Scotland
(1988).
In addition to ensuring objectivity, credit scoring also offers speed to decision,
consistency across a variety of customer interfaces and application channels, control
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of lending quality and cost savings. These benefits, in combination, make scoring a
very desirable means by which to evaluate loan applications.
However, credit scoring is not without its critics. The most vociferous of these is
Capon, whose 1982 critique lambastes the "brute force empiricism that characterizes
the development of credit scoring systems" and leads to "a treatment of the
individual applicant in a manner that offends against the traditions of our society
Capon is not alone in criticising scoring, but it is accurate to say that within the
literature support for credit scoring significantly outweighs criticism.
Credit scoring has for twenty years, been used to make credit decisions on consumer
loans and credit cards and is now entering a new domain. Lenders are now
introducing credit scoring in order to make decisions on mortgage loans. It is this
new application of scoring which this thesis examines.
1.4. The Mortgage Loan
Successive UK Governments have supported the expansion of home ownership in a
manner, which is persuasive and explicit. The changing face of home ownership in
the UK has resulted in an increasing proportion of the UK population taking
responsibility for housing provision by owning their own homes. Sixty seven
percent of the UK housing stock is now owner occupied, an increase of twelve
percent since 1979, and this "acceleration is a direct result of government policy.
As a result the "responsibility for housing provision and finance now lies with the
market, where issues become ones between individual consumers and suppliers"
(Doling & Ford, 1991). The UK now has one of the highest levels of home
ownership amongst western industrialised nations. The desire for home ownership
which has been driven by government housing policies, has resulted in new types of
applicants requiring access to housing finance. Previously "owner occupation had
been seen as a tenure for the middle classes", Spicker (1996), however new entrants
to the sector now come from a wide variety of social backgrounds, age groups and
income levels.
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A mortgage loan is the vehicle by which providers of housing finance offer
individuals the funds to purchase domestic property. Mortgage loans have several
characteristics which make them significantly different from other consumer loan
products. The value of the mortgage loan reflects that a mortgage is typically the
largest single investment undertaken by an individual. The term of the mortgage
loan is typically twenty five years, and this reflects the high value of the transaction
as it takes a considerable time to repay the initial loan sum plus the interest thereon.
The property, which is the focus of the transaction, is the truly unique feature of the
loan. The property being purchased forms a security for the lender, and to an extent
mitigates the risk inherent in the loan transaction. However, this introduces a risk
for the borrower. Should the loan fail to be repaid, the ultimate sanction by the
lender is to apply for a possession order, thus transferring ownership of the property
from borrower to lender. The property can then be sold in order to repay or reduce
the amount of the loan, which is outstanding.
It is this specific aspect of mortgage lending that requires lenders to ensure that they
make an accurate assessment as to the likelihood of loan failure. The cost of
mortgage loan failure is not a solely financial cost, although both the lender and the
borrower face the risk of financial loss. Mortgage loan failure can result in a
considerable social cost, and this does not apply to the same extent to other loan
products. The social cost of loan failure can result in individuals becoming
homeless, and as a result having to "downgrade" their property owning aspirations or
transfer to the public or private rental sector. The "vulnerability of home
ownership" and the relationship between this vulnerability and changes in income
structures, employment patterns, economic conditions and banking practices is the
subject of a developing body of research.
Loan providers are mainly, but not exclusively profit driven. However, when
creating mortgage lending policies they must balance the requirement to generate
profits with the broader social implications of "getting it wrong". At an individual
borrower level, lenders "getting it wrong" can result in homelessness. However, at
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an economic level, the mismanagement of portfolio risk can result in bank failure,
the cost of which is often borne by the economy as a whole.
This thesis considers the application of scoring technologies to mortgage loans.
These loans are significantly different to other loan products. Mortgage loan failure
has wider economic and social implications than failure of other loans, and this
heightens the requirement for mortgage lending to be closely scrutinised to ensure
that policies and procedures are efficient and equitable.
1.5. Layout of Thesis
In Chapter two of this thesis a review of the literature is presented. The literature
reviewed presents the development of scoring, and also considers the range of
techniques applied to scoring and their relative performance. In order to place
mortgage lending in context, the operating environment and the mortgage product
are also introduced. The literature which examines predictors of mortgage default,
is also considered at this time. In conclusion chapter two identifies the current gaps
in the literature which this thesis addresses.
Chapter three outlines the research methodology which underpins the work
undertaken. The research methods, which are used in pursuit of the research goals
are presented and discussed in turn. In conclusion, chapter three confirms why a
mixed methods approach is considered to be the most suitable means by which to
meet the aims of the thesis.
-cr-"""
Chapter four presents the first empirical study of the thesis, and reports the findings
of the initial industry survey, which was undertaken in July 1997. The survey
sought to identify the extent of usage of credit scoring, the drivers for introducing
scoring, the way scoring is being used and the benefits anticipated and achieved by
lenders as a result of introducing scoring. The survey achieved a 56% response rate,
and achieved its goals. In conclusion, chapter four presents several research
questions which are generated by the results of the survey analysis.
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In Chapter five the next phase of the research is described and analysed. An
interview programme was undertaken during July and August 1998, in order to
answer the research questions generated in chapter four. Whilst mindful of
confidentiality issues, the interview participants are introduced, and a precis of some
of their views and insights is presented. The analysis of the interview transcripts
provides useful new insights into the manner in which credit scoring is being
integrated into the mortgage lending process. In conclusion, chapter five presents the
findings of the interview analysis and makes some suggestions as to how credit
scoring might be operationalised in order to improve the benefits being achieved.
Chapter six introduces the case study phase of the research which followed the
interview programme. The case study commenced formally in May 1999. The case
study was undertaken in order to gather application data, which allowed the
development of a mortgage scorecard. Chapter six describes the case study
organisation and the mortgage process of that lender. This chapter then goes on to
describe the data gathering and analysis, which facilitated the development of a
bespoke mortgage scorecard. In conclusion chapter six presents the performance of
the various scoring models that were developed.
Chapter seven of this thesis describes the final empirical work undertaken in order to
answer the research questions that had developed. This chapter reports the findings
of a benchmarking survey, which was undertaken in December 1999. The
benchmarking survey sought to determine whether business measures would confirm
if those lenders who use credit scoring do exhibit improved levels of performance.
In conclusion, chapter seven summarises the key findings of the benchmarking study,
and presents some suggestions for process improvements, which might assist lenders
to improve performance.
In conclusion, chapter eight summarises the findings of all the work undertaken in
support of this thesis, and makes some suggestions for future areas of research,
which might build on this work.
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1.5.1. Summary
The outline of the research presented confirms a multi-method approach being
adopted in order to answer the research questions. These questions which will be
developed during this thesis are outlined below.
□ To what extent and how is credit scoring being used by mortgage lenders?
□ Why is credit scoring introduced into the mortgage loan environment?
□ Once adopted, how do lenders utilise scoring?
□ How successful is credit scoring at delivering the desired benefits to lenders?
□ How must scoring be used if maximum benefit is to be gained?
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Chapter Two
2. A Review of the Literature
2.1. Introduction
In order to examine the subject area of this thesis, a diverse range of literature is
reviewed. The literature reviewed is presented in two individual sections for clarity.
Within the first section credit scoring is introduced. The development of scoring, the
variety of techniques used, a comparison of techniques and a critique of scoring all
seek to provide a rounded view of the research literature to date. Additionally the
literature which examines the perceived benefits of scoring, and the means by which
a lender might use credit scoring to "add value" to the lending process is presented.
Significantly less literature is presented in this area, as little research has been
undertaken on "operationalising" scoring prior to this thesis.
In the second section the mortgage market and product are introduced. The
importance of the mortgage market, and the unique features of mortgages that require
mortgage scoring be considered as a "stand alone" subject area are presented. A
review of perceptions regarding the "drivers" of mortgage default is also examined.
Much of the literature in this field is derived from US experience and from research
relating to options pricing. This literature, provides useful material, not only when
considering what determines whether borrowers default, but also whether borrower
behaviour in relation to a mortgage loan differs from behaviour in relation to an
alternative consumer loan product. Finally, an examination of the incidence and
impact of mortgage default are outlined in order to express the importance of
mortgage default, not only from the perspective of the lender, but also to show that
social and economic links need to be considered.
In conclusion the author summarises the key points relative to this thesis, and
presents the "gaps" in the literature which this work seeks to address.
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2.2. Credit Scoring: Overview
"The problem ofdetermining credit risk has been with the businessman since he first
consummated a business transaction without receiving immediate payment for his
goods or services" (Myers & Forgy, 1963). Despite this observation having been
made almost forty years ago, the problem is as acute today as ever. This is due in
part to the new remote delivery channels, which distance the loan officer from his
applicant. Lenders still struggle to find the most efficient and accurate method of
measuring and managing credit risk. It requires to be a method that is legal,
economically viable, timely, and perceived by customers and intermediaries as being
"fair". One method, which has gained favour and appears to meet all criteria is
credit scoring. Even such luminaries as the Church of Scotland (1988) suggest that
"every lender should be encouraged to establish and operate a workable credit-
scoring system". Credit scoring is a term applied to a variety of statistical techniques
which are used to predict aggregate borrower behaviour. In the case of this thesis
the behaviour which requires to be predicted relates to loan outcomes. Credit scoring
determines the likelihood of an applicant for credit defaulting during the fixed term
of the loan being granted. Credit scoring is used at two levels, application scoring
and behavioural scoring.
Application scoring is used to make an assessment as to whether to grant credit to an
applicant for whom you have no previous record of account performance.
Application scoring does not include information regarding the credit behaviour of
the applicant, except that information provided by credit bureau (secondary data).
Such scorecards may be used in one of two circumstances. The applicant may be a
non-customer of the organisation to whom the application has been made.
Alternatively the applicant may be an existing customer of a lending organisation
that does not gather data on account performance in a manner which enables such
data to be used formally in making new lending decisions.
Behavioural scoring is also used to make decisions about granting or extending credit
facilities. In this circumstance the lender can augment his credit decisioning
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procedures with primary evidence of prior borrower account behaviour. The focus
of this thesis is on application scoring, applied to mortgage loans.
2.2.1. Lending Decision-Making pre. Credit Scoring
Prior to credit scoring being developed with a view to predicting borrower behaviour,
all lending decisions had been made subjectively. Individual lenders used criteria
commonly referred to as the 4 C's of credit, and somewhat ambiguously as the ' four
horsemen of credit" by Churchill, Nevin and Watson (1977). This required that
individual loan officers make a subjective analysis of the applicant's character,
collateral, capacity to repay, and economic conditions at the time the loan was
granted. Whilst such analyses were perceived by lenders to work well, a level of
local knowledge was required by the loan officer in making his decision. This
necessary intervention of the loan officer was recognised by Churchill et al who
suggested changing the 4 C's by dropping "conditions" and instead using the
"common sense" of the loan officer as the fourth C. During this time, developments
in the banking sector meant that fewer small local banks existed, and thus local
knowledge diminished. Additionally increasing competitiveness drove banks to seek
economies of scale. One side effect of seeking cost savings, was a "de-skilling" of
banking personnel by some banks during the 1970's. This resulted in the relatively
specialised loan officers being retained centrally within the organisation, rather than
being at each individual branch where the customer interface occurred. These
changes helped to promote the application of credit scoring technologies in the retail
lending environment. It should be highlighted that the application of scoring
technologies was not adopted by all lenders, or for all products on offer. This is
particularly true of mortgage loans, as will be evidenced later within this thesis.
However, at a macro level, it is clear that since the 1970's credit scoring has been
increasingly applied to consumer credit, both loans and credit cards. This change in
the consumer loan market has seen a move from judgmental to empirical decision
making over the past thirty years. This thesis considers why credit scoring
technologies which allow lenders to reach empirically based lending decisions, have
not been readily adopted for mortgage loans to the exclusion of judgmental
evaluation methods.
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2.2.2. The Development of Scoring
For a review of the development of credit assessment through time, Wahl (1997),
presents a study commencing in the period 2250 BC. However, to retain a focus on
credit scoring, the relevant literature relates to the past sixty years. The first scoring
systems were application scoring systems. The earliest published study reports a
system developed by Durand (1941), for the US National Bureau of Economic
Research. Following Durand's study, scoring was then quite swiftly adopted by
mail order companies throughout the US.
Many of the early papers consider scoring applied to consumer loans only.
Application in a new area is considered by Orgler (1970), who uses the term
"heuristic process" to describe credit evaluation. He then presents one of the early
applications of credit scoring to existing commercial loan decisioning. As early as
1970 Orgler cites the " lack of standard review systems and time pressure on bank
regulatory agencies" as reasons why scoring models are "necessary". It should be
noted that the method in his 1970 paper is substantially critiqued. Haslem and
Longbrake (1972), charged that the method by which the dependent variable was
determined was fundamentally flawed. Developing his work, Orgler (1971) moves
from application scoring to behavioural scoring, this time applying techniques to
consumer loans. Orgler develops models which can be useful when applied to the
portfolios of more than a single lender, thus presenting early variants on today's
generic scoring models offered by a variety of commercial scorecard developers.
One of the earliest papers to apply scoring techniques to residential mortgages is
presented by Rakes (1973). Again confirming the need to provide "scientific
assistance to the usual heuristic process", Rakes cites a concern for "better credit
evaluation in the mortgage loan industry". This is particularly interesting in view
of more recent governmental concerns regarding the potential requirement for
regulation in the UK mortgage market. The model presented does not examine
default per se, but instead examines late payment, and, like models presented later
within this thesis uses regression techniques. Interestingly, variables examined
include some which would currently cause some consternation. Rakes reports that
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where the husband is older than the wife, the repayment habits are worse than
households where the wife is older than the husband. In today's environment a
lender found to be using such criteria would be likely to receive some fairly negative
publicity, regardless of the predictive ability of the variable. The model did
however confirm that "more attention to fewer but more discriminating financial
relationships will result in a better allocation of a credit analysts efforts". This
refers to some "double counting" which was evidenced when judgmental decisioning
was used, concerning variables which are strongly correlated. This finding is
reflected within the work conducted later in this thesis relating to overriding scoring
systems, and will be discussed later within this thesis.
In an early review of the role of scoring in the lending organisation Churchill et al
(1977) summarise the advantages which scoring offers the firm:
1. Gains in management control
2. Benefits in training new personnel
3. Reduction in processing costs
4. More legally defensible system
5. Increased input into the firm's management information system
All of the foregoing remain relevant in today's lending environment, and, with the
exception of items two and four above, were cited during the empirical research
which underpins this thesis as being "drivers" for introducing mortgage scoring in
the 1990's.
2.2.3. A Comparison of Techniques
A variety of papers combine observations on development, with a comparison of the
performance of alternative techniques. Myers and Forgy (1963), provide an
excellent overview of the process involved in developing a credit scorecard. They
conclude that the early development techniques using "weights of evidence" were as
effective as the application of techniques such as regression and discriminant
analysis. Broadening the field further Bierman and Hausman (1970) examine trade
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credit. They consider not only a "good" or "bad" outcome, but also profit,
probability of collecting sums owed, and revision of these probabilities over the loan
term in the decision making process. This leads them to develop new and more
dynamic models in an effort to establish an "optimal credit granting policyThis
prompts consideration of some of the issues that continue to consume lenders, such
as the potential conflict of goals between loan officer and the organisation. Such
issues continue to impact on the adoption of credit scoring by organisations today.
A further review presents the limitations of discriminant analysis. Eisenbeis (1977),
suggests that the technique requires large samples if it is to present unbiased results.
Scoring's popularisation continued with applications in the specialist field of
agricultural finance where Chhikara (1989) reflects on the limitations of scoring
when applied solely to minimise default. Reviewing a variety of alternative scoring
techniques, he concludes that serious deficiencies in existing models arose from this
single focus, and that profitability considerations required to be addressed. Chhikara
also alluded to the fact that the credit decision cannot be viewed in isolation without
taking account of the interaction between the outcome of a single decision and the
impact on the remainder of the portfolio. The narrow focus of scoring on
distinguishing those who will repay from those who will default, also receives
criticism from Boyes, Hoffman and Low (1989). The authors provide an early
model which addresses profitability, using estimates of likelihood of default. This
paper also presents a view of an optimum model, accounting for "time to default"
which would improve the lenders ability to measure expected earnings over the life
of the loan. This type of model is now being considered, examples of such are
presented by Banasik, Crook and Thomas (1997) and Thomas and Stepanova (1999),
in applying survival analysis methods to personal loan data.
Work such as that by Crook, Hamilton and Thomas (1992) also addressed some of
the concerns raised by authors such as Chhikara, in developing models which
examined not whether an applicant would default, but how badly they default. By
considering the extent of the default, so the authors began to consider issues relating
to credit performance, and hence profitability. The focus on profitability continued
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as Brennan (1993) confirms that "credit scoring systems have evolved into
helping lenders predict profitability". Whilst evidence presented within this thesis
does not support this statement as reflecting current practice in the domain of
mortgage loans, it is certainly a statement of desire for most lenders.
A more holistic review of techniques is considered within the survey produced by
Rosenberg and Gleit in 1994. This comprehensive paper, considered discriminant
analysis, decision trees, expert systems, dynamic programming, linear programming
and Markov chains in a variety of applications. In presenting the review the authors
also highlighted the many applications of credit scoring techniques in the 1990's,
confirming that usage had gone beyond the initial decision as to whether to extend
credit or not. New applications include, increasing or decreasing credit available to
existing customers. Beyond the traditional credit role, scoring had also been utilised
by marketing departments to aid customer targeting, and by arrears departments to
develop arrears management strategies which reflected the risk profile of applicants.
However, in concluding Rosenberg and Gleit confirm that the accept/reject credit
decision is the most "mature branch of quantitative methods", with new applications
remaining "much more ofan art".
A further study comparing predictive performance, considers discriminant analysis,
neutral networks, genetic algorithms and decision trees. The focus is on predicting
slow payment rather than default. In this paper Yobas, Crook and Ross (1997),
apply all four techniques to the same dataset. Their findings, which found linear
discriminant analysis to perform well, were not entirely in concert with findings from
alternative studies. No single technique has been found to consistently outperform
others across a broad range of applications.
Hand and Henley (1997) present a further review of the variety of statistical
classification methods. In presenting their conclusions the authors confirm that due
to the complexity of credit decisioning, the range of data used, the various objectives
and desired outcomes of the lender "there is no overall best method". However, the
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very real benefits of scoring in the areas of "classification accuracy, speed of
classification, and revision of lending policy" are reinforced.
Thomas (1998), presents an overview of the variety of methodologies available for
classifying applicants for credit. The title of this work "The Art and the Objective",
alludes to the fact that scoring is not an exact science. Judgements require to be
made throughout the process, and these judgements may alter depending on the
objectives of the scorecard developer and user. Whilst highlighting the similarity of
outcomes from various techniques "all wolves are grey in the dark", Thomas
suggests that even small differences in result are worthy of pursuit. This is because
of the very high volume of credit being managed by lenders, which makes every
percentile point of improvement financially valuable. In considering the future of
scoring, Thomas again confirms the desirability of profitability scoring rather than
risk scoring.
2.2.4. Performance of Empirical V's Judgmental Systems
Despite the existence of a considerable volume of literature reviewing the
development of scoring and considering the performance of techniques relative to
each other, little literature exists which compares empirical decisioning with
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traditional judgmental decisioning. One such paper by Chandler and Coffman
(1979), summarises the findings of several small experiments in which the outcome
confirmed that the "empirical models outperformed their judgmental counterparts on
the average". In addition to the marginally better decisioning performance, they
confirm the additional benefits relating to improved information and surety of legal
compliance. They also highlight an issue that is relevant at a later stage in this thesis,
confirming that individuals exhibit better payment behaviour in respect of their
mortgage loan, than their other obligations. A further comparison, this time in the
domain of commercial lending, is presented by Skrinivasan and Kim (1982). In
reviewing the performance of the statistical models against experts, they find that the
statistical classifications provide slightly superior classification results. However,
they suggest that this is due to the complexity of the data chosen for analysis, and
suggest that the statistical model be used to complement rather than replace the
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expert. Regrettably within the existing literature no data was uncovered which
compared empirical and judgmental decisioning systems applied to mortgage loans.
This gap in the literature is therefore addressed later within this thesis.
2.2.5. Credit Scoring - The Techniques Operationalised.
The focus of much of the foregoing literature is on the discovery of new applications
for statistical techniques. The role of the "end user" in adopting and adapting the
various techniques, is all but ignored in the early literature. This is one area that this
thesis has sought to address. Regardless of the predictive ability of the individual
scorecards, unless they are utilised efficiently the benefits anticipated will not be
delivered. Statisticians and mathematicians are to be applauded for the work put in
to developing predictive models. However a "gap" exists, which requires to be
addressed. In order to address this gap which exists, qualitative research which
considers the operating environment must combine with quantitative research on
loan outcomes, to offer those who apply credit scoring techniques the means by
which to utilise them effectively.
An early paper by Reichart, Cho and Wagner (1983) highlights the need for credit
managers to fully understand "r/ze limitations of the decision tools". Echoing others,
Reichart et al suggest that the real benefit of scoring may not be derived from
predictive capabilities but from the "highly consistent, objective and efficient manner
in which such predictions are made". Overstreet (1986), elaborates the control
advantages of empirical systems in the lending environment. Providing what is
described as a "benchmark" for management to test the rationality of the credit
process, Overstreet provides an insight into the credit process within the lending
organisation. This leads him to confirm that regardless of the method of reaching
lending decisions, "only through strong managerial control systems, is the goal of
consistent, defendable credit-granting achieved".
As the application of scoring became more commonplace in the financial services
environment, a small amount of literature began to consider the "softer" operational
aspects of moving from judgmental to empirical decisioning techniques. A paper by
17
Leonard (1996), taking this perspective, recommends "measures which describe the
scoring impact on the rest of the organisationA combination of measures
presented provides ten means by which the lender can "measure" the benefits
delivered by scoring. Leonard considers the strategic objectives of introducing
scoring to be the start point for those who use scoring. This important point is not
addressed in the statistical literature. The minimising of bad accounts is "assumed"
to be the key objective. This assumption ignores the profitability and relationships,
which underlie each transaction. Within the 1996 article, Leonard addresses the
issue of information sharing in the credit industry, stating that "benchmarking must
be introduced" if the credit industry is to adopt the principles of TQM. In chapter
seven of this thesis the results of a benchmarking initiative developed during the
course of this research will be presented.
Considering the development of scoring, specifically for small business loans,
Mester (1997), states that competition amongst lenders would increase, and suggests
that credit scoring provides an information advantage to lenders. By collating large
volumes of non-geographically specific data about credit risk, lenders can evaluate
loan proposals without necessarily "maintaining extensive branch networks". Again
this is a particularly salient point in UK banking in the millennium as lenders seek to
close unprofitable branches.
It is not until 1998 that the way credit scoring is actually used within the organisation
is addressed in the literature. Sangha (1998) confirms that "banks can maximise the
benefits of using a scorecard by establishing clear scorecard policies and
procedures, and by developing adequate management information systems support to
monitor scorecard usage". Sangha goes on to address the issue of overriding the
decision of the empirical system. This is the first point in the literature where a
conflict becomes clear. In adopting the premise that prediction of outcomes based
on statistical information provides better aggregate lending decisions, the lender then
must compromise this premise by overriding the statistical imperative. Within this
article Sangha specifically states, "a well specified and monitored override strategy
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can provide benefits beyond the statistical predictive ability of the scorecard\ This
assertion and the rationale which underpins it, are addressed later within this thesis.
2.2.6. Credit Scoring - The Operating Environment
In considering how credit scoring requires to be operationalised in order to add
value, it is necessary to understand the environment in which lenders operate.
Gardner, Howcroft and Williams (1999) present a comprehensive review outlining
the developments which combine to create the current operating environment. The
authors echo many of the issues found to be important by the empirical work
underpinning this thesis. Confirming that the "influence of technology is
ubiquitous", they also highlight that technology is increasingly used as a strategic
driver. Going further, they confirm technology to be a "major cause of change".
This confirms that the development of mortgage credit scoring is likely to have far
reaching consequences beyond credit risk management. The traditional importance
placed on lending skills is also confirmed, as is the need to improve cost efficiency
ratios. Identifying the issues which are gaining in importance, the paper reflects
findings of the interviews which will be discussed in detail within Chapter five of
this thesis. In particular the move towards securitisation is confirmed. The paper
also explicitly cites the influence of credit scoring on developments in retail banking.
The nature of financial service organisations is highly complex, this fact is
confirmed by the foregoing literature, and is also evidenced later within this thesis.
The complex nature of such organisations is reflected in the variety of issues which
require to be considered when taking the decision as to whether or not to adopt
scoring. The decision as to whether or not to adopt new technology in financial
services is a theme found within literature in a variety of different fields. Issues
surrounding the incorporation of new products into the banking environment are
directly addressed in the existing marketing literature. When using such literature it
must be remembered that credit scoring is not itself a product, but a technological
application. However using scoring can alter the features of the underlying product,
in this case the mortgage loan.
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The literature which addresses issues on introducing new products which have
technological aspects, highlights many issues relevant to this thesis. Howells and
Hine (1991), examine the adoption of EFTPOS technologies. The authors confirm
that the decision to adopt is influenced by a variety of issues. In the case of
EFTPOS the strategic nature of the decision is highlighted. Competition, delivery
channels, costs, business relationships and the uncertainty attached to new
technologies were all found to be influential, and without exception these issues are
reflected within this research as being important considerations when considering
introducing scoring. A more recent study in a similar field outlines the
development issues relating to Mondex. Howcroft and Hamilton (1999), interview
lenders to ascertain their perceptions about this new technology based product.
Highlighting the fact that cost considerations often outweigh service considerations,
this paper reflects the fact that both cost dimensions, and service dimensions are
important, and this viewpoint is confirmed within their study. Within this thesis
business benefits are categorised as being risk related, process related or cost related.
Using these definitions process might be considered as a proxy for service
dimensions, as the improved processes can result in improved customer service.
What is interesting is that these studies confirm that a new application of technology
has far reaching implications.
The operating environment comprises several different types of lender. Banks,
building societies and "other" specialised lenders. As will be shown later within this
thesis, the numeric majority are building societies. Whilst addressing the
competitive nature of the sector, Ashton (2000), sets some of the traditional
difference between banks and buildings societies in context. He also confirms that
at the current time, the mortgage market provides similar competitive challenges to
both.
What becomes clear is that the literature relevant to credit scoring is multi
disciplinary in nature. In addition to the more technical literature focusing on
improving scoring outcomes, literature considering new technology implementation,
banking strategy, and customer service issues complement each other in providing an
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understanding of the operating environment. This literature review provides
confirmation of the key issues in the financial services operating environment. These
will be addressed in greater detail within the empirical aspects of the research
presented in subsequent chapters.
2.2.7. Credit Scoring - A Critique
The literature which seeks to determine new applications for statistical techniques,
which can offer considerable improvement in risk management is to be commended.
Literature considering the wider implications of combining statistics with "best
practice" in lending, allows the debate surrounding the application of statistics to
business problems to be accessed by a wide variety of organisations. However, at a
fundamental level, criticism is levelled at the notion that it is rational to be empirical.
The seminal critique of scoring was produced by Capon (1982). The critique rests
on several aspects of scoring. The first concern expressed is that "any individual
characteristic that can (legally) be scored has potential for inclusion in the scoring
system". The concern with the inclusion of any variable, is the lack of explanatory
relationship between the variable and the outcome (default/not default). This
concern is not diminished for Capon following a Senate hearing relating to scoring.
During the hearing, the then Chairman of Fair Isaac, a leading scorecard developer,
confirmed that at that time, Fair Isaac felt that they should be allowed to use
variables such as race, gender, age, ethnic origin and marital status in scorecard
development. Obviously concerns arose as to the potential for scoring to
discriminate against minorities in the community. Such discrimination on the basis
of race, gender, age, and ethnic origin are now prohibited under the terms of the
Equal Credit Opportunities Act in the US. Legislation in the UK which seeks to
prevent discrimination, includes the Race Relations Act, the Equal Opportunities
Act, and the Consumer Credit Act.
Capon then presents a scoring table of a major retailer and critiques scoring on
several other points. Firstly he notes that there are no economic variables such as
income, debts, expenses etc. As will be evidenced later within this thesis these
variables have a role to play, and thus the criticism on this point is valid. Capon also
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criticises the lack of variables relating to credit history, again an important omission
from the scorecard under review. He also criticises the scorecard as the relationship
between length of time in employment and address, and improved credit
performance are not presented as being linear. This criticism is invalid, as will be
proven later, these relationships are not necessarily linear. The scorecard being
critiqued also contains coding attached to employment which is considered no more
valuable for some occupations than the status unemployed. The work of this thesis
shows that the employment variable does provide considerable predictive capability.
The development data used on the scorecard being critiqued may or may not have
confirmed this trend. Capon critiques the fact that evidence of previous borrowing
results in borrowers being penalised. This would not necessarily be true of every
scorecard. Capon also found that failure by the applicant to answer questions within
the credit application, offered the applicant more points than provision of certain
answers. This author would suggest that scorecard development based on datasets
with significant volumes of missing answers would compromise the predictive
ability of the card. The critique goes on to examine a second system, and again
picks up many points about the performance of various variables.
When considered relative to the work undertaken in support of this thesis, much of
Capon's critique based on the variables included is proven to be unfounded. Many
of the relationships which he finds irrational, are in fact found to exist. An example
is income. Capon criticises that the points awarded for income do not increase
monotonically rather they "fluctuate wildly". The experience of this author is that
whilst the relationship does not "fluctuate wildly", nor is it strictly monotonic.
However, a second aspect of the critique remains a problem for lenders in the present
day. That is the bias inherent in the scoring system. This is because the
development of the system is based on those applications approved and on whom the
developer has performance data. This provides a one sided view. The scorecard is
developed on those who were expected to be good, and are then either good or bad.
However, a whole body of relevant data is not available. That is, data on those
declined credit, on whom it is not possible to confirm whether or not the decline
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decision was the correct one. This problem, inferring the behaviour of the rejects or
"reject inference" is tackled using a variety of statistical techniques (Kelly, 1998).
However, regardless of the technique adopted, the true behaviour of rejects had they
been accepted is never known with certainty. The only way around this problem is
for lenders to "open up" the lending book, lending to every applicant for a period.
This enables them to establish empirically how those they "would/should" have
rejected actually performed. The downside of such an approach would be the
increased credit risk, and levels of loss, from having a non-selective approach to all
applicants.
Other problems of scoring presented by Capon include multi collinearity between
variables, sample sizes used in development and judgmental aggregation of data by
developers. Many of these problems can be overcome by having knowledgeable
developers using adequate samples, and conducting thorough coarse classification of
data without "cutting corners".
The final methodological concern is also valid, and is again addressed within the
findings of this thesis. Capon considers that the "use of the overriding procedure is a
statement that the system is not doing the job it was designed to do, (and that) it is a
discriminatory procedure against those who are less vociferous following credit
denial". As will be discussed later, a scientific approach to overriding augmented
by rigorous appeal procedures can go a long way towards overcoming this concern.
Despite the fact that Capon's critique "stands alone" against a wealth of data in
support of scoring, many of the points he made were valid at the time of writing.
However, as more empirical work on the development and performance of scoring
models has become available, and as procedures around credit scoring have become
more "transparent", so many of his fears have been assuaged. This is not to suggest
that credit scoring has been adopted by all lenders and receives wholesale support
from borrowers. A wealth of negative publicity about seemingly "senseless" credit
scoring decisions is presented in the press. However, much of the negative
comment stems not from the inefficiency of the credit scoring model, rather from a
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misunderstanding of the abilities and limitations of the mechanism, and a failure by
lenders to have in place credit policies which reflect these.
2.3. Overview Mortgages - The Market and Product
This thesis seeks to determine whether credit scoring is a suitable means by which to
evaluate mortgage loan proposals. In order to address this issue it is necessary to
have some understanding of the dynamics of the UK mortgage market. Therefore an
outline of the UK market is now presented. It is acknowledged that to fully
investigate the dynamics of the mortgage market would require a separate thesis.
However, this outline is presented in order to contextualise some of the issues. This
is followed by a consideration of the mortgage product itself, in order that the unique
nature of the product relative to other forms of consumer credit is clarified.
2.3.1. The UK Mortgage Market in the 1990's
In order to fully understand the dynamics underlying the market it is necessary to
consider the influence of Government policy on the home ownership profile of the
UK population. Two opposing political factions have dominated the UK political
stage. The Labour and Conservative parties have influenced home ownership, based
on two opposing ideological premises. Traditionally the Labour party supported the
provision of housing via the public sector. Their financial policies supported this
premise, and funding was directed to local authorities for the provision of housing.
However, in complete contrast, the Conservative Party supported the ideal of the
individual as the home owner. As early as 1955 the Conservative Party was fighting
elections under the banner of the "property owning democracy". The policy shift
by the Labour party, from a commitment supporting state provision of housing,
towards support for the individual owner, has been well documented by many
authors including Birchall (1992), Doling (1993), Balchin, (1995). This shift may
in part have been prompted by a populist policy shift which reflected Balchin's
(1995) findings for the Thatcher government, that next to food, humankind's most
important material need was housing. Since the mid 1970's, when the Labour
party's endorsement of home ownership outweighed it's support for Council
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provision of housing, the party in government has supported home ownership with a
variety of initiatives.
Booth and Crook (1986) summarised earlier strategies employed by successive UK
Governments to encourage a property owning democracy. These initiatives
included, right to buy, shared ownership, mortgage guarantees, sale of land, and sales
under licence. These public strategies were supported by fiscal interventions to
ensure that the property owning democracy became a reality. Initiatives such as
guaranteed loans (1954-57), loans to Building Societies (1959-62), option mortgages
for low income buyers (1968), tax relief on mortgage interest rates (1971 -2000),
were all intended to make home ownership more accessible, and thus more attractive.
The initiatives outlined are not intended to summarise every government activity
which influenced the desire of UK residents to own their own homes. Rather they
are presented to highlight the persuasive campaign conducted over the past fifty
years, which in part influenced individuals to aspire to own their own homes. It is
within the context of the desirability of home ownership that we must view the
literature relating to mortgage default, and it's rationality or otherwise.
2.3.2. Mortgages and Default Risk
A substantial body of default literature is presented which examines the propensity of
a borrower to default on his mortgage loan. Much of the literature is based on US
experience. It is worthy of note that the US mortgage market differs from that of the
UK in one key respect. Within the US, a very active secondary market in mortgage
backed bonds exists. In support of this three Government backed agencies are
chartered by an Act of Congress. These are, the Government National Mortgage
Association (Ginnie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Ginnie Mae is
a fully fledged government agency which exists to provide liquidity in the market by
swapping securities for loans, providing a guarantee for an annual fee of 6 basis
points (OECD 1995). Freddie Mac a quasi governmental agency is described as "a
secondary mortgage market conduit, whose vision it is to provide low-cost, reliable
mortgage credit to home buyers'' (MacDonald & Makuch 1995). Fannie Mae's role
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is described as "providing financial products and services that increase the
availability and affordability of housing for low-, moderate-, and middle income
Americans", (Homer 1994). No equivalent to this role currently exists within the
UK, although a secondary market is beginning to emerge. Within the last few years
lenders have begun to see the potential advantage of securitising their mortgage
portfolio's in this way, and gaining access to low cost finance via such a mechanism.
The difference in markets is highlighted within this review, as it cannot be assumed
that UK experience on default will reflect US experience. The ability to securitise
the debt, and the expectation that the debt will be securitised may impact on the risk
behaviour of US lenders and borrowers.
2.3.3. Mortgage Features
Another aspect that justifies considering mortgage scoring independently is the
unique nature of the product. Whilst credit scoring has been used in the credit
decisioning of personal loans and credit cards for several decades, it remains a
relatively youthful pursuit in mortgage lending. Given the potential advantages of
scoring, it may be that the unique nature of the product has impacted on the rate of
development in this area. A mortgage loan is typically the largest financial purchase
any individual makes. The importance of the purchase is particularly relevant if we
consider the aspirational nature of the purchase. As discussed previously this may in
part result from government intervention, which created the desire within individuals
to be part of the "property owning democracy". That the mortgage loan, is
significantly different from other consumer loan products, is confirmed within the
literature by Brennan (1993). He confirms that three key features, which differentiate
the mortgage loan from other consumer loans, exist. These are summarised as
collateral, term and amount and are now considered;
□ Collateral - the mortgage loan is secured in favour of the lender. The property
underlying the loan forms the security. The risk is therefore mitigated by the
security to some extent. Making a mortgage loan decision is therefore
considerably more complex than making a decision on an unsecured loan. The
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value of the underlying security may vary, both upward and downward.
Therefore the financial risk is mitigated to an extent by the property value, but
the property value changes. As will be evidenced within the empirical work,
which supports this thesis, characteristics of the property do influence propensity
to default. This adds a new group of variables, which the loan officer must
consider when making his lending decision. This increases the complexity of the
decision, from solely a consideration of applicant stability and ability to repay, to
include property characteristics.
□ Term - A mortgage loan is typically for a period of twenty five years. This
extended term, makes prediction of outcomes more complex. A consumer loan is
normally for one or two years. Thus, when decisioning consumer loans, the
prediction of future behaviour only requires to be correct over a 24 month time
span. Predicting up to twenty five years ahead is more difficult. In reality the
planning window is more typically seven years. This is the typical term used by
lenders to calculate profitability profiles on mortgage loans. Lenders confirmed
that they anticipate that a high proportion of mortgages will migrate at around
this time. Migration might mean replacing one mortgage with a new mortgage at
the same lender, or moving to an alternative mortgage provider. Additionally,
the type of "life style" events which are related to mortgage default, are often
impossible to predict in advance. Again increased complexity. And finally the
term, when combined with the importance of the underlying property value
means that economic cycles may require to be considered. Certainly the level of
interest rates has been found to be influential on propensity to default. Thus the
mortgage decision now comprises stability, affordability, property and product
characteristics.
□ Amount - the value of the mortgage loan is normally significantly greater than
other types of consumer loan. Thus the risk of loss, which can result from each
incidence of default is potentially greater. This requires very accurate prediction
of outcomes if risk is to be managed and maintained at acceptable levels. As
indicated earlier the amount of the loan is secured against the collateral.
However, the fluctuating value of the collateral, and the ability to realise it,
mitigates the reduction in risk achieved via the existence of the collateral.
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In summary Brennan observes "mortgage lending is not a milieu that has lent itself
to automated review and approvalThe validity of this statement will be tested
within this thesis. In addition to the unique nature of the product which Brennan
addresses, it is also worth examining the product at a profitability level. Whilst
work contained within this thesis did not uncover product profitability profiles, it was
found that the mortgage product often contains an "enticement" or a requirement, to
participate in a "bundle" of associated products. Thus the profitability of the
mortgage sale, may be derived from the profitability of the mortgage and/or from the
profitability of associated products such as buildings insurance, home insurance,
payment protection insurance, endowment policies and mortgage indemnity
guarantee.
A final differentiator of the mortgage, not discussed by Brennan, is the existence of
Mortgage Indemnity Guarantee (MIG) policies, which protect the lender in case of
mortgage default. MIG's were a compulsory element of mortgage purchase by
borrowers where the loan to value ratio was above a certain level which varied by
lender. This was typically between sixty and eighty percent. During 1998/9 these
were mainly phased out by the lenders, as being an "up front" cost to the borrower.
Interview evidence confirms that these are still required by lenders, and the cost is
being borne by borrowers but more discreetly placed. Again the MIG provides
another facet to an already complex product as far as risk assessment is concerned.
2.3.4. Predictors of Default
A wide variety of studies have sought to examine those variables, which are most
closely related to default. Attention is drawn to the fact that the studies are often
looking at very specific products, and that the definition of default varies from lender
to lender. However, the breadth of literature was useful in identifying a start point
from which to commence an examination of default on an UK mortgage portfolio.
Von Furstenberg's (1969), study examined mortgages which were insured via a
government scheme. As such they differ from a "typical" UK portfolio in that they
were "'financed on more liberal terms". Acknowledging limitations within the data
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used, loan to value ratio (LTV), age of the mortgage, term of the mortgage,
mortgagor income, and mortgagor age were found to account for most of the
difference in default rates. In particular the emphasis on the "stake" or equity in the
home (indicated by LTV), is suggested as "being the true cause of a high rate of
default". LTV is presented as the principal variable explaining high default rates. At
a policy level, Von Furstenberg suggested that a small grant to home owners to
reduce the LTV and give them a "stake" in the property would be more efficient and
more socially desirable than insuring mortgages with high LTV ratios. This, an
interesting observation when considering the role of such insurance, which in the UK
would be the mortgage indemnity guarantee premiums (MIG). MIG's relationship
with default is considered later within this thesis.
A considerable amount of literature is devoted to considering the risk of alternative
types of mortgage instruments, particularly between fixed and variable rate products.
Vandell, (1978) examined the impact on default risk that resulted from the product
interest structure and supported Von Furstenberg in the conclusion that "equity
accumulation appears to he the dominant factor in determining risk of default".
Providing additional insight on the performance of mortgages with low initial costs, a
type of product that is often used in the UK market to attract borrowers, Vandell
asserts that "lowering the initial payment level to attract additional households to the
home ownership market is not unambiguously desirable". This finding is reflected in
the performance of discounted mortgages examined later within this thesis.
Developing the range of variables considered, Campbell and Dietrich (1983)
consider broader externalities and include economic variables such as local
unemployment, and mean housing prices. Their empirical study considers two
propositions. One that default is determined by the current "equity shield", (which
may be significantly different from initial LTV), and the other that default is
determined by the ratio of mortgage payment to disposable income. The findings
confirm the relationship between default and the economic variables, particularly
unemployment. Building on this and earlier work, Vandell and Thibodeau (1985)
conduct further analysis which includes economic variables with financial, borrower,
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loan and housing market data. Results presented confirm the importance of LTV in
predicting default, but also include some new non-loan related variables as being
statistically significant. Neighbourhood quality (subjectively rated) was introduced
for the first time, and proved significant. Additional new insight is derived via the
notion that the subjective manner of loan appraisal is relevant, when attempting to
build empirical models to predict default. Vandell and Thibodeau suggest that some
of the relationships evidenced were likely to result from "stricter appraisal
standards" applied to certain groups of variables.
The influence of economic issues on mortgage default is confirmed by Cooperstein,
Redburn and Meyers (1991). The authors suggest that modelling default during
turbulent financial cycles presents new challenges and requires new techniques.
Again confirming the importance of the equity shield, they also conclude that interest
rate levels have a strong influence on default. However, the potential relationship
that may exist between interest rates and property values is not fully addressed within
the paper, and this leaves unanswered the question as to whether both variables
should be included in a single model.
Gau (1978), considers the risk rating of mortgages in the secondary market. Whilst
consideration of this particular product is not directly relevant to this thesis, his
approach is useful in that he examines sixty four variables which might impact on
default. Using these variables Gau creates a taxonomic model for predicting
mortgage default. Additionally, in categorising the determinants of default risk as
Financial, Property, and Borrower, he presents a model for work presented later
within the thesis, in which the mortgage variables are grouped categorically in this
manner.
The presentation and discussion of two key theories of default are a recurring theme
within the literature. The equity theory suggests that a rational comparison of the
financial costs and returns of continuing the mortgage obligation drive the default
decision. The ability-to-pay theory maintains that mortgagors do not default as long
as they can meet their repayments. The theories are formalised by Jackson and
30
Kaserman in 1980, who conclude that "the equity theory dominatesThe
implications of this confirm the importance of economic factors in the mortgage
market. At a credit decision level this suggests that trends in housing prices, may
be a valid inclusion. However, it also suggests the importance of the role of the
LTV ratio when quantifying default risk, which will be tested later in this thesis.
Webb (1982) confirms the element of choice attached to the default decision, and
also re-introduces the influence of the nature of the product on the behaviour of the
individual. "Faced with a reduction of income a borrower may choose not to pay
some other obligation rather than become delinquent on his mortgage loan". Such
a statement reinforces the complexity of managing credit risk, where the nature of
the product influences the behaviour of the individual. However, the nuances of
individual behaviour and actions are often ignored within the literature, particularly
by those authors such as Kua, Keenan and Kim (1994), who see default as being "the
cost-minimising response to adverse changes within an uncertain economic
environment". The notion of borrowers "exercising options" with regard to default
is based on economic principles. However, the economic principles may require to
be augmented by a consideration of the "emotional" aspects of the default decision
by any lender actively managing default.
The issue of borrowers electing to default as a "choice", receives further attention
from Ambrose, Buttimer and Capone (1997) who conclude that there are several
"benefits" to borrowers who chose to default. In suggesting that default is undertaken
in order to eliminate negative equity, the paper does not reflect UK experience where
negative equity remains the borrower's responsibility and the debt is not in fact
"eliminated" until it is fully repaid. A further "benefit" of default is considered to be
living rent free during the default period. The paper considers the policy
implications for lenders if we attribute "default" a value, suggesting that lenders can
minimise these "benefits" to borrowers by the use of default penalties.
Providing a useful synthesis of the evidence on mortgage default, Vandell (1995),
suggests that more work requires to be undertaken. In particular Vandell brings the
importance of trigger events such as divorce into the debate. Additionally the role
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and influence of the lender on the default decision are highlighted as requiring study.
This more holistic approach to examining default had been offered in part by Waller
(1988). His "clarifying analysis" examined the final decision to default once
delinquency had been established. Separating the events (delinquency and default)
might seem to be an unusual approach, since intuitively they appear to be inherently
linked. Conducting an empirical analysis, Waller found, not surprisingly, that the
equity shield is the key determinant as to whether borrowers sell their homes to avoid
default rather than defaulting. What is interesting within the study is that no
borrower characteristics taken from the initial application were significant factors on
the final default decision (as opposed to the delinquency decision). If this were
found to be the case in repeated studies, a mortgage scorecard that predicted
delinquency, such as that presented later within this thesis, might potentially be more
useful than one attempting to predict default if as Waller suggests the default data is
unrelated to the application data.
Viewing mortgage default from a completely different perspective, Doling, Karn and
Stafford (1985), consider the impact of the "desirability" of owner-occupation. In
doing so they provide the first UK evidence regarding mortgage default. Showing
concern about the rising level of mortgage default in the UK, the authors highlight
some important issues. Firstly, the presentation of evidence on default in the UK is
often via figures for property possession by lenders. This can be highly misleading
as many borrowers in difficulty may resolve the problem via other means. Thus
focus on possessions presents only the "tip of the iceberg" regarding mortgage
default. A consideration of the outcomes of default show the options of the
individual to include, moving "down market", and returning to the rental sector.
Doling et al suggest a "scale ofmortgage repayment difficulties which go far beyond
the traditional view of the financial well being of the owner-occupier". The second
issue presented is the likely future trends in the UK market, suggesting that "quite
high rates of default are here to stay". Whilst the paper is written more in relation
to government policy than lender policy it is interesting to note that the concerns are
more socio economic than solely economic. Considering the role of the lender
Spicker (1996), again presents social concerns. Discussing relationship breakdown
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and the impact on the home owner he asserts, "the current arrangements are a mess.
Lenders need to exercise a flexible approach". He goes on to say that more
information is needed in the public domain about lending policies and practices.
There is little evidence of default as a "rational response" within this perspective.
The more socio economic focus is also evident in a comprehensive review of home
ownership in the UK undertaken by Ford (1998). Confirming that "home ownership
remains the preferred tenure of the majority of households Ford identifies several
important issues resulting from the alteration of labour patterns. Commenting that
"difficulties in paying for housing are common", potential consequences for lenders
are cited as "mortgage arrears and continuing possessions". Recommendations
include "consideration of private insurance for mortgage payment protection to
provide a comprehensive safety net", and "more flexible models that offer the
potential to assist mortgage borrowers who experience difficulty to sustain home
ownership
2.3.5. Incidence and Impact of Mortgage Default
As evidenced in the preceding section, much of the literature on default is strongly
focused on the lender's ability to predict default rates. This exercise is conducted in
order to manage default rates at levels, which maximise portfolio profitability. It is
worth noting that the term "default" is not a generic one, it has a variety of meanings
when used by different lenders at different stages of "lateness of payment". An
account may be designated as "in arrears" when one or two payments are missed and
then "in default" when three payments are missed. Alternatively an account may
remain "in order", until a certain percentage of the whole sum outstanding is "late",
at which point it may be transferred straight in to the category "default". For the
lender, these categorisations allow risk profiling and ultimately financial
provisioning. For the borrower, these categories reflect the seriousness of their
financial situation, and the likely actions being taken by the lender to manage the
arrears situation. Thus as terms are used interchangeably and inconsistently, it is
difficult to establish what "typical" levels of default and arrears are across the UK.
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One useful measure of UK default within the literature is provided by the Council of
Mortgage Lenders, who provide statistics based on arrears as a percent of all loans by
volume as well as by value. Figures provided show that in 1993, 5.03% of all
mortgages (by volume) were in arrears. This figure declines each year until 1998
when the arrears level stood at 2.15% CML (1998). Very little is produced within
the literature which provides absolute confirmation of these facts, however arrears of
5% to 6% are presented as being a mid 1980's position by Doling (1990), and this
ties in with falling rates since then. Within the same article Doling provides
evidence of US default levels at 5.4% in the 1980's, which mirror UK levels. These
facts are supported by evidence provided by the Mortgage Bankers Association of
America (MBA). The MBA present themselves as being the pre-eminent association
of the US real estate industry. Total default rates for all US loans confirms the
general statistical trends. The total US default range is from a 1979 level of 4.77%, to
a 1995 high of 6.07%, and a subsequent decline to a 1999 level of 4.13%.
Whilst it is outwith the scope of this study to provide a European analysis, Doling
(1990), also confirmed a considerable variance in arrears experience between the UK
and US levels when compared to Finland. The implication of this work is that due
to traditional institutional and community relationships maintained by banks in
Finland, their actions result in arrears levels of less than one percent. Whilst this
data was gathered at interview, rather than via published statistics, it highlights the
potential for altering perceptions as to how best to manage default. Whilst data on
national arrears levels is not readily available, a study by Potter and Drevermann
(1988), conducted within the German Republic highlighted the volatility of mortgage
default levels. In the Federal Republic possession increased by 102% between 1980
and 1985. No overall level of arrears is presented which allow a comparison with
UK, Finnish or US data. Flowever, in conclusion the authors recommend measures,
which remain valid in the UK market today. They highlight the need for preventative
measures such as mortgage insurance, simplified mortgage payment schemes and the
need for correct cost calculations at the outset. They additionally suggest several
remedial measures such as improved debt counselling, abolition of penalty clauses,
and the appointment of a receiver as a mediator who has no financial interest. Whilst
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the UK equivalent is unlikely to be a receiver in the official sense, a non financially
involved mediator might be a useful addition to the default management process.
The existence of such literature provides an illustration of the scope of the topics
relevant to this thesis. Additionally the extent of cohesion amongst many of the
issues discussed, suggests that a European wide study into mortgage default would
be of value to participants in the mortgage market.
The causes, trends and concerns about mortgage default are framed within concerns
about government policies to encourage home ownership, fiscal changes in support
of home ownership, availability of funds, relative interest rates, housing prices and
levels of unemployment. The importance of mortgage default is shown by its far-
reaching impact. Not only are the lender and borrower affected, but the government
and society are also affected by the requirement to provide alternative
accommodation for those rendered homeless by mortgage repayment difficulty.
The ultimate consequence of mortgage default is possession by the lender of the
property. Possession is the point at which the lender takes legal redress in order to
take over the security which was underlying the loan. At this point the property
ownership is transferred from mortgagee to mortgagor, in full or partial repayment of
the debt burden of the loan. The CML also produce data on number of possessions,
which ranged from a 1982 level of 6,860 properties or 0.11% of all loans by volume,
to a 1991 high of 75,540 (0.77%) properties. In line with default this figure
continues to decline to a 1997 level of 32,770 properties which represented 0.31% of
all loans held by lenders. In 1998 the downward trend appeared to cease with
possessions quoted in the financial press as being up by 9.5% on the equivalent
period of the previous year, Adams(1998), amounting to an increase of one percent.
However, as the economy is seen to "heat up" so evidence is presented in the
financial press that "analysts note some evidence of deteriorating credit quality ...
and an uptick in short term mortgage arrears" Brown Humes (1999).
The statistics presented relative to possessions hide an underlying volume of
mortgage failure. Mortgage possession statistics, provide evidence of those
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properties whose ownership has been transferred as a result of a lender induced court
appeal. However many borrowers "voluntarily" sell their homes, or "give up"
possession in favour of the lender. Thus the statistical gap between those 5 - 6%
who are in arrears and the 0.31% who eventually lose their homes via possession
orders, comprises those who have restored their financial position, and those who
have selected to extricate themselves from the property and the loan transaction prior
to possession. Worthy of note is that borrowers who extricate themselves from
their property, may not realise enough capital from the sale of the property to repay
the mortgage loan in full. Additionally a group of borrowers exist who remain in
properties, which have a current value lower than that required to repay the loan were
the properties to be sold. This "negative equity" situation is encompassed within the
literature relating to the rationality of the default decision, and additionally receives
much press attention
Commenting on trends in possession Ford (1998), highlights that changing
possession levels may result from factors beyond the economic, such as stricter
arrears management to fend of shareholder criticism. This highlights that statistics
presented in relation to arrears and possessions, present something of a "black box"
to the observer. Much needs to be known about the credit and arrears policies which
underpin the statistics, as well as the broader economic environment if statistics are
to provide meaningful insight into the state of the UK mortgage market.
2.4. Issues Influencing the Adoption and Application of Scoring
The organisational aspects of scoring considered within the credit scoring literature
were reviewed in section 2.2.5. The literature presented in this area is less extensive
than the more technical literature which comprises the majority of scoring literature.
It is therefore necessary to examine a range of literature outwith the traditional
domain of scoring which examines the problems organisations face, when seeking to
adopt new processes and technologies.
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Doling and Ford (1991), allude to the complexity of the mortgage market place.
Highlighting trends in the building society movement, they present a picture of
societies struggling to maintain their share of a highly competitive market. They
make a strong link between increased competition and impact on lending policies,
suggesting that "in order to find customers they have been forced to become less
conservative in their lending". Gardener, Howcroft and Williams (1999), provide an
update on the situation facing UK banking today. Providing evidence on the key
issues they present an industry where changes over the previous three decades have
indeed been something of a "revolution". Within the mortgage loan market, these
changes have had considerable influence. The advantage gained via new
technologies is evident. New players are entering the market often utilising new
distribution channels. Such organisations have an advantage over the "traditional"
lenders in that they can maintain lower cost bases. Anecdotal evidence from such
lenders confirms that they maintain cost income ratios of between 20 - 30%. This
compares with cost income ratios of traditional lenders which have fallen towards
45% within the past ten years from a previous level often around sixty percent.
Empirical evidence within this thesis will consider this issue in more detail. The
lower cost base allows competitive pricing, and attracts borrowers to the new
lenders. Additionally new delivery channels for mortgage loans utilise new
technologies (credit scoring), and can offer a decision in principle in nine minutes,
again comparing very favourably with the traditional lender where the decision can
take from forty five minutes to several days. Thus as will be evidenced, credit
scoring can offer risk, process and potentially cost benefits to lenders. This thesis
examines why credit scoring has not at this time been adopted as the exclusive means
by which to make mortgage decisions.
In considering the non-adoption it is necessary to acknowledge the traditionally
conservative nature of bank management in the UK. As evidenced in the credit
scoring literature, lending skills relative to the 4 C's of credit were a valuable
resource. Staff who held lending "mandates" were senior in authority to those
without, and higher lending authorities rose almost monotonically with staff grading.
Thus when credit scoring was first introduced there was considerable resistance from
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management who were aware that the introduction of such a system would result in a
"de-skilling" of the workforce. This de-skilling in terms of specific retail lending
expertise, is presented by Gardener et al as "re-skilling," emphasising the changing
nature of skills required.
We therefore see organisations with a long tradition of judgmental lending, being
forced by external influences to compare themselves with organisations that are
achieving the benefits and advantages offered by empirical lending. A change such
as this can bring changes that are dealt with as being evolutionary in nature within
some of the more traditional lending environments. However, that the benefits of
scoring support something of a revolution amongst the new lenders is not surprising.
What is evident is that as credit scoring usage becomes more commonplace, a greater
understanding of the purpose and ability of the scorecard allows it to be implemented
and used more effectively. No longer solely used for "ranking risk", credit scoring is
becoming a means by which lenders can gain risk, process and cost benefits across
their loan portfolio.
2.5. Conclusion
A wealth of literature exists which examines credit scoring as a decision making tool.
The range of techniques that lend themselves to the problems to be solved, and the
many issues that face those developing credit scoring models are well documented
and are mainly in the public domain. However, no evidence was uncovered that
compared the performance of an empirical decision making tool for mortgages to
that of the judgmental decision maker.
□ This thesis provides such a comparison. This is intended to contribute to the
existing literature which compares the performance of decision making tools, but
which does not currently consider mortgage loans.
Additionally, little information was uncovered that presents empirical evidence of the
incidence of credit scoring usage in the UK market place. As it is unclear how
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widespread the practice is, or the results achieved by such organisations a clear gap
was identified within the literature.
□ This thesis presents empirical evidence of levels of scoring usage. This data is
augmented by the evidence from a benchmarking study. It is intended that this
new data provide a useful contribution to the literature in the field.
Additionally, should a lending organisation wish to consider adopting empirical
decisioning technologies little informative literature exists which addresses the
operational aspects which require to be considered. The means by which the
organisation should operationalise credit scoring in order to reap cost, risk and
process benefits are not broadly discussed within the academic literature.
□ An aim of this thesis is to address these issues, and to open up the debate as to
whether and how mortgage credit scoring should be adopted to meet
organisational needs.
Finally much of the literature which relates to mortgage default is based mainly on
US experience. Very little published data exists which determines the applicant
characteristics which are most closely related to the propensity to default in the UK
market.
□ This thesis presents an UK empirical study which provides this information, thus
contributing to the UK literature within the field.
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Chapter Three
3. Methodology and Research Design
3.1. Introduction
This chapter will set the research within the context of the methodological approach
taken. In doing so it will consider the two traditionally opposing research paradigms.
The overall research design utilised will then be outlined. In each subsequent section
each of the research methods used will be presented, justified and where appropriate
critiqued. In presenting firstly the research methodology, and then the research
methods it is intended to avoid the confusion that can occur when the terms are used
erroneously in an interchangeable fashion.
3.1.1. Shamelessly Eclectic (i)
The research methodology adopted, is one which "purists" in either the traditional
positivistic paradigm, based on a natural scientific forms of enquiry, or interpretative
researchers from a purely social scientific background might traditionally have
challenged. In setting the research within a synthesised epistemology, this author
intends to gain the benefits offered by both the traditionally opposed paradigms. In
considering the epistemological dichotomy often presented to researchers, this author
will provide evidence that an alternative proposition grounded in a more eclectic
approach can offer the best opportunity for understanding and resolving complex
research problems.
3.1.2. Considering the Paradigms
The first paradigm under consideration is positivism. Positivism is a product of
natural scientific enquiry. Natural science can be described as "research firmly
based upon one or more past scientific achievements, that some scientific community
acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation of it's practice", (Kuhn, 1970).
The basic tenet of such work is the emphasis on research designs and experiments
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that were repeatable, recreating identical results in a variety of conditions that would
then be recognised as "truths". This led to a view that science was universal and
objective. However, it is worthy of note that positivism itself is not a generic term.
Twelve varieties of positivism were presented by Halfpenny (1982), and whilst these
were subsequently reduced to three by Outhwaite (1987), the scope and nature of
positivistic forms of enquiry are extensive.
Rather than viewing a positivistic approach to be rigid to the point of detracting from
the research, this author finds value in a positivistic approach. The benefit of
positivism in allowing comparisons of outcomes from repeatable experiments allows
new techniques and applications to be validated against some pre-determined
measures. Confirmation that structure in scientific study is a desirable and fluid
force rather than restrictive, is provided by Frankfort-Nachmias (1996), "scientific
methodology is first and foremost self-correcting". This suggests that despite the
presentation of natural scientific enquiry as being framed within "rigid" structures,
the variety of applications evidenced over time ensure that positivism continues to
evolve to meet the needs of the researcher.
A natural scientific approach to enquiry was selected for part of the research study
which this thesis reports. In order to consider one aspect of the benefits of credit
scoring, i.e. risk benefits, it was necessary to create an empirical model with the
ability to predict outcomes. Having created a model, it was then necessary to
examine how the outcomes of an empirical approach to decision making compared to
outcomes obtained when judgmental evaluation was undertaken. Thus empirical
observations as to the behaviour of data allowed scientific statements to be made
regarding the empirical outcomes. Unless a positivistic form of enquiry had been
followed, the empirical data could not have been examined with necessary rigour.
However, despite the empirical evaluation of outcomes, even this aspect of the
research enquiry was not solely positivistic. The nature of the data under
examination was such that legislation prevented a purely positivistic approach being
taken. Thus some data with strong correlations which were empirically worthy of
inclusion were in fact excluded. This compromise of the empirical imperative is
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necessary if study in this field is to be conducted within the legislative requirements
which prevail. However, legislation is not the only reason why a positivistic
approach was considered to be inadequate as the sole means by which to address the
research problem. Within industry, credit scoring models of the type created within
this thesis are commonly created, utilised and systematically compromised by
overriding. This compromise of the empirical imperative is one of the reasons why
a positivistic discourse is an insufficient means by which to conduct this research. A
requirement to understand not only what the empirical models can offer, but how
they must be utilised if benefits are to be achieved is the purpose of the research. To
gain this understanding requires that the alternative paradigm be included in the
research.
The alternative research paradigm often presented as being diametrically opposed to
positivism is the interpretative alternative. The benefit of Verstehen (interpretative
understanding), is illustrated by Abel (1948) who explains that "the sense of
relevance is the result of personal experience; the connection has been established
by me, so I am certain of it's possibility". Interpretation considers the role of
"human actors" in social scientific enquiry. Human action and expression are
subject to interpretation. Thus a body of research exists which suggests that whilst
positivism allows us to quantify what occurs, the only facility it offers to the
researcher is observation of events. Whilst conducting such experiments allows us
to become aware of what happens in a given circumstance, we do not become
enlightened as to the reasons (causation) which underpin our observations.
Within the context of this thesis, it was necessary to examine and provide evidence
which not only recorded observable key changes and issues in mortgage credit
decisioning, but also to provide a deeper understanding of the underlying reasons
underpinning them. In order to understand the reasons why certain phenomena
were found, it was necessary to invite those most closely involved to give their own
views on certain industry events and trends. These views were often subjective in
nature, and resulted from the interpretation an individual had placed on events.
However, to deny the validity of the "lived experiences" of participants and
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practitioners in the field would have limited the value of the research. That is not to
suggest that experience and understanding of events endow knowledge with greater
significance. However, to preclude such qualitative data from the research study
would have provided a much more limited study of events. Thus an approach
combining the potential benefits of both paradigms was adopted.
3,1.3. Shamelessly Eclectic (ii)
That scientific study should be grounded in that which we know to be true, is clearly
desirable. However, to frame research entirely in a single paradigm is not always
desirable. Combining quantitative and qualitative research has won the support of
several authors. Highlighting the complexity of the issues, Bryman (1984),
considers the means by which certain research techniques have become associated
with particular epistemological positions. He suggests that much of the debate
which purports to discuss combining methodologies, mistakenly focuses on technical
rather than epistemological issues. Examining both traditions, Bryman confirms the
role of qualitative research methodologies in conducting research, as undertaken
within this thesis. Bryman suggests that undertaking qualitative research in this way
sends the researcher on a "voyage of discovery, rather than one of verification". In
considering quantitative methodologies he highlights the use of the survey document
in research. Viewing the survey as a "positivist tool", he makes the important link to
the attached epistemological assumption that the survey allows an element of
objectivity, replicability and causality to be established. Identifying a "blurring of
the lines between the two styles", Bryman remains cautious about the true possibility
of reconciling the two stances at a methodological level due to the "fundamentally
different views about the nature ofsocial science".
Rossman and Wilson (1985), confirm the development of a polemic between the
perspectives of qualitative and quantitative researchers. Reporting on developments
over the previous thirty years, they focus on methods rather than the philosophical
premise of the researcher. They argue that combining methods allows the researcher
to improve the accuracy of his conclusions. They suggest that methods can be
combined for purposes of corroboration, elaboration and initiation, and they provide
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examples of each of these. Confirming that by combining "numbers and words" we
can "produce richer and more insightful analyses of complex phenomena than can be
achieved by either one alone".
Providing an outline of the two traditions of positivism and phenomonology,
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Low (1991), confirm the clear dichotomy which exists
between the constructs. However they confirm that "the reality of research involves
a lot of compromise between these two positions", suggesting that many researchers
"adopt the pragmatic view by deliberately combining methods". Whilst pragmatism
is sometimes necessary in order to progress research, it must not be used as an
excuse to ignore the underlying methodological issues in favour of debate about
methods.
It is in 1994 that Rossman and Wilson revisited the debate about combining
"numbers and words". Whilst they focus on methods rather than methodology they
provide evidence of the value of combining methods drawn from US research. In
confirming their support of mixed methods, they cite Lortie (1982) who called for
researchers to be "shamelessly eclectic" in combining concepts from various
disciplines. They conclude that the research community requires to be "shamelessly
eclectic" in our use of methods if we are to "understand the intractable and
persistent problems of today".
Acknowledging the debate, and considering issues of methodology in accounting
research, Laughlin (1995) presents an historical overview of the development of such
seemingly opposing themes. Summarising the work of the great philosophical
thinkers, Laughlin suggests that there is a place for what he refers to as "middle
range thinking" where the accounting tradition of empirical research is augmented by
more descriptive research.
In several fields of research, it is acknowledged that whilst at a methodological level
there remain two distinct paradigms, support is growing for allowing more flexibility
for the researcher who moves between paradigms in order to meet the demands of
the research. This approach coined as being "eclectic" is perhaps better described
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as being a synthesis of methodologies, putting together a variety of individual
elements to make up a complex whole.
3.2. Research Design
Continuing the theme presented in support of the synthesised methodological stance,
the research design presented uses multi method research. Each method utilised will
be considered independently in subsequent sections of this chapter. However, it is
initially worthwhile to put the combination of methods used within a context. The
research comprised elements that were highly exploratory. In particular the attempt
to understand how credit scoring was operationalised within the organisation is an
area that has not previously been addressed. A major concern at the commencement
of the research was that raw data would not become available. Thus at an early
stage it became clear that more than one method might be required in order to
conduct an investigation with necessary rigour. This early understanding was
supported by the view that mixed methods research offers the benefit of triangulation
of results. The concept of triangulation is based on the assumption that "any bias
inherent in particular data sources, investigator, and method would be neutralised
when used in conjunction with other data sources, investigators and methods" (Jick,
1979). The further benefits of triangulation are summarised within Creswell (1994),
as offering:
□ benefits, of overlapping different facets of the phenomena
□ development, allowing the first method to help to inform the second method
□ initiation, when contradictions and fresh perspectives emerge
□ expansion, where mixed methods add scope and breadth to the study
Within this research design each phase of the research is conducted using the most
appropriate method. These methods differ, but by using multiple methods it is
intended that bias be avoided, that the results will be enriched, and that some of the
benefits of triangulation be achieved.
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The initial phase of this research was exploratory. No information was available
which confirmed the method of decisioning used by mortgage lenders. The first
requirement of the research was that a broad overview of the current situation in the
market place be established. This required that a high volume of data be gathered
from a research population, which was geographically dispersed. In combination
with the dispersion, some resource constraints existed. Considering the exploratory
nature of enquiry required, and taking into account the limitations which existed, it
was decided that the postal survey method was the most appropriate means by which
to gather data.
The initial survey provided data at the exploratory stage of the research. This
primary data provided a unique view of the position of credit scoring within UK
mortgage lending.
However, following analysis of the initial survey, several interesting features arose
within the data gathered that required further explanation in order that a deeper level
of understanding is achieved. For this exercise it was decided that a follow-up
survey so close in timing to the initial survey would not be well received.
Additionally it was clear that the complexity of these new issues did not lend
themselves to survey analysis. It was therefore determined that a representative sub¬
set of the population should be invited to take part in interviews. An interview
programme was therefore conducted, and the data gathered was analysed to further
enrich the research
The interviews conducted had provided a wealth of useful data. However, an
important research question still required to be addressed. This led to a further
research initiative, the undertaking of a case study. The case study allowed the
gathering of loan application and performance data from a lender who agreed to take
part in the case study. By using the case study approach it was possible to gain
valuable insight into the credit process in a mortgage lending environment. By
gathering application and performance data it was possible to compare the
performance of judgmental and empirical decisioning applied to mortgage loans.
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This phase of the research required that the development of a bespoke credit scoring
model be undertaken. The purpose of the model was to compare the performance of
empirical and judgmental loan decisioning applied to mortgage loans. This was
particularly desirable as no previous comparison was available in the public domain,
and because within the literature it had been suggested that mortgage loans did not
"lend themselves" to credit scoring.
The final phase of the research undertaken involved undertaking a benchmarking
study. Within the literature it was suggested that benchmarking must be introduced.
However, the study was also undertaken with a view to triangulating the results of
the earlier research. The study intended to identify whether those who use credit
scoring achieve levels of performance, which exceeds that of non-scorers. This study
was undertaken via a postal survey. This final survey provided some useful data,
which offers potential for the future development of the research.
Multi-method research such as this, enables the researcher to examine the research
problem from a variety of perspectives. Additional benefit results from the
substantial volume of primary data generated, which can support significant
advances being made to knowledge in the field of research. This thesis will present
the findings of the multi-method research design, and the contribution to knowledge
that resulted. The sections which follow within this chapter, consider each of the
research methods utilised.
3.3. Survey Method
Due to the exploratory nature of the initial stages of the research project, the survey
method was identified as the best means by which to gather data. The intention was
to gather data via a cross-sectional questionnaire based survey, the results of which
would allow inferences to be made. Due to the geographic dispersion of the
population being considered, a postal survey was deemed to be most appropriate.
The advantages of surveys, which include the economy of the method, and the quick
turn around in data collection are confirmed by many authors such as Fowler, (1984),
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and Babbie (1990). These benefits played a part in selecting the method, but were
augmented by other valid reasons. Limited resources meant that interviewing every
member of the research population was logistically impossible. Additionally it was
the intention of the initial survey to gather data which was both quantitative (data
about the organisation), and qualitative (providing reasons, circumstances and
background information). Requiring this range of data suggested that a survey
which allowed the respondents to gather and provide data "at their own pace", would
be better received. Additionally at this early stage of the research the likelihood of
gaining access to individuals within the organisation was considered to be low. Thus
it was decided to use the survey document and to ensure that it was managed in a
way which would maximise response rates.
3.3.1. The Survey Instrument
A single survey document was required which would facilitate data gathering from
two distinct groups within the population, those who had access to some form of
credit scoring and those who did not. It was decided to produce a sectional
document, with one common first section and then direct the respondent to the one
appropriate section which related to his scoring status. This resulted in the document
appearing to be rather larger at first sight than might be considered desirable.
However, this problem could not be avoided, and again it was hoped that techniques
to maximise response rates would help to overcome any reticence on the part of
potential respondents.
The questionnaire was designed to gather the raw data, which would produce an
overview of the status of credit scoring in the mortgage market. It would confirm
whether scoring was being used, for how long it had been used, and how scoring had
been introduced and developed within the individual organisations. Additionally
and equally importantly the questionnaire sought to determine how scoring was
being managed, and for what business purposes it was being utilised. Finally the
business benefits which were being sought, and achieved, were to be identified by
use of the questionnaire. It is acknowledged that this is a large task using a single
research tool. Respondent information requested from all respondents comprised
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10 questions. Those who did score were invited to answer a further 24 questions.
Non scorers were directed to a section comprising 6 questions. A full draft of the
questionnaire in its final format is provided in Appendix A.
Acknowledging the work of Berdie & Anderson (1974) who confirm that a "a well-
planned and carefully constructed questionnaire will increase the response rate",
and seeking a reliable questionnaire which "consistently conveys the same meaning"
it was deemed necessary to pre-test the questionnaire. Berdie and Anderson suggest
we aim for a "sensuous questionnaire", suggesting that the very appearance of the
questionnaire determine whether it is completed or not. With this in mind a high
quality document was sought. In accordance with the recommendations of Churchill,
Nevin and Watson, (1977), draft versions were pre-tested. Pre-testing involved two
groups. Five fellow academics were invited to participate, as were three industry
experts. This two-fold process of pre-testing was intended to meet the following
objectives. Firstly, the academics were asked to critique the questionnaire with
regard to presentation, ease of use and general clarity. The industry experts were
invited to critique the questionnaire at a second stage with a view to confirming not
only the appearance and ease of use to be appropriate, but also to confirm that
language and terminology used was common to those within the financial services
industry. The industry experts were also invited to examine the range of data being
requested in order to identify whether the data was commonly available in the format
requested. The academics were selected on the basis of proximity and research
experience. The industry experts were selected on the basis of their knowledge of
mortgage decisioning, their industry knowledge, and as having had previous working
relationships with the researcher.
Within the questionnaire, questions asked required a variety of answer formats.
Where limited options of response existed, the questions were closed. The format
presented for response was that of "ticking a box", to allow speed and ease of
completion. However in order to allow flexibility to the respondent, where any
doubt existed as to whether "other" responses may have been desirable, the category
"other" was included, and space left for additional information to be provided.
49
Several questions were intentionally presented as being open ended. Respondents
were provided with lots of space to explain various procedures via narrative
responses, using their own words. Tick boxes were considered and rejected for
these sections as they may have limited the variety of responses given, and thus
much of the richness of the data gathering exercise would have been lost.
3.3.2. The Survey Population
Selecting a survey population was assisted by the provision of a paper based database
by the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML). The CML was formed in 1989 to
provide a single representative voice for all mortgage lenders. CML members are
responsible for "98% of total residential mortgage lending", CML (1996). The
database comprised addresses and telephone numbers of the corporate headquarters
of one hundred and twenty five mortgage lenders. Of the 125 lenders identified
seven were not surveyed. This was because these organisations were identified as
being "nominal" head offices of overseas organisations and undertook no lending
within the UK. This left a population of 118. The population surveyed comprised
banks, building societies and specialised mortgage lenders. The basis of these
categories will receive more attention later within this thesis. However it is relevant
to consider the categories numerically in figure 3.1, as the numbers involved
influenced the decision to survey the whole population.






Banks 25 3 22
Building Societies 75 1 74
Specialised Lenders 25 3 22
Total 125 7 118
As evidenced above, banks and specialised lenders were numerically small groups
compared to building societies. Acknowledging that low response rates are common
50
in research surveys, it was decided that surveying the whole population was the best
means by which to obtain a representative and usable dataset. Given that the whole
population was relatively small numerically this posed no real problem.
3.3.3. The Survey Procedure
Managing the response rate upward was the objective of many elements of the actual
survey procedures now outlined. In accordance with acknowledged best practice in
research, and summarised by Hunter and Earp (1999), eighteen variables are
presented in figure 3.2, which potentially influence response rates, and these were
considered and managed.
figure 3.2: Managing Response Rates
Variable Action Taken
Advance warning Not undertaken
Explanation of selection Advised population selected were
members of CML
Sponsorship - make details overt Highlighted that the research was
sponsored by ESRC and University
Envelope - avoid junkmail look Professional look adopted by use of pre¬
printed named labels
Publicity - use local media None undertaken
Incentives - small or future Feedback report offered to participants as
incentive
Confidentiality - give assurance Assurance given
Reminders - after cut off Reminders used
Anonymity Not anonymous, required to identify
respondents
Appearance - professional, uncluttered Sought this, and believe this was
achieved
Length Confirmed as satisfactory at pre test
Topic - interest Presumed to be of interest as key area of
jobs of respondents
Return envelopes Stamped addressed return envelopes
provided
Inclusion of covering letter Included
Endorsement - from local figure None sought
Donations to charity Not considered
Type of questions- constraints that exist Used open ended questions wherever
appropriate
Location of receipt - home or work Work was considered appropriate
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Only four of the eighteen variables were not considered in depth. These were
endorsements, gifts to charity, publicity in the local media and pre-notification. Of
these, the first three were considered inappropriate for exploratory research
underpinning a thesis. The fourth, pre-notification was not undertaken for two
reasons. Firstly the cost of producing and mailing a pre-notification tool could not be
justified as there was little hard evidence that pre-notification would significantly
alter the response rate. Secondly, bearing in mind the volume of correspondence
individuals receive it was decided that notification of future correspondence might
serve to make recipients aggrieved about the forthcoming survey, rather than
encouraging them to anticipate it with relish. A further variable, anonymity, was
considered but not offered, as it was necessary to identify the responses as being
from specific lenders by type. Also, anticipating the progression of the research, it
was intended to develop and maintain relationships with those lenders interested in
the field of work. As a result, being able to contact them in future was considered to
be desirable.
Having determined the key features in maximising the response rate, it was decided
that a named individual should be identified within each organisation to be targeted
as the survey recipient. Each organisation was telephoned in order to identify the
individual who had responsibility for credit decisioning. This was a difficult task
due to the diverse range of individuals who might hold this responsibility. Relying
on researcher knowledge of the field, responsibilities were tracked to Chief
Executives and Company Secretaries in smaller building societies, and to a variety of
staff members within Mortgage or Credit Risk departments in larger lending
organisations. The raw database containing address information on the population
was amended to show name, designation and salutation using the new personalised
information. This new database was considered a valuable research resource and
facilitated the use of mail merge tools, easing the considerable administration
involved.
The completed survey document along with the covering letter (see Appendix B),
and prepaid return envelopes were mailed in July 1997. Non-respondents received a
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follow up telephone call during early August asking if they had received the survey
document and intended to complete it. This yielded some additional responses. At
the end of August all target respondents received a further communication. Those
who had responded received thanks and notification of the likely timing of feedback
(Appendix C), and those who had not responded received a final invitation to take
part in the research (Appendix D). This final letter prompted a further organisation
to call, and ask to be part of the survey, claiming not to have received the initial
communication. They received a copy of the survey document with a covering letter
(Appendix E). Full details of the response rates are provided within chapter 4 of this
thesis.
3.3.4. The Benchmarking Survey
Following the initial survey, semi-structured interviews and a case study were
conducted, and these will be discussed in the sections which follow. However,
within this survey section it is important to record that a second survey was
conducted. This took the form of a benchmarking survey, which was conducted in
December 1999. The population surveyed were the same as those surveyed in 1997,
and the reasons for conducting the survey will be elucidated within Chapter 7 of this
thesis. The process of developing the survey document followed procedurally on
the development of the initial survey, and it is not intended to cover each stage in
detail again. The best practice procedures were again followed in order to manage
the response rates upwards. However, the response rate was not as successful as that
received in the initial survey. This, and other issues relating to the benchmarking
survey will be covered in full depth within Chapter 7. The benchmarking survey
document is included as Appendix K.
3.4. The Interview Procedure
Following the completion of the initial survey and subsequent data analysis, several
issues remained unresolved. Some inconsistencies had become apparent within the
data, which suggested that further insight was required. For this reason it was
decided that interviews be conducted, to gather further data which would hopefully
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clarify and resolve the inconsistencies. This element of the research was qualitative
in nature, and this is confirmed by the research meeting the assumptions of Merriam
(1988):
□ the primary concerns were about processes
□ the main interest was in meaning, how people made sense of the phenomena
□ the researcher was the primary instrument of data collection
□ the research involved fieldwork, the researcher physically going to the institution
a the research was descriptive, the understanding gained through words
□ the research built abstractions and hypothesis from the data
3.4.1. The Interview Population
The interview population was determined via analysis of questionnaire respondents.
Three types of organisations were identified, banks, building societies and
specialised lenders. Within each category three distinct "status" existed relevant to
credit scoring. Those were, currently scoring, not scoring and developing scoring.
The respondent organisations were selected based on a grid represented in figure 3.3.
Due to the assurances of anonymity provided to respondents, numbers of
organisations rather than names, are provided indicating those who were interviewed.
figure 3.3: Interview Population
Bank Building Society Specialised
Lender
Does Score 4 2 1
Does Not Score 2 1 1
Developing 0 2 0
6 5 2
Following analysis of the data derived from the initial survey, it had become
apparent that the size of respondents (measured by volume of lending) varied greatly.
It therefore seemed appropriate to interview one large and one small lender in each
organisational type, and in each of the categories "scoring", "not scoring" and
"developing scoring". Where possible this procedure was followed. However, as can
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be seen in figure 3.3 this was not always possible for each category, as not all
categories could be filled. The category "developing" could not be filled for banks
or specialised lenders. Additional interviews were undertaking in the banks who are
using scoring category, as several of these lenders were very interested in the
research and volunteered their involvement.
Similarly not all categories had a large and small lender, and for these categories
only one interview was conducted. From the initial breakdown a target number of
eleven interviews had been identified. As it was intended that all interviews would
be conducted within a three week period, organisations were also chosen in order
that a sole researcher could feasibly carry out the interview programme. This
involved selecting organisations based firstly on the necessary categories identified
in figure 3.3 , and then considering geography as a sub category.
At each of the eleven organisations initially targeted, the staff member who had
completed the survey document was firstly invited to take part in the interview
process by letter (Appendix F), and then via follow-up telephone call. Of the eleven
targeted, ten agreed readily. One organisation declined on the basis that the
information was likely to be too sensitive to discuss. This decline let to another
lender, identified in the same category, being invited to participate, and they readily
agreed. Two bank lenders who had communicated their interest in the research also
volunteered for interview, and these offers were gratefully accepted. Therefore
thirteen semi-structured interviews were conducted mainly during July and August
1998. One lender was interviewed in October due to scheduling difficulties.
3.4.2. The Interview Instrument
Driven by the data gathered in the survey, an interview agenda was developed. The
development of the script was formed, based on the sometimes contradictory
findings of the initial survey. The agenda was augmented by some topical issues of
the day. This being the case the interview format was semi-structured. The agenda
was formalised and an interview outline was developed. This interview outline for
credit scorers is presented in Appendix G. This was then adapted for each category,
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to include non-scorers and developers. This script was not intended to be followed
"slavishly", rather it was used to ensure that each point was covered. The interview
was seeking to elicit a range of factual information about the participant organisation,
as well as to gain lender perceptions about the development and application of
scoring within individual organisations.
3.4.3. The Interview Procedure
At the commencement of each interview, the researcher requested permission to tape
record the interviews. This was granted on all but one occasion, however on a single
other occasion the tape failed to work. Thus two interviews were recorded via notes.
One set of notes recorded as the interview was being conducted, the other recorded
immediately upon leaving the interview and checking the tape. Taping and then
transcribing the interviews was the preferred method of gathering and analysing data
for the following reasons. Taping was selected over note taking to ensure accuracy,
and improve the "flow" of the interview. Taping also allows the researcher to
return to the raw data of the fieldwork on as many future occasions as may be
required. This was deemed to be important, as the research being undertaken was at
a very early stage. It was anticipated that as the research matured, the researcher
might wish to "revisit" the data and therefore maintaining it in a raw format could
prove to be useful in future.
3.4.4. Interview Analysis
Transcribing the interviews was selected as a necessary precursor to analysing the
data. The data was analysed manually using colour coding. Colour coding allows
the researcher to structure the analysis of the transcripts. The process of coding is
similar to using a computer package such as Ethnograph, and is suitable for relatively
small numbers of interviews. Each interview is reviewed, and themes within the text
are highlighted in a particular colour for which an index is kept. This process
ensures that the research outcomes are drawn objectively from the research data,
rather than subjectively from "impressions" gained by the researcher. This was
considered to be vital, as the researcher had previously been involved in credit
scoring within industry. This previous exposure to the issues could have led to some
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preconceptions being held, and these might have found their way into the research
analysis had a formal structure of analysis not existed. Following the completion of
the identification of themes, a summary of the interview outcomes (Appendix H) was
produced and forwarded to the participants involved in this phase of the research
along with a covering letter (Appendix I). This procedure was conducted in order to
maintain good relationships with participants, and to offer some benefit to those who
continued to be involved with the research.
The outcomes of the analysis of the interview research will be presented in full in
Chapter 5 of this thesis.
3.5. Case Study Method
Following analysis of the interview data it became clear that a further research
method required to be introduced to deal with the complexity of the research
problem. Within the credit literature, and following the early stages of the research it
was established that no evidence existed, which confirmed scoring's performance,
when applied to an UK mortgage loan portfolio. As the research progressed, and
relationships with lenders improved, informal discussions were progressed with a
view to obtaining loan application and performance data. These initial discussions
took place over a five month period between October 1998 and February 1999.
It became clear that the case study method might be the most appropriate means by
which to conduct the next phase of the research. The discussions surrounding
research method have frequently placed case studies at the top of a hierarchy of
approaches. This research hierarchy view is expressed by Piatt (1992), who suggests
that case studies be used at the exploratory phase, surveys at the descriptive phase
and only experiments can be used to provide explanatory enquiry. However this
analysis is hotly contested by Yin (1994), "this hierarchical view is incorrect". Yin
suggests that case studies may be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory. In
particular he suggests that case studies can usefully be used to answer how and why
questions, where the focus is on contemporary events. Within the context of this
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thesis, the case study was intended to fulfil two roles. Firstly it was intended as a
means by which to answer the questions as to how credit policies and decisions
operated in the lending environment, and why they were used in certain ways.
Secondly the case study was also chosen as affording the best means by which to
obtain empirical data. Due to the sensitive nature of the work being undertaken, both
within the individual organisation and in the broader market place, it was recognised
that a "partnership" with a single lender was the best means by which to obtain the
data. This would afford the researcher the best opportunity to obtain the data by
offering a very focussed research design to a single lender who would benefit from
obtaining the results of the research undertaken.
3.5.1. Designing the Case Study
The design of the case study required discussions with potential participants. The
selection of those with whom discussions were undertaken was a function of their
"non-scoring" status. What was intended was that a review of the application
processes and subsequent account performance would be undertaken in a non-
scoring organisation. This data would be combined with data gathered in other
phases of the research, allowing a comparison between lenders using empirical and
judgmental methods of credit evaluation.
According to Yin (1994), a single case study is appropriate where the researcher
wishes to test a proposition or theory. A single case study was also desirable due to
the requirement that the volume of data being generated remain manageable. Two
organisations were identified as being suitable as case study participants. Both were
invited to participate in discussions about the proposed research. A research outline
document, was produced and submitted to the lenders, providing an outline of the
research plan (Appendix J). This document was intended to meet the requirements
of a good case study design, whilst meeting the commercial expectations of the
lenders. The draft document was well received. However, it was agreed that the
scale of the proposal was over-ambitious. Finally the larger of the two interested
lenders was formally approached with a tailored research plan. After several
subsequent meetings the scope of the project was reduced. Following several more
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meetings and the formalisation of a confidentiality agreement, the data to be gathered
became available.
3.5.2. Data Gathering Procedure
Within the case study organisation data was gathered from several sources.
Documentation was provided to the researcher in the form of "staff manuals and
guides". This information provided evidence of the formal written procedures,
which were issued to staff involved in mortgage application and evaluation.
Members of staff (identified by the organisation) were then designated to assist the
researcher by providing evidence as to how the various systems and processes
operated. Unstructured interviews were held with a variety of staff members within
the organisation. This allowed the credit processes to be documented. Information
was also obtained from staff on an "ad-hoc" basis, as the researcher required specific
information relating to specific cases. The remainder of the data gathered within the
case study organisation was drawn from paper based files. The source of this data
and sampling methods will be discussed in full later within this thesis.
However, relative to the procedure involved, a data-gathering instrument was
required. A specific instrument was favoured over notes in order to ensure that all
the data required would be accurately and systematically recorded. The data-
gathering instrument was created empirically, and an outline of this process will be
provided in Chapter 6. Having prepared the data gathering tool, it was then
necessary for the researcher to work at a variety of sites belonging to the case study
organisation in order to gather the data. The time required physically obtaining the
files, recording the data, and returning the files within a large warehouse had been
underestimated. Thus during the data gathering phase, a considerable amount of
time "slippage" occurred. However, gathering a large volume of application and
performance data on mortgage loans within the UK mortgage environment, allowed
the research to produce evidence about the suitability and performance of credit
scoring applied to mortgage loans. The data gathered has been retained and is
considered a valuable resource, which will support future research.
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3.6. Conclusion
A considerable amount of effort went in to creating a research design, which allowed
a new perspective to be introduced into credit scoring research. Whilst the synthesis
of methodologies may be challenged at a philosophical level, the research outcomes
are believed to justify the approach. The main body of work is based in the domain
of positivistic endeavour. However, the recognition of the importance of gathering
data from participants which allows them to "interpret" events, places aspects of the
research in the interpretative paradigm.
The mixed methods research also allowed a wealth of data to be gathered, viewing
complex problems from a variety of perspectives. It is intended to show within the
findings of the research, that the mixed methods approach offered a means by which
to triangulate the research findings. This triangulation provided considerable
richness to the study, which is believed to be reflected in the research outcomes.
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Chapter Four
4. Mortgage Credit Scoring - Survey Evidence
4.1. Introduction
This chapter presents an account of the findings of the initial postal survey, which
was undertaken in order to provide empirical evidence on credit scoring applied to
mortgage loans in the UK. Specifically, this chapter will provide evidence on the
extent to which credit scoring has been adopted, and the role of scoring within the
mortgage function of the organisation. Additionally the benefits anticipated by
organisations as a result of scoring being introduced, will be compared with the
benefits which are being achieved. In conclusion this chapter will summarise the
key findings of the initial survey, highlighting several issues which arose, and the
contradictions which became apparent. It is these issues and contradictions which
form the basis for the next phase of the research.
4.2. The Survey Population and Respondents
As outlined within the research methods chapter, the survey population is identified
as the members of the Council of Mortgage Lenders. One hundred and eighteen
organisations received a postal survey during July 1997. This was during a time of
significant change in the financial services market place. Several mutual societies
were in the process of converting their status to that of public limited companies.
Others had recently changed. In order to ensure consistency, it was determined that
organisations should be categorised by type according to the KPMG retail financial
sector database produced in July 1997. By adhering to the categories determined
by KPMG, a consistent view was taken as to status. Thus organisations in the
process of change retained their previous status, those who had converted or formally
merged adopted their new status.
Of the 118 companies who received the initial postal survey, ten responded in
writing confirming that they would not be completing the questionnaire. Of the ten,
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six indicated that they felt that the questionnaire was not relevant to their
circumstances. Three stated that it was not company policy to take part in surveys,
and one did not provide a reason. Of the remaining 108 companies, 64 responded by
completing and returning the questionnaire following the first letter inviting them to
do so (Appendix B). On receipt, the completed applications were formally
acknowledged with a letter thanking respondents, and confirming that they would
receive a copy of the findings in due course (Appendix C). In an effort to improve
the response rate a second letter (Appendix D) was sent to non-respondents in
August 1997. This resulted in contact being made by two further organisations,
which claimed not to have received the first letter and questionnaire. These
organisations requested a copy of the survey document, and did take part in the
survey. This produced an overall total of 66 usable responses from a population of
118, giving a response rate of 56%. In order to measure the success of the survey
relative to others, a comparison with similar surveys was sought. Whilst not a direct
comparison, a similar population is surveyed annually in the US via the Home Equity
and Loan study. This study, which in 1998 was in its twelfth year, is conducted by
the Centre for Financial Service Studies at the University of Virginia. Whilst the
survey tool is more extensive, this established study reported a 1998 response rate of
28%. Whilst only providing a single example in comparison, this helps to confirm
that the UK study received a "good" response rate. It is believed that the high
response rate generated within the UK survey results in part from the actions taken to
maximise response rate, which were presented within the research methods section
of this thesis. Additionally, the high response rate suggests a high level of
practitioner interest in the subject of mortgage credit scoring.
4.2.1. Respondent Bias
The profile of those who responded was examined in order to determine whether or
not it was a representative sample of the whole population. According to Donald
(1960), "the efforts taken to achieve small non response rates are of much greater
importance than the particular procedures used to make small adjustments for the
non response that does occur". The most common protection against non-response
bias is "attempting to increase the response rate", Uambert and Harrington (1990),
and this has been done. Despite the high response rate which was generated,
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consideration was given to the various methods of measuring for bias in the
respondent population. The preferred method would have been to conduct
independent t-tests on the non-respondents based on characteristics relevant to the
enquiry such as volume of mortgage business. This proved to be impossible, as data
was not available from the non-respondents which would facilitate such testing. An
alternative method was selected. This involved comparing the composition of the
respondent group with the non-respondent group based on the available
characteristics which are relevant to the study. The groups were compared, the
first analysis being that of organisational type. The results presented in figure 4.1,
show that the respondent population was largely representative of the overall
population, based on organisational type. Banks are slightly over represented to the
detriment of the building society group.













type as % of
population
type
Bank 22 18.64% 16 24.24% 72.72%
Building Soc. 74 72.71% 38 57.57% 51.35%
Other 22 18.64% 12 18.18% 54.54%
118 100.00% 66 100.00%
A further examination of the respondent population was conducted. This second
analysis sought to determine how influential the respondents were within the
population. This was done by examining the proportion of UK mortgage loans
granted by the respondents, as a proportion of all mortgage lending. Using statistics
for the period July 1997 to June 1998, CML (1998), it was determined that 1.39
million loans had been approved. Within the respondent population 1.15 million
loans had been approved, almost 83% of the total loans approved. Considering each
category individually, we see that the respondent bank figure represents over 79% of
all loans granted by banks. The building society figure for loans approved by
respondents, is considerably higher than that recorded in the statistics for the whole
building society population. This results from the fact that the CML building society
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figure does not include re-mortgage advances. The CML categories of bank and
"other" figures do include re-mortgage advances. With regard to the large variation
in the "other" category, it is worth noting that of the twelve respondent organisations,
two failed to provide data on lending volumes.








Building Society 258,000 325,849
Other 120,000 22,183
1,391,000 1,153,041
Taking into account the variations noted above, the respondent sample is considered
to be a representative sample of the financial services sector in the context of
mortgage lending. The population who responded conducts a very high proportion
of mortgage lending in the UK market. It is acknowledged that the representation is
less conclusive for "other specialised lenders" when considered by volume
4.3. Level of Usage ofMortgage Credit Scoring
In order to obtain a broad overview of mortgage credit scoring, lenders were asked to






□ in use (any capacity)
□ previously used - no longer used
64
4.3.1. Level of usage based on organisational status
A descriptive overview of usage based on organisational types is presented
graphically. The first chart in figure 4.3 depicts usage across all organisations. This
is followed by three individual charts based on individual organisation by type. The
results highlight that banks are by far the most advanced in levels of adoption of
credit scoring, followed by the smaller group of other lenders and then finally by
building societies. All respondents are included in these categorisations. The figures
presented therefore depict results from sixteen banks, thirty eight building societies
and twelve other lenders. This represents the total population of sixty six
respondents.





















The pie charts in figure 4.3 provide an overview of the situation, and reflect the
actual scoring status of lenders at the time of the initial survey. Within the
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questionnaire, lenders were also asked to assess whether they thought it "likely" that
they would use scoring in future. Forty five percent of those not formally
considering scoring at the time of the survey, agreed it was "likely", that they would
use scoring in future. This belief may have been influenced by increased business
imperatives requiring low cost base and improved service levels, which can make
scoring an attractive option. Overall there seemed to be a general view that scoring
was very much a tool which would be increasingly utilised in the mortgage market.
4.3.2. Levels of usage based on loan volumes
Having considered the levels of usage by organisational type, it is also pertinent to
consider the levels of usage by number of mortgages granted. This analysis
identifies the proportion of all mortgage loans that are processed via lenders who
have access to mortgage credit scoring. This is perhaps a better indicator of the
influence of credit scoring in the market place.











Figure 4.4, confirms the significance of mortgage scoring. Sixty two percent of all
mortgages granted have been processed by organisations that are using mortgage
scoring. If we project this to reflect volumes of loans from organisations who are
currently developing mortgage credit scoring we present a view more representative
of today which confirms that seventy four percent of loans by volume are being
processed by organisations using scoring technologies.
This substantial volume of mortgages that are being processed by organisations using
credit scoring makes it imperative that research is conducted which considers the
means by which effective utilisation of scoring technologies can be achieved. The
role and purpose of credit scoring as a method of credit assessment require to be
clearly understood. Additionally the equity of credit scoring as a means of credit
decisioning for mortgage loans, requires to be established and communicated to
participants and stakeholders in the mortgage market.
4.4. Maturity of Credit Scoring
In order to test the assertion within the literature that mortgage scoring was a less
developed genre than scoring of other consumer credit products, lenders were asked
to categorise their scoring status on a variety of products.





□ in use (any capacity)
□ previously used - no longer used
However, due to the small numbers in some categories, the analysis which follows
combines responses in the categories under development and in use as being one
single category. The category "not applicable", is intended to be used where the
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product is not offered by the lending organisation, and is therefore presented in the
figures which follow as "not offered". When reviewing results it should be noted
that eight lenders failed to provide data relative to both personal loan and credit card
scoring, and thus the responses presented total fifty eight in both of these categories.
4.4.1. Personal Loan Scoring




not offered 4 28 8 40
not used 1 4 5
under development/in use 9 4 13
14 36 8 58
As evidenced in figure 4.5 above, banks are the most prolific users of personal loan
scoring. The banks that provided the "not applicable" response comprise two
whom had recently converted from building society status, and two others. Ninety
percent of banks offering personal loans confirm that they use scoring, compared to
fifty percent of building societies and no others. When the length of time that
personal loan scoring has been in place is considered, all banks have been scoring for
six years or more. Building society usage is more recent with 25% of respondents
introducing loan scoring in the previous 2-5 year period, with the remainder having
scored for six years or more. When all organisations are considered as a single
group ninety two percent have used personal loan scoring for six years or more, with
the remainder using personal loan scoring for between two and five years.
4.4.2. Credit Card Scoring




not offered 6 32 8 46
not used 2 2
under development/in use 8 2 10
14 36 8 58
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All banks that offer credit cards use credit scoring. Fifty percent of building societies
which provide credit cards, are also using or developing scoring. The specialised
mortgage lenders are not in this market. Again the maturity of the banking sector in
scoring usage is evident, as eighty seven percent of users have been scoring for more
than six years with the remaining twelve percent experienced in card scoring for
between two and five years. Both building societies have been using or developing
scoring for less than one year. When viewed as a single user group, credit card
scoring has been used by seventy percent of lenders for six years or more, by ten
percent for between two and five years, and by the remainder for up to one year.
4.4.3. Mortgage Scoring




not used 3 24 6 33
being considered 1 6 1 8
under development/in use 12 8 5 25
16 38 12 66
Figure 4.7 presents the raw data used to create the graphic images in figure 4.3. As
mortgage lending is applicable to all respondents, the numbers of respondents has
increased to comprise the whole population. As a result the categorisation in figure
4.7 is slightly different. Increased volumes of respondents allowed those who are
currently "considering" using scoring to be shown as a separate category. Seventy
five percent of banks are currently developing or using scoring for mortgage loans.
This is a significantly higher proportion than the twenty one percent of building
societies, that are developing or using scoring. Of the other lenders forty one
percent are using or developing scoring systems. When the population are viewed
as a single group mortgage scoring is confirmed as being less well established than
other applications of scoring. Only fifteen percent of lenders have used mortgage
scoring for six years or more. The majority, (78%) have between two and five years
experience with the remainder exhibiting less than one years experience.
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4.4.4. Summary - Lender Experience of Mortgage Scoring
Viewing lender experience as a function of the length of time they have been using
credit scoring to offer decisions on a range of different lending products, mortgage
scoring is confirmed as being a less well developed genre than both personal loan
and credit card scoring. The relative immaturity of scoring as an organisational
tool for mortgage lenders confirms the need for research to be conducted at this time.
This relative immaturity also helps to explain the lack of literature specifically
addressing mortgage scoring issues.
4.5. Scoring as a Function of Size
As evidenced previously 1.15 million loans were granted by the sample during the
twelve month period preceding the survey. The next stage of analysis is intended to
identify whether there is a direct relationship between the decision taken to adopt
mortgage scoring technologies and volume of mortgage lending conducted.
Organisations were sub-classified into two groups for this analysis. Those who were
actively using or developing credit scoring, were classified as those who "do score",
and all others were categorised as "do not score".
Using a box plot in figure 4.8 to depict the distributions we can see that those lenders
in the category "do score" display a higher mean number of loans granted, than
those who do not use scoring. Additionally we can see that the spread amongst
scorers is considerably greater than amongst non-scorers. We also observe that
several outliers, indicated by the small black circles, are evident in both groups. The
outliers comprise those organisations which have loan values which are between 1.5
and 3 box-lengths from the edges of the box. Also observed are some extreme
values, indicated by asterisk. The extreme values indicate organisations, which have
loan values more than three box lengths from the edge.
The presence of outliers and extreme values within the categories scorers and non
scorers, show that the relationship is not solely a function of size. Several lenders
who have very high volumes of lending do not use credit scoring, whilst others with
relatively low volumes do score. This interesting outcome, highlights that credit
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scoring is not adopted solely relative to the volume of loans being granted.
Additional considerations must impact on the method of credit decisioning utilised. It
is intended that this thesis will help to identify these additional determinants by
identifying the circumstances in which credit scoring can be used to add value to the
mortgage lending process.

















N = 40 23
do not score do score
A further test was conducted to identify differences in population means between the
two groups, those who score and those who do not. For the purposes of this test
those currently scoring and developing were categorised as "credit scoring", and all
others were combined to form the category "not scoring". Due to the evidence of
extreme values and outliers, a non-parametic test was sought to test the null
hypothesis that the two sample groups are from identical populations. The Mann-
Whitney test was selected as it presented a suitable means by which to test the
hypothesis. Organisations were ranked relative to the number of mortgage
applications processed with the highest number ranking at one, and the rankings
increasing as the volumes fell. Thus a low ranking value relates to a high mortgage
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volume. The results of the Mann Whitney confirm that the scorers exhibit a lower
mean rank, confirming the higher volumes being processed. Results confirm that
the null hypothesis can be rejected at a level of significance of 0.05, and are
presented in figure 4.9 as follows:
figure 4.9: Mann Whitney - Volume of Loans Processed
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Credit Scoring 25 19.84 496
Not Scoring 41 41.83 1715
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Z = 4.0978'
4.5.1. Scoring activity related to mortgage loan value
Having examined scoring activity based on organisational type, and by lending
volumes, a final test was conducted. The data was further analysed in order to test
the assertion that credit scoring was most suitable for those lenders who conduct
lending which comprises a high volume of applications with low loan values. This
view was reported by some of those who participated in the interview phase of the
research. If this view holds true, the implication might be that lenders believe that
loans of higher value require the "specialised knowledge" offered by an underwriter
to assess the risk profile of the applicant. The first part of the assertion has been
tested in part by the preceding section, which confirms that high volume lenders
make more use of scoring than those managing low volumes. The second part of the
assertion requires the mean financial value of mortgage applications being processed
by each lender, to be established. Again to test this the Mann Whitney test is used.
A mean mortgage loan value was calculated for each lender who provided data in
this category. This resulted in sixty-three respondent organisations being compared.
1 U = 41*25+(41*25)/2 - 1335 = 202.5, E (R,) = 41 (41+25+1 )/2 = 1373.5, Var(R,) =
41 *25(41 +25+1 )/l 2, E(U) = (41 *25)12, var(U) = 41 *25(41 +25+1 )/l2, Z = U - E(U)/VvarU,
Z=-310/75.6499 = 4.09
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Each mean loan value is then ranked. Rankings are based on organisations with the
highest loan values being ranked from a value of one, with the rankings increasing as
the mortgage values fell. Thus the lower the mean ranking, the higher the loan
values. Respondents were then divided into two categories based on their scoring
status, and the sum of the mean value of the rankings is then compared Again
groupings are based on those scoring and developing being categorised as "credit
scoring", and all others being categorised as "not scoring". Following analysis the
null hypothesis that the two populations are identical is again rejected. Results
contradict the popularly held belief of scoring's relationship with low value lending.
The analysis confirms empirically that the organisations which do score, process
loans which have a higher mean value than those organisations that do not score.
Confirmation of these results is presented in figure 4.10.
figure 4.10: Mann Whitney - Value of Loans Processed
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Credit Scoring 23 25 567
Not Scoring 40 36 1449
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Z = 2.42
4.5.2. Scoring activity related to cost:income ratio
One of the benefits of credit scoring which is accepted within the literature, is the
potential cost savings which those adopting scoring technologies can derive. Low
costs generally are reflected in a low cost base. A measure, which reflects a low
cost base relative to earnings, which is commonly used and reported in retail
financial services, is the cost:income ratio. Using data presented within the KPMG
retail financial services database, costuncome ratios were identified for fifty-two of
the sixty-six respondents. Again respondents were categorised as being in one of
two groups, those who do score and those who do not. Results of the analysis
confirm that the mean cost:income ratio of those who do use credit scoring is lower
than those who do not. However the lowest value overall is exhibited by an
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organisation which does not score. Whilst this result is interesting, and provides
some confirmation of the assertion made within the literature a note of caution is
sounded. This analysis does not provide evidence that the cost:income ratio of the
various lenders which took part, result solely or directly as a result of using a
particular method of credit decisioning. The proportion of income derived from
mortgage lending, varies between lender organisations. For some, mortgage loans
form a major source of income, however this is not the case for all lenders. Thus,
further investigation utilising additional data would be required if the link between
cost:income and scoring were to be established in a less tenuous manner. However,
the results of the analysis do provide an interesting observation. The supporting
figures are now presented in figure 4.11.
figure 4.11: Scoring Status - Loan to Value Ratio
Minimum Maximum Mean N std. Dev.
Do score 41.59 66.72 55.54 19 8.47
Do not score 32.96 79.21 58.91 33 10.32
4.5.3. Summary - scoring as a function of size
It is clear that a relationship exists between lending volumes and the decisioning
system used. However, this relationship should not be imbued with more
significance than merited by the data considered. In considering the whole issue of
mortgage lending many more attributes need to be considered. Whilst the data
considered by the survey is valuable, it has been gathered with a particular research
focus in mind. It is therefore important that lending volumes are not attributed a
sole "causal" value, relative to the decision to adopt mortgage scoring based on this
data. Other potential influences on the decisioning mechanism are likely to exist.
Amongst these are delivery channels used, levels of technology in place, and existing
management information systems available. However, what is clear is that those
with high volumes of mortgage applications are more likely to be using credit
scoring.
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When loan values are considered, the fact that scoring organisations process loans
with a higher mean value, presents some interesting questions that cannot be
answered at present. When considering mortgage credit risk, the mean value of the
loan is less critical than the proportionate loan to value ratio of the transaction.
Unfortunately this data, which would provide more insight, was not available within
the current study. However, the notion that credit scoring is only suitable for high
volume/low value lending has been tempered by the presentation of this empirical
evidence, which refutes this fact.
Supporting the assertion that scoring offers cost benefits, it has been found that on
average, scoring organisations do have lower cost:income ratios than non-scoring
organisations. Again the finding is interesting but not conclusive. This is due to the
complex range of variables that comprise the cost:income relationship. These go
well beyond the mortgage decisioning mechanism and even the mortgage product.
For many of the lenders concerned, a multiplicity of products make contributions to
the overall profitability of the organisation, and each absorb a proportion of the costs.
Finally, whilst mindful of the cautionary notes, empirical evidence has been
presented that confirms mortgage scoring is adopted by high volume, higher value
lenders who on average display lower cost:income ratio's than non scoring
organisations. When these features are presented in combination, they might
indicate that credit scoring is allowing some lenders to reap the benefits of
economies of scale.
4.6. Developing Mortgage Scoring
As has already been established, credit scoring is relatively new to mortgage lenders.
With this in mind, it was unclear how scoring had been developed within the
respondent organisations. The first question presented sought to identify where the
impetus for introducing scoring had come from. Respondents were asked to
nominate members of the organisation as "drivers for change" in introducing credit
scoring. Twenty-two organisations provided data, of which twelve confirmed that
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the Director of Credit had been key in ensuring scoring was implemented. Taking
individual responsibilities into consideration, this suggests that for the majority of
respondents, scoring was introduced with a focus on improved risk management.
The remainder of respondents cited the categories IT director, "other", and multiple
"drivers" as those responsible for the introduction of scoring.
As mortgage scoring is relatively youthful, it was unclear whether respondent
organisations had the expertise to develop and introduce scoring without external
help. Organisations were therefore asked directly whether scoring had been
developed "in house", externally or jointly with external help. Twenty-three
respondents provided data of which only three had developed their systems "in
house" without assistance. The majority, sixteen, had worked jointly with external
developers of whom ten had worked with Scorex. The remaining three had placed
responsibility totally outwith the organisation, devolving development entirely to the
external organisation.
4.7. How scoring is used in the organisation
As the survey was exploratory, lenders were invited to provide non-prompted
narrative responses, presenting their perception of the role of scoring within their
own organisation. The responses are subjective in nature, and provide an insight
into the dynamics of selecting an appropriate decisioning system within a lending
organisation. The responses were analysed by identifying repeated themes and
responses within the text. Where appropriate these were then grouped. This data was
not gathered with a view to providing a scientific resume of all possible issues
surrounding the selection or rejection of scoring. Rather it is an attempt to gather as
much data as possible that will support the generation of hypotheses about scoring
usage, and determine the way forward for the research.
4.7.1. Systems prior to scoring and reasons for change
The alternative and predecessor to credit scoring is judgmental evaluation of lending
proposals. Within the judgmental evaluation process two main modes of operation
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were identified within the responses. One group of lenders outlined a hierarchical
system of lending authority. In such a system the loan value determined the level of
seniority of the staff member making the decision whether or not to lend. This
system suggests a formalised career path attached to mortgage underwriting which
provides associated training and remuneration. The hierarchical approach can be
critiqued at several levels. With this approach, some difficulty can occur in matching
the loan applicant to the necessary lending authority. Thus for example, an
individual requesting a high value loan may find his application being forwarded to
an appropriate member of the hierarchy. This process can result in delay of
response. Additionally no evidence was uncovered that proved loan value is directly
related to the risk profile of the loan. Within the literature, and empirically within
this thesis, it is proven that the loan amount to property value (LTV) ratio is strongly
correlated to risk of default. It is therefore reasonable to observe that any
hierarchical system might be more efficiently based on LTV ratio than loan amount.
The second group identified were those organisations where decision making was
mainly driven by "policy rules". No data was gathered about how such policy rules
were developed or by whom, but traditionally policy rules are determined by a
centralised risk department and then cascaded throughout the organisation. Where
lending is managed by policy rules, there is likely to be a less formal structure of
seniority attached to loan decision making. Policy rules also contain some major
deficiencies. An example is the common policy rule that the upper lending limit, be
set at three, three and a half, or even four times the applicant's salary. No empirical
evidence has been found which justifies or explains how values such as these are
determined, or how they came to be accepted as "commonly" set limits. The use of
this "mortgage multiplier" was also critiqued by Howcroft and Hill as early as 1992,
who stated that "the current practice of using the mortgage multiplier to assess how
much a customer can borrow on a mortgage, needs to be reassessed". Whilst not
approaching the issue from an identical perspective, new empirical evidence
presented later within this thesis addresses this issue. Findings confirm the
diminishing credit risk linked to increasing basic income. However, the relationship
found between risk and monthly net income, which is discussed later within this
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thesis, is not monotonic and thus not easily explained. Therefore Howcroft and
Hill's desire for the influence to shift from annual basic income, to include a
consideration of existing commitments would appear to be justified. This helps to
illustrate that historical policy rules may not be the best means by which to create
lending policies that accurately reflect mortgage credit risk.
4.7.2. Rationale for changing from judgmental to empirical decisioning
Respondents were then asked to provide the reasons underlying the decision to
change to credit scoring. These are presented ranked from the most commonly
cited, to the least commonly cited.
I. The key reason for introducing credit scoring was to achieve improved risk
management. This was presented in a number of guises, including a desire
to reduce arrears, reduce losses and generally as a desire to "improve credit
quality". Due to the lack of publicly available data on the performance of
mortgage scoring, it must be inferred that each lender undertook the creation
and testing of a credit scoring system. We must then infer that the system
was found to provide improved lending outcomes. That an empirical
mortgage scoring system can provide better lending outcomes than
judgmental evaluation is proven later within this thesis. However, the point
must be enforced that achieving improved performance is not an automatic
outcome of adopting credit scoring. The improved performance which can be
evidenced at the test stage of scorecard development, assumes strict
adherence to the system decision outcomes. Otherwise the empirical
imperative and thus risk management is compromised. This presents the first
contradiction found in lender's responses. Despite adopting scoring in order
to improve risk management, they fail to apply scoring in a consistent
fashion. Further evidence within the survey responses confirmed that all
lenders who have mortgage scoring systems, over-ride the system generated
lending decisions in an ad-hoc fashion. Thus the desire for improved risk
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management is compromised to a degree by the method by which credit
scoring appears to be managed at an operational level.
II. Consistency of decisioning was the next most commonly cited reason to
introduce scoring. Consistency is confirmed within the literature as being
afforded by a centrally managed scoring system. The judgmental alternative
is to have a variety of individuals decisioning based on policy rules. The
application and adherence to such rules can vary between individual lenders,
thus inconsistency occurs within such a system. Consistency is desirable for
two main reasons. At a risk management level, consistency is required if
risk exposure levels are to be maintained. Credit policy rules are set in an
effort to ensure a pre-determined level of risk is borne. At a customer
service level, consistency is required to ensure that individuals are treated in
an even-handed manner, regardless of the channel by which they apply for
credit. Again, achieving this desired consistency is not an outcome of
adopting credit scoring. It is only achieved where scoring outcomes are
applied and adhered to in a steadfast fashion. Again, a contradiction where
the desire for consistency appears to be compromised by the method by
which credit scoring is managed at an operational level.
J3I. The next most common reason for introducing scoring was the perceived
objectivity of scoring. The objectivity is derived from the empirical methods
by which scorecards are developed. Again, a desire compromised by the
practice of over-riding, where the over-riding is conducted in a subjective
manner. Evidence that this is the case resulted from the follow up interviews
which took place and will be discussed in full later within this thesis. The
legislation which governs scorecard development may also compromise
objectivity to an extent. Not all variables most closely related to default risk
are necessarily included in a final scorecard. This is because legislation,
which seeks to protect individuals from discrimination precludes the
inclusion of certain data. Thus the data included is not wholly objective. The
legislation itself could in certain circumstances prove to be discriminatory.
An example might be a dataset on which male and female borrowers
exhibited different loan performance outcomes. By not allowing gender to be
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included in the scorecard, the better performing group is negatively
discriminated against. However, at another level, objectivity from a system
based approach is ensured. Much of the concern about subjectivity may
result from the difficulties of understanding the decisioning process. This is a
particular problem when decisioning is conducted by a large number of
individuals on a judgmental basis. Scoring provides a scientific basis for
understanding why applications should be accepted or rejected
IV. The next most common reason cited was "speed". Speed refers to the time
taken from receipt of the application form, to the borrower receiving
agreement in principle that he can borrow the desired sum. Credit scoring
can improve the speed to decision, as the system can evaluate the data
gathered efficiently and very quickly. Evidence supporting this statement is
presented within the benchmarking chapter of this thesis. Again
improvements in how quickly decisions are made, are dependent on how
scoring is operationalised. The data gathered on over-riding meant that the
benefit of improved processing speed would not necessarily be achieved, due
to the influence of the additional underwriting time which was found to be
part of the mortgage scoring/over-riding process. Additionally the variety of
locations of scoring within the mortgage process impact on the speed
improvements achieved. A point of sale system, might offer substantial
improvements in speed, whilst a centralised system would less able to
improve speed as significantly.
V. General improvement in the mortgage process, and improved levels of
customer service were the next most common responses. Without being
explicit, lenders referred to "process improvements". This could be derived
from a wide combination of the earlier responses of consistency, objectivity,
risk management and speed. Likewise customer service improvements could
result from various aspects of the issues already raised.
VI. Fewer responses were received for the final group of reasons, but these are
some of the most thought provoking. Three lenders stated that they had
introduced credit scoring to "aid" the underwriting staff. This suggests that
they did not intend to move from judgmental to empirical decisioning. These
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lenders explicitly intended to combine judgmental and empirical methods.
No rationale for doing this existed in the existing literature, and this was one
area which was subsequently investigated at interview. Only two lenders
cited the improved management information which is derived as a result of
credit scoring. One key aspect of management information is the score value
itself. When evaluating loans the score value provides a risk ranking for each
applicant. The score can be used to profile the lending portfolio with a
variety of other foci. Marketing strategies, arrears management and risk
pricing can all be influenced by the risk ranked score values. Only one lender
introduced scoring on the basis of reduced costs. Unfortunately the response
was not specific in highlighting which aspects of costs would be directly
impacted on. However, the cost benefits anticipated augment the previous
risk and process benefits already identified. Three different individual
lenders introduced the more strategic dimension of the decision to change to
the new system. One simply stated "strategic reasons", the others more
explicitly stated a desire to move to point of sale decisioning and a desire to
introduce risk pricing. Both benefits are realisable as a result of credit
scoring. However, both could be and are achieved by other means. Many of
the participant lenders have judgmental point of sale decisioning in place, and
are moving from that to the centralised control offered by scoring.
Additionally risk pricing already exists in mortgage lending albeit only tacitly
acknowledged. Risk pricing results from mortgage borrowing rates being
determined to a large extent by the loan to value ratio. As previously stated
the LTV is strongly associated with propensity to default and is therefore a
useful proxy measure by which to determine price based on risk.
4.7.3. Summary why lenders change to empirical decisioning
Lenders clearly have an agenda when they decide to move from judgmental to
empirical decisioning systems. The key components of improvements in risk
management, processing efficiency and customer service were evident within
responses. Additionally, more strategic influences were identified which suggest that
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lenders might introduce scoring as part of a broader plan such as to change delivery
mechanisms, or product positioning.
However, conflicting goals have been identified. Whilst improved risk, process and
service benefits are desired, the method by which scoring is operationalised limits the
extent to which these benefits can be achieved. Only three lenders had explicitly
introduced scoring to augment the judgmental process. However, in effect all
lenders are combining empirical and judgmental decisioning systems. A question is
raised as to whether using scoring to augment the skills of the underwriters differs
significantly from using underwriters skills to augment the scoring system. Further
analysis presented later within the case study section of the thesis suggests that the
underwriters are not successfully augmenting the lending system. However, as will
be evidenced this may have resulted from the nature of their involvement in the
process, rather than from their abilities.
The findings of the case study determined the need to conduct interviews in order to
understand two things. How aware are the lender organisations of the compromise of
the initial goals, and why is this compromise deemed necessary? These issues are
addressed in the review of the interview findings presented in chapter five.
4.8. Why Lenders Compromise the Empirical Imperative
Respondents were explicitly asked how they used scoring in the decision process.
Twenty-one lenders provided a response. Responses were invited in three categories:
□ a lending officer makes a decision, the score value is considered
□ credit scoring system provides a decision which is always accepted
□ credit scoring system provides a recommendation, which may be overridden
The figures confirming the response numbers and organisational types are presented
in figure 4.12.
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figure 4.12: Scoring Usage - Empirical, Judgmental, Combined
Bank Building Society Other
1. Judgmental
(considers score)








45% (5) 63% (5) 100% (2)
4. Multiple response 12% (1)
100% (11) 100% (8) 100% (2)
Category one reflects that the lending officer makes a decision, and considers the
credit score value. This suggests a judgmental system augmented by an empirical
system. Seven of the twenty-one respondents confirmed this to be the case.
Category two presents a credit scoring system providing a decision that is always
accepted. This suggests a wholly empirical approach to credit decision making.
Initial analysis confirmed that three lenders were in this category. However, closer
examination of the survey document provided contradiction from two of these who
then went on to provide a variety of over-ride reasons. This disproved the always
accepted assertion, and thus these lenders were transferred in to category three. The
remaining lender asserting that they always accepted the score recommendation was
in fact developing the system rather than using. Thus they intended to always accept
rather than are currently always accepting a system generated decision.
Figure 4.12, confirms that no single lending organisation utilises a wholly empirical
decisioning process. All lenders who have scoring experience used a combination
of empirical and judgmental decisioning methods. Category three comprised those
lenders who confirmed that the credit scoring system provided the lending decision,
but this decision could be subsequently overridden. This approach suggested the
overt combination of empirical and judgmental systems. In total twelve lenders,
more than half of the group, is in this category. A final respondent confirmed that
they were in all three categories. This may well have been the case, as alternative
delivery channels may have been used within the organisation, and each could have
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used a different method of decisioning. No additional information was available
that confirmed this fact.
4.8.1. The Circumstances Which Prompt A Compromise
The compromise under consideration is the practice of overriding a credit score
generated lending decision. No differentiation was made within the survey which
distinguished between the two main categories of override. The decision can be
either to accept an application which the credit scoring system declines, or
alternatively to reject an application which the credit scoring system has accepted.
The section addressing overriding is gathering data on both types of override.
Many examples of the circumstances in which a credit scoring generated lending
decision can be overridden are offered. Responses are presented ranked from the
most common to the least common responses.
I. Ten lenders cited the most frequent reason given, all of whom confirmed that
they would override a decision for an existing customer. Depending on the
lender's source of business this could result in almost all being overridden, or
almost none at all. "Existing customer" is likely to be only a partial
explanation of the override decision. What is being implied is that due to the
fact the lender knows the potential customer, additional information is
known. This suggests two things, both of which are somewhat contentious.
Firstly, it assumes that those making the lending decisions are aware of the
variables and weightings utilised within the credit scorecard. This is
unlikely. Lenders guard the scorecard content closely for fear that knowledge
of scorecard content might lead to abuse of the system. Such abuse might
result from either potential customers becoming aware of the required
characteristics and falsifying data. Alternatively staff members, some of
whom receive financial incentives to lend money, might falsify application
data themselves to improve their lending rates. The second somewhat
contentious issue is the assumption that underwriters can use this additional
information, should it exist, in a manner which allows them to rank risk
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effectively. Recalling the goals for scoring to provide consistent, objective,
risk-ranked lending decisions, it seems that a conflict exists if varying
amounts of unspecified "information" are being used to augment decisions
made by the scoring system. This is particularly true where the unspecified
data is being combined with data based on evidence of aggregate past loan
performance, such as the data in the scorecard. Again this anomaly required
to be discussed with lenders at the interview stage, if an understanding as to
why this practice was common place was to be gained.
II. "Information held which is outwith that which the scoring system utilises" is
the second most common reason cited. This category could therefore be
viewed in the same way as the previous reasons. Can the lender be sure the
information is in fact "additional"? How can the lender use such information
in a fair, consistent and objective fashion, which more accurately ranks the
associated risk?
III. The next most popular reason for overriding was half as popular as the belief
that additional information needed to be considered. Four lenders confirmed
that overrides occur "whenever a specialist underwriter deems it necessary".
These responses were received from lenders who used the empirical system,
solely to augment the judgmental evaluation which was the primary decision
making tool. The potential for scoring to "add value" based on the potential
benefits which lenders intended that scoring would deliver, is significantly
reduced when scoring is used in such an extemporised manner.
IV. Three lenders confirmed that they override the credit scoring system based on
the criteria "loan to value ratio". During the case study phase of the research
reported in chapter six, loan to value ratio is found to have a monotonic
relationship with default. As LTV increases so does likelihood of default.
Two observations are made about overriding based on LTV. Firstly, LTV is
so strongly correlated to risk of default that it would normally be included in
the credit scorecard. This leads to lenders overriding based on "double
counting" of data already contained within the lending decision. Thus the
overriding may be either penalising or enhancing the risk profile of the
applicant, by reconsidering data which has already been used to rank the risk
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of default. However, the second observation records an anecdote and brings
a new dimension to a review of overriding. Anecdotal evidence presented by
a single lender suggested that loans with LTV ratio's of below eighty percent
rarely result in a loss to the lender subsequent to default. The "equity shield"
being adequate to compensate for the cost of the default. This suggests that
LTV as well as being an indicator of risk, is also an indicator of the
underlying profitability of the transaction should default occur. This brings
an important new focus to the consideration of lender actions. Credit scoring
applied to mortgages is currently producing a risk ranking. However, the
scorecard is not considering profitability, nor as was evidenced earlier, does it
consider the value of the relationship. This suggests that overriding in
certain circumstances may usefully augment the risk ranking, by considering
these new dimensions. What is harder to establish is how successful a
subjective consideration of profit and relationship values can be when used to
augment an empirical value of risk?
V. Only two lenders confirmed they considered overriding the empirical
decision based on customer or intermediary driven appeals. This low number
is somewhat surprising as the industry's own Guide to Credit Scoring (1993),
confirmed that following an appeal "lenders should reconsider the
application if supported by additional verifiable information" and that "the
review should be conducted by a different lending officer". As around
"thirty percent of those who apply for mortgage credit are refused" (Brown-
Humes, 1997), it could be presupposed that all lenders would override as a
result of appeals. However, as lenders are responding using their own
definitions, it should be noted that the reasons in categories one and two
could result from the appeals process.
VI. The remaining responses were as follows. Two lenders confirmed that policy
rules existed which allowed them to override the score outcome. This
response could perhaps be aligned with responses citing "additional
information". However, the basis for such policy rules would require to be
established prior to effective evaluation of the benefit of such actions. A
single lender confirmed that the credit score would be overridden where a
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guarantor was willing to underwrite the loan. This is certainly a circumstance
where the risk is mitigated by data external to that considered by the scoring
system. The scorecard considers the applicant profile, and does not consider
the guarantor profile. Augmenting the scorecard to consider the guarantor
data would be complex but possible. The presence of a guarantor may or
may not affect the likelihood the applicant will default. Additionally the
relationship between risk and the presence of a guarantor, would require to be
established to ascertain to what extent, if any, the guarantor mitigated the
risk. A further lender confirmed that procedures surrounding the overriding
of the score outcomes had not been formally drafted. This suggests a truly
ad-hoc approach to combining empirical and judgmental methods.
4.8.2. Summary - The Circumstances Which Prompt A Compromise
Evidence is provided which confirms that the empirical imperative is compromised
for a variety of reasons. Whether the empirical system is augmenting the
judgmental methods or visa versa, overriding takes place. What is less certain is the
impact of such overriding on the effectiveness of the system. Can a credit scorecard
deliver the goals of consistency, objectivity, speed and risk management whilst being
combined with subjective overriding?
A new dimension is considered. Granting mortgage loans obviously requires a
consideration and quantification of the risk inherent in the transaction. However,
profitability or the "return" on the transaction is also of considerable importance to
the lending organisation. If a scorecard is only predicting risk, this suggests that
overriding based on profitability could be a valuable process. However, this would
require that the risk:return relationship could be combined to produce a lending
decision which is better than a solely risk based decision. The question as to
whether lenders base lending decisions on risk or return was taken to the interview
section of the research, an analysis of which is presented in the next chapter.
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4.9. Business Benefits Derived Via Credit Scoring
The survey identified the expected benefits of changing from judgmental to empirical
decisioning. The survey then sought to identify which of the anticipated benefits had
actually been delivered, and whether any unexpected benefits had been achieved.
Respondents were asked to outline the business benefits that had been "derived from
the use of credit scoring". Again no prompts were given to respondents, and they
were free to answer as they wished. The responses were all in narrative form, and
these were again analysed by identifying themes and quantifying responses.
Responses are presented ranked from the most common to the least common
responses.
I. Speed is the most commonly derived benefit of credit scoring. Seventeen
respondents confirmed this fact. Expanding the response, it became clear that
some respondents are deriving speed by "fast-tracking" applications. This
process involves applicants which achieve credit score values indicative of a
low level of risk being processed differently. The improvements in processing
speed can be achieved in a variety of ways. These include undertaking no
manual underwriting, requesting less supporting documentation, or point of
sale decisioning as opposed to centralised decisioning. Additionally by fast-
tracking the lowest risk applicants, lenders confirm that they also benefit by
improving the utilisation of their "scarce underwriting resource". This
confirms that for many lenders, credit scoring is delivering benefits in all of
the categories of risk, process and customer service benefits. It is also
possible that speed was the most commonly cited benefit, as it is the current
focus of many lenders. They are seeking increased speed in order to match
the new entrants to the sector who offer speedy mortgages via telephone and
Internet delivery channels. These lenders offer lending decisions in principle,
in times of around ten minutes. Therefore processing and decisioning time is
a particularly important performance measurement at the present time.
II. Ten lenders confirmed that consistency was being achieved. Echoing earlier
comments, this perception may be somewhat misleading due to high levels of
over-riding. However, what is clear is that consistency is certainly improved,
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even if not absolutely achieved. All applicants are being assessed within an
identical and consistent process, and all are achieving an initial decision in a
wholly consistent fashion. Only the minority that are being over-ridden, may
be inconsistently dealt with. The inconsistency can be removed by the
development and implementation of credit policies specifically dealing with
over-riding. This suggests that empirical decisioning may be used as the
key decisioning method, augmented by judgmental for a few cases that merit
additional consideration.
III. The next most popular benefit achieved was confirmed to be reduced levels
of arrears. This benefit confirms that the goal of improved risk management
is being achieved. It is interesting to note that this risk benefit, has ranked
behind process and service benefits. A particularly useful observation when
related to the literature, and much of the research to date. Until now both
have focused mainly on credit scorings ability to reduce arrears and improve
risk management. This benefit is also confirmed by additional work within
this thesis, which confirms that a bespoke mortgage scorecard can have the
capability to predict arrears more effectively than a large number of
individuals making judgmental assessments.
IV. The ability to handle greater volumes of lending, with no reduction in credit
quality is cited by five lenders. Whilst scoring can handle greater volumes,
due to speed of processing, introducing scoring would not directly influence
volume of applications received. This finding suggests that scoring must
have been introduced to coincide with a strategy which increased volumes of
business handled. Whilst it cannot be confirmed for all lenders, for some
this was certainly derived via using scoring as a mechanism for decisioning
within new delivery channels such as telephone call centres. During the
interview phase it became clear that some lenders had different credit
management strategies for each delivery channel. However, this response
suggests that credit scoring was introduced as a strategic tool, to allow
lenders to access new markets and attract additional business. It would seem
that this strategy had worked satisfactorily.
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V. Improved management information was recorded. Building and maintaining
a credit scoring system requires high volumes of good quality data.
Therefore good data management is a prerequisite of scoring. The output data
when the system is operational allows lenders to track the performance of the
loan portfolio very closely. Examples of improved management information
included levels of arrears, maturation patterns of arrears, performance of
over-ridden applications relative to the rest, and performance of individual
underwriters. Many of these data outputs are new to lenders. In particular
the ability to track override performance provides useful data about the credit
policies in place. Lenders also cited the benefit of tracking overrides as
these cases are perceived as "marginal business". Lenders confirmed that
they believe opportunities may exist to conduct marginal business very
profitably. This is partially due to the size of the sector, (thirty percent of
applicants are declined), and may also be due to the belief that there is
potential to use risk pricing in this sector.
VI. The ability to use the credit score as a means to introduce risk pricing was
presented by three organisations. Risk pricing is at present based on the
LTV ratio, which is a single risk variable. By using the credit score to set
the price, a more holistic view of the risk underlying the transaction would be
presented. Receiving the same level of support lenders confirmed the credit
score's role in supporting the work within a judgmental underwriting
department. They stated that the benefit of the score was its use in setting the
level of underwriter. This reflects the traditional hierarchical structure,
whereby the more senior underwriters deal with "riskier" business. Thus
when the application has been scored, the score value determines the level of
seniority of the individual who then manually underwrites the business. This
suggests the organisation does not believe that the scoring system they use
contains adequate information by which to predict mortgage outcomes.
Whilst it may seem something of an anomaly to both utilise and then
disregard a credit scorecard, many valid reasons might exist for doing so. As
has been discussed earlier, mortgage scoring is in its infancy for the majority
of these lenders. Additionally the majority did not have "in house" expertise
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in scorecard development. The lack of in-house skills, may have resulted in a
generic scorecard being purchased rather than a bespoke card being
developed. This would limit the effectiveness of the outcomes. Lenders may
therefore be rationally utilising an integrative approach to introducing the
technology to the organisation. This allows them to test the performance of
the scorecard, whilst managing the risk using the existing underwriting
resource. Such an approach allows the effectiveness of the system to be
established, prior to a more convincing move to empirical decisioning.
VII. The final response which received support from more than a single lender,
confirms the earlier assertion that policy rules may not be the most effective
means by which to manage risk. Two lenders confirmed that dependent on
the score value, they relaxed the salary multiples that normally determine the
maximum loan value. This suggests that applicants can borrow more or less
depending on their risk profile. Salary multiples allow all individuals to
borrow the same maximum amount regardless of perceived risk. Lenders are
convinced sufficiently of this to suggest they will "optimise profit by relaxing
the salary multiples". This is potentially a risk management benefit, and a
customer service benefit also. Additionally by differentiating themselves on
the means by which they determine maximum loan amount, they may attract
a new group of applicants.
4.9.1. Summary - Business Benefits Derived Via Credit Scoring
A range of benefits is identified as being derived via the introduction of credit
scoring. As a result of the confirmation of benefits sought and derived, the benefits
of credit scoring can now be placed into a variety of categories which can be
differentiated. Risk benefits, process benefits, customer service benefits and cost
benefits are all identified. This provides a new perspective on credit scoring
research. The potential benefits achievable go beyond improved risk management,
which until now has been the focus of credit scoring research.
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4.10. Response of those who do not credit score
The final section of the questionnaire was directed at those organisations who are
neither using, nor developing scoring. Forty-one respondents were in this category;
four banks, thirty building societies and seven other lenders. The profile of these
organisations is that of smaller lenders. This is confirmed by examining the mean
number of mortgages processed. The non-scoring respondents exhibit a mean
number of 7,433 applications per annum. This compares to a mean number of
37,203 for those who do use scoring. The building society lenders are mainly small
"local" societies and this should be borne in mind when examining responses. The
intention was to gather a range of data, which outlined why organisations chose to
maintain their judgmental evaluation systems. No response options were offered
within the questionnaire. Respondents were invited to provide their explanations in
narrative format and in their own words. Reasons are presented ranked from most
common response to least common.
4.10.1. Business reasons for using judgmental evaluation
I. The most common reason provided was the "flexibility" offered by
judgmental evaluation. Several organisations allude to the fact that this
flexibility is linked to using a broader range of data than a traditional
scorecard. Many specifically stated that they "considered all relevant data".
They were not specific about the nature of all the additional data. However,
some aspects of the range of data used were cited, and include many
references to "in depth knowledge of the customers", and strong "customer
relationships". This reflects the local nature of the customer base of many
respondents. This view of judgmental evaluation as being flexible, ignores
the fact that most underwriters are governed by a set of policy rules. Policy
rules are themselves rigid. As an underwriter can waive policy rules, so a
credit scoring organisation can override a scorecard. The views presented
about the wide range of data, and the customer relationship, disguise the fact
that in many of these instances the lenders are in fact referring to behavioural
data, e.g. behaviour of associated current account. Such data can usefully be
included in a scorecard. The one area of expertise that cannot easily be
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included in a scorecard is local knowledge. Where the local knowledge
referred to is knowledge of the local economy, the information is likely to
prove valuable. Within the literature review, evidence was provided which
supported the inclusion of local unemployment rates and house price indices
in the US market. Thus the perception of increased flexibility of judgmental
evaluation could be challenged at all levels with the exception of the potential
value of economic data.
II. The performance being achieved by judgmental evaluation was the second
most common reason. Lenders confirmed that they achieved levels of
arrears and debt which satisfied them. Several asserted that the levels they
achieved are lower than industry average. This is an area which requires
more detailed examination. It is difficult to determine the "optimum" level
of debt which maximises profit. Data is not available in the public domain
which presents the trade off between debt levels and profitability. However,
due to the nature of the mortgage loan the trade off is not a simple one.
Mortgage debt results not only in potential financial loss for lender and
borrower, but also a social cost as the borrower loses his home. Whilst
lenders have traditionally maintained low debt levels, the increase in
awareness of customer profitability profiles, means that lenders are aware that
they could in some cases allow debt to rise, and at the same time increase
profitability. However, it is likely that organisations which pursued such a
strategy openly, would be accused of "profiting from human misery" within
the popular press. Nonetheless, having debt levels which are lower than
average may not be to the lenders benefit.
III. Size was reported in two ways. Lenders suggested that low volumes of
lending which they conduct, meant that judgmental evaluation was the most
cost-effective means by which to assess applications. They also reported that
low volumes of data, and very little "bad" experience made it impossible for
them to build scorecards which would be accurate predictors of bad debt.
These are valid observations. Whilst some lenders purchase generic
scorecards, the best performance is derived from a bespoke scorecard. Small
sample sizes are also acknowledged to be a potential problem. However,
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within the literature several scorecards which performed well were developed
on small samples, as was the scorecard which is presented later within this
thesis.
IV. The remaining responses were varied. Lenders confirmed a lack of
knowledge and lack of research relative to credit scoring mortgage loans. A
single lender alluded to the fact that they focused on quality not quantity.
This confirms the popular belief that scoring is suitable for high volume, low
value lending. As was already evidenced this popular belief is somewhat
contradicted by the survey evidence gathered. On a completely different
tack, one lender confirmed that they employ "case ownership" where the
lending employee is tacitly responsible for the loan outcome over time.
They considered that their arrears management was facilitated by this "case
ownership", as their employees had a responsibility to "chase up" potential
debtors. A perspective which is perhaps possible for this organisation which
processes almost seven thousand applications per annum, but would be
unrealistic for a large lender to consider.
4.10.2. Summary - Business reasons for using judgmental evaluation
From the perspective of smaller lenders, it is acknowledged that lending volumes are
a valid constraint. With little bad experience, small sample sizes make building a
scorecard more challenging. However, the key issue of flexibility of judgmental
evaluation is not as convincing. As evidenced, only the economic data is likely to be
of real value. No information was evidenced which suggested that underwriters do
in fact consider economic factors.
4.10.3. Benefits Which Scoring Could Deliver
When non-scoring organisations were asked about the benefits which scoring could
deliver, the benefits identified almost mirror those presented by those who have
adopted scoring. Speed of processing, consistency and improved risk management
were most common. Next most commonly cited is the ability to risk-price based on
the credit score. This was a surprising result, as risk pricing based on the credit score
value is not common. No evidence of such pricing has been uncovered in practice.
Lenders are obviously aware of the potential to improve margins by accepting higher
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risk business. Reduced costs and the ability to fast-track low risk applicants are also
reported by two lenders each, as is the improved management information, which is
derived from scoring. The final categories were the ability to centralise decision
making, and the ability to improve product penetration rates via improved marketing
information. The responses show that even those who reject scoring as a mechanism,
are well aware of the potential benefits that can be achieved when circumstances are
apposite.
4.10.4. Why Credit Scoring is Unsuitable for Certain Organisations
The key reasons why scoring is considered unsuitable reflect the responses as to why
the lenders current system is viewed as preferable to scoring. Most important were
the strength of the customer relationships, and the perceived inflexibility of scoring.
It was not clear from the responses why scoring was believed to be detrimental to
relationships. However, looking at the previous responses it seems likely that this
issue is linked closely to the perception of inflexibility. The lack of suitable data on
which to create a scorecard was also reported, as were the costs of both introducing
and maintaining a system. Both of these appear to be valid reasons why scoring
may not be suitable. However, it does raise the question as to whether smaller
societies could conceivably "pool" data in order to develop effective scorecards, and
at the same time manage development costs. The remaining responses highlight the
depth of feeling about scoring. Two organisations stated that they felt scoring would
not fit their "culture". No explanation was provided. This may reflect the historical
autonomy of decision makers and also the hierarchical nature of lending authority,
where those who lend are ranked in order of seniority relative to the level of their
individual lending mandate. The cultural conflict between scoring and lending
hierarchies can in part be driven by an unwillingness to relinquish seniority to a
computer; a fact recorded by another lender who reported that "we employ people
who think, not just follow a computer programme". This viewpoint is reflected by
another lender, who states that scoring is unsuitable as "we have highly skilled staff."
On the same theme two lenders suggested that scoring was a negative force which
"clouded peoples judgement", by providing a risk ranking. The suggestion here is
that the scorecard is not a good indicator of risk, to the detriment of the underwriter
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who is. Scoring was also considered unsuitable by lenders who considered
themselves to lend to a very specialised market. The public profile of these lenders
was not supportive of the view that they operated in a specialised niche market.
4.10.5. Negative Experience of Credit Scoring
The most common negative experience came via anecdotal evidence from mortgage
intermediaries who had confirmed to lenders that they had "bad experience" of credit
scoring. Those lenders who rely on mortgage intermediaries for a high proportion
of their mortgage business are those who are most sensitive to intermediary
perceptions. Lenders also had first-hand experience of lending successfully to those
who had been declined by organisations who conduct credit scoring. They
confirmed that this "marginal lending" was an attractive market for them.
4.11. Conclusion
The survey provided a wealth of informative data. However following analysis of
the survey data, an apparent dichotomy seemed to exist. Lenders were adopting
empirical methods of decisioning, whilst continuing to undertake judgmental
evaluation. This led to the generation of several hypotheses;
□ Despite assertions that the introduction of scoring is driven by risk management,
lenders are aware that their scoring system does not contain enough data to
predict mortgage risk
□ Organisational culture determines the rate and means by which lending policy
alters from judgmental to empirical
□ Lending decisions are being made based on profitability profiles of customers,
rather than risk profiles.
In order to test the hypotheses, more detailed investigation and understanding was
deemed necessary. It was determined that the best means by which to achieve a
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deeper understanding was by means of a follow-up interview schedule. An outline
and analysis of this interview data is now presented, in chapter five.
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Chapter 5
5. The Lenders Perspective - Interview Evidence
5.1. Introduction
As evidenced in the foregoing chapter, the industry survey provides a wealth of data.
However inconsistencies were found within the responses. The main reasons that
lenders had introduced scoring were confirmed as a desire for objectivity,
consistency, improved risk management and speed of decisioning. Yet no single
lender was adhering to the credit decisions recommended by the scorecard in all
cases. A wide variety of reasons for overriding the decisions, which are generated
by the scoring system, were provided. These anomalous responses had prompted
the generation of several research questions as presented in Chapter 4 and now
reiterated:
□ Do the credit scoring systems used contain sufficient data to be able to predict
mortgage default risk?
□ Does organisational culture determine the rate and means by which lending
policy alters from judgmental to empirical decisioning?
□ Are lending decisions made based on the profitability profiles of customers,
rather than risk profiles?
An interview schedule was undertaken to present these questions directly to lenders,
in order to ascertain their level of awareness, and to obtain their views on the issues.
This chapter presents an account of the interviews, which were undertaken during
July and August of 1998. The participants in the interview programme are profiled,
along with a review of the interview content. Thereafter the interview findings are
presented. In conclusion this chapter provides answers to the research questions
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presented, and highlights some issues for credit policy and the management of credit
scoring.
5.2. Participants
As introduced within the outline of the research design presented in chapter three,
thirteen organisations were selected for interview from the respondent population of
sixty-six . As participants were assured of complete confidentiality, no single lender
will be identified. However, whilst not compromising the confidentiality agreement
reached, the organisations are classified by several categories. The organisations
were selected on the basis of organisational type and credit scoring status.
Additionally where possible a large and small volume lender was selected in each
category of lender type and scoring status. By selecting on this basis, it was intended
to identify lenders who would represent a diverse range of views. Looking at the
lenders in more detail, six banks, five building societies and two specialised lenders
agreed to be interviewed. The scoring status of these lenders is as follows:








Not Used 2 1 1 4
Total 6 5 2 13
5.2.1. Participant Profiles
When examining the scale of mortgages processed by interview participants, the
diversity in mortgage volumes processed is exhibited in the range. The lowest
number of mortgage applications approved per year was found to be 250 with a
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maximum number for a single lender of 173,600 applications. Such an extreme
range, makes it understandable that the processes and attitudes presented during the
interviews might not necessarily result in a consensus of opinion. Figure 5.2,
presents the volume of loans, organisational type, and scoring status in more detail.
figure 5.2: Value of Loans
Volume of Loans per annum Organisational Type Credit Scoring?
173,600 bank yes
149,711 bank no




11,000 building society no
6,830 building society yes
5,500 building society no
1,200 bank no
750 other no
250 building society no
withheld bank yes
This confirms the survey findings that the selection of a decisioning system is not
wholly related to size. Whilst one lender interviewed processes slightly under
150,000 mortgages per year without scoring the applications, another who is
processing 6,000 mortgages does use credit scoring. That one group can derive
value from scoring, whilst the other chooses not to use scoring reflects one of the
themes of this thesis. What benefits do lenders derive, and what conditions must
exist if these benefits are to be achieved? Figure 5.2, also confirms that the
majority of interviewees who are not currently using credit scoring are smaller
lenders. This also reflects the findings of the initial industry survey, and confirms
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that, in this regard, the profile of the interview participants generally reflects the
profile of the whole population.
A further comparison, which compared the interview participants with the survey
population was undertaken. This was a further attempt to determine whether the
interview population could be considered representative of the whole population. On
this occasion the cost:income ratios of lenders being interviewed were compared
with the population ratios. The interview population is found to be in a range slightly
lower than the population as a whole. The minimum cost:income ratio found across
the whole population is 32.96%. This value is also the lowest value of the group
interviewed. The maximum ratio found across the whole population is 79.21%. This
is higher than the maximum within the interview population, which is 64.47%. The
lower maximum value in the interview group, is reflected in a lower mean value of
52.94%, which compares to a population mean of 57.67%.
Having selected the interview participants by organisational type and scoring status,
and having compared volumes of mortgages processed and cost: income ratios no
serious anomalies were found between the profiles of the interview participants and
those of the population as a whole. Therefore the views of the interview
participants, are believed to reflect the range of views likely to be found across the
mortgage industry at the time the interviews were conducted.
5.3. Interview Outline
The interviews were conducted at the office of the interviewee, and typically lasted
for approximately one hour. The interview outline, which is presented in Appendix
G was based on the findings of the initial survey and augmented by topical issues of
the day. The interview outline was amended depending on scoring status, but the
areas covered remained similar. Topics were grouped and broadly follow the
structure of the survey questionnaire. It should be noted that as the interview format
was semi structured, the discussion ranged outwith the predetermined topics on some
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occasions. Any additional material is reported accordingly. The topic groupings are
as follows.
5.3.1. The Mortgage Process
The mortgage process was discussed with a view to determining the variety of
different "application flows" that might exist. The impact of the process on time to
decision, and the variety of locations for credit scoring to take place within the
application process were discussed. Additionally the source of mortgage
applications was discussed at this time. This sought to determine the influence of
the intermediary on both the mortgage application process, and on the method of
credit decisioning. As this section of the interview was an exploratory "fact find"
and overview, the questions are presented in the same way to all organisations
regardless of scoring status.
5.3.2. Introducing Scoring
Those lenders who use scoring were invited to discuss all aspects of the development
and implementation of scoring within their organisation. Much of this questioning
related to topics, which are commercially sensitive. This included an attempt to
determine how the scoring decision output is presented to staff, and how the staff are
incentivised to adhere to the system generated decisions. Additionally it was hoped
that lenders might be able to confirm the groups of variables included in the
scorecard, and present their intuitive belief based on their own experience about what
actually causes mortgage default. Within this section of the interview the
management of overriding is discussed. As the existence and prevalence of
overriding is one of the key findings of the initial survey, some time was spent on
this issue. Lenders who did not use scoring were invited to expand on the responses
given in their survey document as to why they chose judgmental evaluation. They
were then invited to outline the decisioning process followed. All lenders were also
invited to discuss the lending which they conduct which is outwith credit policy. For
non-scoring organisations this is the near equivalent to overriding. For organisations
which do credit score, the relationship between credit policy rules and credit scoring
requires to be understood.
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5.3.3. Measuring the Success of Scoring
Within the survey, lenders had identified the benefits anticipated and achieved via
adopting credit scoring. The interviews sought to identify the tangible measures that
lenders used to quantify the success of their mortgage activity. This included an
attempt to identify the variables that might underpin the (then) potential future
benchmarking survey, which is reported in chapter 7 of this thesis. Additionally the
method of measuring profit on mortgages, and the level of staff awareness as to
where mortgage profitability derives from were discussed. These topics sought to
address the hypothesis that the mortgage decision was in fact based on profitability
and not risk alone. No major differences in presentation of these questions were
required to reflect scoring status.
5.3.4. Appeals Against System Decision
This area of discussion resulted partially from the survey findings, and also from
researcher experience. Only two lenders within the survey confirmed that they
override based on customer appeals. This confirmed researcher experience that the
appeals procedure is at best relatively unstructured within most lending
organisations. It was hoped to gain more understanding of the appeals procedure
offered to those declined access to mortgage credit. Those not scoring were asked
about the appeals process in place which allowed appeals to be made against the
judgmental loan evaluations.
5.3.5. Other Issues
Other issues were discussed informally towards the end of the interview, and were
presented to all lenders regardless of status. These included the existence or
otherwise of mortgage indemnity guarantee insurance (MIG), which protects the
lender against default. Mortgage Guarantee Certificates, which provide a guarantee
to applicants that a pre-agreed sum will be advanced to them (subject to certain
criteria being fulfilled) were also discussed. The existence of, and market views on,
risk pricing were also considered within this section of the interview, as was
organisational readiness for, and involvement in the securitisation of mortgage loans.
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5.4. A Synopsis of Interview Participants
Due to the confidentiality assurances given to participants, the full transcript of each
interview has been withheld. In order to render the transcripts anonymous, much of
the relevant data would have required to be removed. This would have resulted in
the accuracy of the transcripts presented within the thesis being unacceptably
compromised. Instead a brief synopsis of each interview is reproduced below,
paraphrasing snatches of the interview material. This is intended to exemplify the
diversity amongst participating organisations.
I. A building society who use credit scoring. Processing over 50,000
mortgages annually. Mortgages introduced via many different channels.
Came into scoring for risk management reasons, and are only now awakening
to the benefits of scoring. "Scoring actually hampered the process for
several years", although the quality of the loan book has now improved.
Provide decision in principle within one day, although the final decision takes
about two weeks. Aiming to move to a two stage process with decision in
principle in fifteen minutes and final decision in forty minutes. The
interviewee introduced the subject of the "morality" of lending, and of the
"macho culture" in the lending environment. They confirmed that they
"discourage appeals". Looking back over the history of the organisation
they confirmed that they had a 150 year history of "zero credit risk" and had
come into a 1990's recession where they had "very little control of the
lending book". Confirmed the general trend identified in the literature of a
de-skilled workforce, where staff knew that they were being "consistently
outperformed" by the scorecard. Also confirmed the product influence on
risk, stating that people with fixed rate loans "generally perform better than
those on flexible rates".
II. A bank who use credit scoring. They receive eighty five percent of their
mortgage business via linked insurers. Processing just over sixteen thousand
mortgages every year, they have thirty underwriting staff. They differentiate
the mortgage process between intermediary introduced and direct business.
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For a single intermediary company they conduct the credit reference search
prior to accepting the application, suggesting that they anticipate poor quality
business via that source. Confirmed that service level agreements are in
place between themselves and mortgage intermediaries, suggesting a very
close commercial relationship. Scoring is used to highlight poor quality
business. They confirm that they actually approve a high proportion of the
credit score "reject" recommendations. Alluding to the hierarchy attached to
lending limits, they confirm that underwriting is one of the "higher level
competencies" within the organisation. Profitability of the mortgage is
derived from the mortgage interest, plus the associated fees and insurance
premiums which are part of the mortgage "bundle".
III. A bank who is not currently scoring. All applications come via branches,
even those being introduced by intermediaries. Branch acts as a conduit.
Currently process numbers in the low thousands. Four underwriters
available, but only use two at a time. If the loan is outwith underwriter
sanction level, they make recommendation and pass to second underwriter.
Average LTV 68%. Twelve page mortgage application form. Confirmed
substantial amounts of training given to underwriting staff, and that
underwriting is seen as a career "springboard" to management. Stated that
staff incentives are "dangerous" in a lending environment. Also sceptical
about the intermediary's ability to evaluate proposals, stating that they do not
pre-screen applications they merely "tort them up". When asked about
appeals highlighted that the customer cannot appeal directly, only the branch
can appeal against a decision. Also confirmed that they don't securitise the
mortgage book due to "weak management information systems".
IV. Building Society who do not use credit scoring. Ninety percent of business is
received direct from customers. Majority of business is conducted on
properties within a fifty mile radius of own office. Not comfortable doing
LTV of 95% or above. All customers interviewed for approximately one
hour and a half at first interview, with a follow up second interview. Every
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application signed off by either chief executive or company secretary. From
application to formal offer takes fifteen days, which has reduced from twenty
nine days in the past two years. Confirmed underwriter has ongoing
responsibility for loan performance. If loan goes into arrears underwriters do
home visits, "they can't just walk away, they have responsibility throughout
the mortgage's life". Insist that all borrowers have insurance against
unemployment. Always give a reason for a declined application.
V. Other lender who is not scoring. Currently processing just under 1000
applications per year. This figure is down from 20,000 , which was boosted
by market conditions and council house sales. Six or seven underwriters.
Application sent to District Office where it is double checked by Manager
prior to being send to processing office. There passed to underwriter for
checking and each application reviewed by supervisor. Supervisor and
underwriter sign-off each offer. From application to offer in approximately
ten days. Confirmed that they offer mortgages not "to make huge profits"
but instead to "give a service to our customers". Mortgages considered a
peripheral rather than core product.
VI. Building Society, not currently scoring but is actively considering adopting
scoring. Would like to credit score, but this is currently low priority on IT list
of tasks. Branch officer make the initial lending assessment of each
application, and each branch has lending authority. Application sent to head
office for the preparation of formal offer papers. Head office does a random
quality check on applications. Application to offer in ten to fourteen
working days. Staff involved in underwriting require to pass an "in house"
competency exam. Confirm a building society ethos whereby they take
"lower profits in order to deliver high interest rates and low mortgage rates".
VII. Other lender. Scoring for three years. Currently processing twelve thousand
applications per year with fifteen underwriters. Delivery channel via
telephone banking. Decision in principle using scoring system. If the
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telephone application is approved a paper based application is sent to the
customer for completion. Paper application is then scrutinised against
telephone details on receipt. Stated they are not really underwriting, just
"checking papers". Confirmed that default levels are much lower as a result
of scoring. Stated that the underwriters "consider themselves" to be in a
career path, and that they "think themselves" to be better judges than the
credit scoring system. Highlighting some organisational tension between the
underwriters and the scoring team, confirming that underwriters are "fighting
it" when presented with evidence that their overrides perform badly.
VIII. Bank using credit scoring. Twenty staff with underwriting authority,
processing about twelve thousand applications per year. Branch based
application form. If branch "does not like it" they phone central underwriting
function for advice. Also if the application is outwith credit policy it is
referred to central underwriting team. Depending on circumstances the
branch may take up references. Application then sent to central processing.
Documentation examined for conformance with credit policy and lending
decision made. Application then retrospectively credit scored. Allow five
percent of total lending to be in the overridden category, and no more than
fifty percent of loan portfolio should be above ninety percent LTV ratio.
Evaluate portfolio performance by market share, arrears performance, and
profitability. Believe that scoring offers them the facility to write "high risk
business, and keep it okay".
IX. Building society that is currently using credit scoring. Processing just under
7,000 applications per annum. Sixteen staff with authority to lend, fourteen
of whom use their "discretion to lend" fairly regularly. Maximum LTV 95%,
excepting negative equity applicants who are existing customers. Branch
based interview, and application subsequently sent to central processing.
Following receipt of references, application is underwritten. Underwriters
split into geographic teams, with the exception of one group who deal with
high volume mortgage intermediaries. Following lending decision
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application is then "shadow scored". Score not used by organisation but sent
to external agency who conduct analysis on performance of loan portfolio.
Also have a telephone application channel. The details are input to computer
system from an abridged application. No credit score built into telephone
application. Paper application sent to customer, then per lending process at
branch. When asked about target turnaround times from application to offer
confirmed that "we look to do it within twenty eight days". Agreements exist
with volume introducers to process offers within fifteen days. Suggested that
underwriters are not aware of mortgage profitability, stating that "they don't
really think like that". Also confirmed that they are aware that they "are not
getting full value" from their scoring system as they "don't use the
information as well as we should".
X. Building society not currently scoring. Branch network of 120 offices. All
business (including intermediary) processed via branches. All lending
authority is centralised. Currently processing 20,000 new loans per annum,
up from a previous year figure of 11,000. Paper based application for each
customer. Branch then takes up necessary references. On receipt of
references, application and references sent to central lending department
where application is underwritten. Application to offer in fifteen days.
Confirmed that they try to differentiate themselves from other lenders by
providing a better service. The mortgage process is such that they don't run
an affordability test on everybody! When asked if staff were aware of the
profitability profile of mortgages, interviewee responded in the negative
stating "absolutely not, I wouldn't want to go down that route at all". The
focus of lending is on the credit risk management, rather than profitability.
XI. Bank, recently converted from Building Society status and not using credit
scoring. Processing almost 150,000 mortgages per annum. Multiple delivery
channels and a range of credit policies each relevant to a single channel. A
wide range of credit processes takes place within their Group. Anecdotal
evidence about the decision to drop the requirement for MIG. Suggested that
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a single lender had dropped MIG as a marketing tool intending it to be a
temporary move. This lender was then shocked when other lenders followed
the initiative and was effectively "bounced in" to permanent removal ofMIG.
Branches currently given targets for volume of sales, rather than quality of
sales. Currently streamlining processes.
XII. New bank, recently moved into the mortgage market using credit scoring.
Scorecard created without data, based on previous developer experience.
Payment behaviour scorecard based on bureau data, being combined with
affordability data. Staff incentives likely to be linked to profitability of
products. Maximum LTV 90%. Delivery channel is via telephone banking.
XIII. A bank lender, currently credit scoring and processing almost 17,000
mortgages per annum. Mortgages received from customer base via branches
and also direct from intermediaries. A single credit policy exists, but a variety
of credit processes are in place. For own customers, the application is scored
at the customer interface. The initial decision for these cases is reached in
about ten minutes, following completion of the first half of application. If
this is favourable the "second phase" of application is completed. If
affordability is under strain, application is passed to underwriters. Second
decision in principle is reached in about twenty four hours. For intermediary
introduced business a centralised decisioning process is used. Loans are
scored separately and underwritten by underwriters who are grouped by the
volume of business which the intermediary introduces. The bank confirmed
that management information regarding performance of overrides needs to
be improved. System is better at "recording narrative data rather than
coding".
5.5. Analysis of the Interview Data
At the commencement of each interview the interviewee was asked whether a tape
recording of the interview might be made. Eleven interviews resulted in tape
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recordings being available. Each interview was subsequently transcribed and a
transcript was mailed to each interviewee, in order that they could confirm the
accuracy of the transcript. The eleven transcripts and two sets of interview notes
were then analysed using a colour coding technique. Coding facilitates the
identification of themes within the responses. Colour coding was selected in
preference to a computer driven package such as Ethnograph or Nudist, due to the
relatively small number of interviews being examined.
The key themes that resulted from the interview analysis are now presented grouped
by topic, and where appropriate are considered relative to the existing literature and
survey findings.
5.6. Interview Outcomes
5.6.1. The Mortgage Process
Lenders express a desire to improve the application and decisioning processes, in
order that customer service might be improved. The impact of the mortgage process
on overall processing costs led to a focus on the number of "actions" required with
each new application. The process varied enormously between lenders, and
determinants of the number of "actions" required included the existence or otherwise
of lending mandates, the delivery channels in use, and the level of technology in
place. The relationship between the process efficiency and customer service is
highlighted in the variations found in both time to decision and time to offer.
The source of applications also impacted on the mortgage process. Organisations
with multiple sources of mortgages often operated a variety of processing systems,
and a variety of credit policies were found to co-exist within a single organisation.
There are several implications evident from an examination of the mortgage process.
Most importantly, the credit scoring organisations are confirmed not to be deriving
the full benefits of speed, consistency and risk control due to the management of
scoring within the mortgage process. Anecdotes, such as credit scoring being
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carried out "retrospective" to the lending decision being made, and a lender who
confirmed that the score "formed no part of the decision to lend" reflect the difficulty
in adapting new technologies in a "value adding" way. This confirms the survey
findings that scoring is operationalised in a manner which compromises its ability to
add value. What is evident is the dilemma for organisations which have traditionally
placed value on personnel with lending skill, now considering such skills to be
"redundant" for all but the "marginal" cases around the cut off score. The cut off
score is the numeric score value selected by the organisation, above which
applications would normally be approved and below which they would normally be
declined. The cut off score is set in order that the lender accepts a pre-determined
level of risk. Those cases closest to the "cut off' value, are hardest to predict
outcomes for, and are in a "grey area". Lenders often chose to manually underwrite
those applications that have score values close to the "cut off'.
A further observation resulting from considering the mortgage process, is the
implication of using multiple credit strategies as were found to co-exist in several
organisations. Multiple strategies may compromise the ability of the lender to
ensure consistency. If the delivery channel selected by the potential customer is the
determinant of the credit policy rules being applied to their application, applicants
may find that applying via one medium results in an application being accepted,
whilst choosing another might result in a reject. It may be possible for the lender to
confirm statistically that "typical" applicants via each delivery channel exhibit
different risk profiles. However, at a customer service level, it would be difficult to
justify such an approach to applicants. A further compromise in customer service
was evident in the service level agreements, which were found to be in place between
lenders and intermediaries. These ensured that applications via the intermediary
channel are subject to faster turnaround times than those coming directly from
applicants in many cases.
Finally the focus on the number of "actions" involved in the mortgage process, finds
lenders attempting to reduce the volume of supporting "evidence" which they
typically request from applicants. The requirement by lenders for applicants to
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provide verifying data slows the process considerably. Lenders confirm that they
are considering which pieces of the "data jigsaw" they could omit gathering extra
data on. Examples of items that may be considered superfluous in future might
include the employer's salary reference, or even the property survey document for
certain categories of property or loan. However "smoothing" the mortgage process
in order to improve customer service, might ultimately have a negative impact on
risk management.
5.6.2. The Credit Decision
Many variations on the processes which support the evaluation and decisioning of
mortgage loans exist. The credit decision is variously taken centrally or within the
branch network. It is also made based on some combination of judgmental,
empirical or combined decisioning methods. As the process is so varied, various
flow charts are used to present the range activities which surround the credit decision
making process. These are now presented in figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3, appears complex and unwieldy, but does in fact reflect the many process
flows which are found to exist in mortgage lending organisations. By necessity of
space limitations, a range of interactions are excluded from the process flows
identified. Liaison with both customer and intermediary for example are not shown.
However, the arrows which indicate iterations back to the "application made" stage
are intended to indicate liaison with applicant over references, etc. The omission of
customer liaison is important, as more than one lender confirmed that they contacted
each applicant once per week within the application period to let them know how the
application was progressing. Additionally the box for references sought could have
more exit arrows, as lenders make second and third requests for data. Despite the
necessary omissions from the model, it does present an indication of the complexity
of the process of reaching a credit decision.
During the interviews all participants were keenly aware that the "time to decision"
requires to be driven down in order to meet the demands of higher expectations of
customer service. It is interesting to note that lenders who receive a high proportion
of mortgage business via intermediaries, have service level agreements in place with
those intermediaries. As a result, the agreements offer the intermediary better
service than that offered to the average customer who came direct to the lender.
Time to decision is commonly agreed to mean the time taken to offer the customer an
"agreement in principle". Agreement in principle does not become a binding
agreement to lend until the necessary supporting evidence is presented. Hence the
dilemma arises as to how lenders decide which supporting evidence can be dispensed
with without compromising risk management. An important issue which this thesis
is unable to address, is at what point the customer believes he has received a
commitment from the lender to approve the mortgage loan. If the customer is
satisfied that a commitment has been made when he receives "agreement in
principle", then the key objective for lenders must be to drive down this timescale.
Credit scoring can substantially reduce the time to agreement in principle, by
processing and analysing the necessary data in a much shorter timescale than a
judgmental analyst might take. However, achieving speed is dependent on the
location of scoring within the mortgage process.
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Where lenders have a credit scoring system at the customer interface the time to the
agreement in principle decision is greatly reduced. However, the majority of those
who credit score have a centralised scoring system, with paper based applications
being sent to a central processing centre. In such a circumstance scoring offers no
real time advantage to the lender in terms of processing days. The ability of the
scorecard to offer a speedy decision is also mitigated by the means by which
organisations input data entry. Again where this occurs on a "twilight shift" basis,
valuable time may be lost whilst waiting for the data entry to take place. Thus the
manner in which scoring is absorbed into the mortgage process, might compromise
the "speed" benefit which lenders seek to achieve.
A common perception presented is that a scoring system considers fewer variables
than a credit underwriter might in reaching a credit decision. However the subjective
nature of underwriting means that this fact cannot be confirmed. What became clear
from interview data is that organisations are aware that the scorecard can outperform
the judgmental evaluation. Despite knowing this, they continued to allow the
underwriters to override the system based decisions on a fairly ad-hoc basis. This is
partly due to the way that the output of the scoring system is presented within the
organisation. Whilst the system decision derives from a numeric score, the system
output is often in the form of a graded recommendation. This might take the form of
accept, reject or refer to the underwriting department. One lender confirmed that up
to twelve graded outputs existed. Another confirmed three outputs, accept, decline
and fail. He then went on to confirm that decline was "a misnomer", and that they
did in fact grant "a high percentage of them". That such anomalous responses and
actions are considered to be the norm, confirms the highly unstructured nature of the
process. Typically lenders proceed to subjectively underwrite accounts which are
not a clear "system reject" Some lenders also underwrite those accounts which are
marginally above the "cut off' score with a view to potentially rejecting "system
accepts". This is clearly a policy decision to review all cases around the margins of
the "cut off score". Lenders do however provide a consensual view that it is
desirable to drive down the number of applications being referred to underwriters,
along with the associated costs and process delays.
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The manual underwriting of mortgages and the existence of credit policy rules, were
the two key foci of the credit decision discussions. Such is the importance of these
topics they are now both reviewed in more depth.
5.6.3. Manual Underwriting of Mortgages
The requirement to retain members of staff to undertake underwriting is confirmed
by all lenders, even those with considerable scoring experience. Between
organisations the underwriting process varies considerably. Methods of grading the
underwriters are managed in several ways. Some are simply graded against a loan
value. Thus the more experienced underwriters make decisions on the larger value
loans, and the junior staff take decisions on the lower value loans. Alternatively
underwriters may be graded on criteria such as loan to value ratios. As LTV ratio
more accurately reflects the underlying risk, this method, used in combination with
loan value might provide a better method of grading. However, others are graded
against "policy rules". Lending policy rules dictate key criteria that require to be
met, e.g. salary multiplier. The junior underwriters being permitted to grant loans
which meet all criteria, and those more experienced lending officers being permitted
to grant loans which are for a variety of reasons outwith criteria.
Underwriter training is largely in-house. However, no evidence was found which
suggested that any training is given which recognises that over-riding the scorecard
requires specific skills. That the underwriters within scoring organisations receive
no training on the specifics of credit scoring and overriding, was a surprising finding.
This might also suggest that the very subjective nature of underwriting might also
compromise scorecard efficiency. When specifically asked about tracking
underwriter performance, lenders variously had the ability to do so or not. Those
who could not track individual underwriter performance, cited poor management
information as the cause. Others had simply not got around to tracking "it's one of
those things that we've always said we need to do and we should do". Those who
could and chose not to suggested that as they "haven't had to, we haven't had a
problem with underwriting " stating that "if we had a problem we 'd go back and do
some navel gazing". This suggests a somewhat reactive approach to risk
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management rather than a proactive avoidance of risk. Peculiarly, even where
underwriters were subject to a performance management system, lenders confirmed
that it "does not relate to the quality of their underwriting". Lack of further
questioning, left unasked the important question as to how underwriter performance
might be evaluated if not related to the quality of their underwriting. However, others
did track performance believing it to be a form of "internal policing". The
underwriting discussion presented some new information on risk perception as to the
responsibility of the underwriter at a period "post completion" of two or three years.
One lender suggested that events, which occur at a period two years post completion
could not have been predicted at the time of application. If indeed this were found
to be true, it would have implications for the data used in scorecard development,
and indeed on the purpose of the scorecard. This premise generally alludes to the
belief held that most default is caused by "lifestyle events", such as relationship
breakdown and unemployment. However, these events may not preclude analysis
that allows prediction. They might merely require that lenders ask new questions of
applicants, in an effort to build models that might include some element of prediction
of lifestyle changes. This seems to be some way off for mortgage lenders. A
subsequent examination of the types of data collected on application forms, presents
no evidence of "lifestyle data" being recorded by lenders. However, evidence
within the literature confirms that new areas can successfully predict default, such as
the neighbourhood analysis conducted in the US, which produced a successful
predictor variable.
5.6.4. Mortgage Policy Rules and Policy Overrides
All lenders confirm that they have in place mortgage policy rules, which are also
referred to as credit policy rules or as mortgage lending criteria. These criteria are
normally issued to those at the "front end" of the delivery channel, both internally
within the lending organisation, and externally to intermediaries. An attempt to
uncover the foundations on which the policy rules were established was
unsuccessful. When asked the basis of the rules, lenders suggest they are mainly
"historic" rules, but no evidence was uncovered that provided a definitive data source
for the rules. Thus the rigour of the process by which mortgage policy rules are
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established, is unknown. The criteria are intended to indicate fairly broadly, the
profile of applicants which the lender is willing to consider. Policy rules typically
include the mortgage multiplier, i.e. a multiple of the annual salary which is equated
to a maximum loan value. Policy might also dictate maximum borrower age, rules
regarding previous credit behaviour and the types of property which can form the
security on a mortgage loan.
Some conflict was found to exist between having credit policy rules and using credit
scoring. As one scoring lender confirmed "the majority are declined before they've
even got to the stage offilling out an application form". Confirming that despite the
presence of a scoring system the initial interview would "pre-screen" applicants and
that "a typical reaction would be a verbal reaction". Again, conflict with the desire
for consistency and objectivity, and evidence that the empirical imperative
underpinning a move to credit scoring is not wholeheartedly adopted or understood.
In order to build and maintain an effective scorecard the organisation requires to be
fully cognisant with the profile of applicants. In limiting the applications which are
processed, by making a subjective decision about which applications should be
credit scored, so the organisation is losing potentially valuable data. However,
developments in the integration of policy rules and scoring were evident. One
lender confirming that "we are developing credit systems to not only calculate the
credit score, but increasingly to make policy decisions".
However, in concert with credit score decisions, policy rules are frequently
overridden for variety of reasons. Exceptional circumstances are often mooted as
being reasons why policies such as the mortgage multiplier are varied. The credit
policy rules form the basis for applicants to be pre-screened. This pre-screening
might actually preclude a formal application being taken, or a credit score being
sought. Within the case study phase of the research more consideration is given to
enquiries which fail to convert to mortgage applications, perhaps as a result of the
pre-screen instigated by policy rules. What is not clear is the value of these policy
rules. If we consider risk, profitability and customer service, it is difficult to find a
strong relationship with a policy rule such as salary multiplier. An individual
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wishing to borrow four times his salary, based on a loan with a forty percent LTV
ratio, is difficult to compare to an individual wishing to borrow three times his salary
based on a loan with a one hundred percent LTV ratio. For staff at the customer
interface, who might not be trained mortgage underwriters to be able to make such
complex judgements subjectively, and in the light of only partial information about
the applicant presents something of a challenge.
The issue of policy rules was presented to lenders as something of an anomaly in the
overall credit process . In response they suggested that removing the credit policy
rules would involve them in costs of reviewing cases that were obviously "bad", e.g.
those with previously bad credit history and evidence of court judgements being
made against them. When asked to consider whether some of the other credit policy
rules might be usefully reviewed, lenders were not convinced of the value of such a
review, preferring to retain existing rules and continue to make exceptions. This
approach again conflicts with the desire for consistency which lenders stated they
wanted to achieve. If the credit policy rules are based on evidence which suggests
they are related to risk profiles of applicants, then the way they are currently applied
might also have a negative impact on risk management objectives. Additionally for
organisations that elect to use credit scoring, the existence of policy rules is still
harder to validate. Given that the credit scoring system was built on previous
applicant and performance data, and is believed to predict default, why would it be
necessary to pre-screen applicants against still more rules? Any data known to be
predictive of risk should be built into the scoring system, particularly as the data
which comprise policy rules are the type of data commonly found in the system, i.e.
salary levels, age and credit behaviour. Some property characteristics might be one
exception to this rule, but they too have the potential for inclusion. In the scorecard
this might be presented as a variable related to construction materials, or as a variable
reflecting a surveyor's recommendation regarding the property.
Mortgage policy rules often also govern the matter of affordability. Affordability
calculations are dealt with via a variety of approaches. Some lenders conduct a
manual calculation of affordability which is drawn up and examined by the lending
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officer. Others have affordability models built into the credit scoring system.
Affordability in some cases drives the amount of the loan being offered, rather than
the traditional approach using mortgage multipliers. Not all lenders interviewed
conducted an affordability test on all applicants, which would appear to be in conflict
with the voluntary mortgage code which exist. The Code of Mortgage Lending
Practice, (CML 1997), states that "all lending will be subject to our assessment of
your ability to repay". Evidence gathered during the case study phase of the
research, confirms that the calculation of affordability is often fairly haphazard and
inconsistent. Additionally, many credit scoring systems do not include an analysis
of affordability. This requires that detailed income and expenditure data be
maintained, and that affordability ratios be calculated and subsequently related to
loan outcomes. Alternatively, more general affordability calculations might be
made based on data from family expenditure surveys. What is clear, is that if
lenders who use credit scoring are to comply with their industry code, they must
consider how to combine the need for an affordability assessment into the credit
process in a manner that does not compromise the need for objectivity, consistency
and speed. The nature of the system output, and the question of providing staff with
incentives to lend also require consideration as they are relevant to this issue.
Where a system generates an "accept" decision, and staff are incentivised to lend,
their ability to provide an impartial assessment of affordability might be affected.
This is confirmed by one interviewee who suggested that "there is a sales culture,
and they want to (lend)", going on to say that "they might have met the customer and
given the warm words and so on This highlights the potentially opposing aims of
the risk manager being interviewed, and the sales team responsible for conducting
the lending.
In considering the importance of policy rules and their management, the interviews
sought to identify the performance of loans granted outwith policy guidelines. The
level of data available varied considerably between lenders, and no lender had a
system that did not require some refinement. Much of the data captured by lenders
was in a text format, which does not lend itself for analysis. Often lenders do not
record details of the reasons why a loan was identified as being outwith normal
119
lending criteria, nor the reasons for the subsequent override. This limits their ability
to perform subsequent performance analysis. Where responses as to how the non-
policy loans performed were available, they conflicted directly. Some lenders could
produce evidence that the policy overrides performed as well as the rest of the loan
portfolio, whilst others confirmed that they performed worse than the rest of the
book. These contrasting experiences may result from differences in the mortgage
process, or in the rules and procedures which are adopted to authorise and manage
the loans which were overridden. What remains unclear, are the foundations on
which the credit policy rules have been established. Therefore the true role of credit
policy rules and their relationship with risk management was not clearly established.
5.6.5. Information Used in Reaching the Credit Decision
Addressing some issues raised within the literature, an attempt was made to identify
whether the categories of data used to reach the credit decision varied between
empirical and judgmental decisioning systems. Lenders were cautious in providing
this information, and the results are indicative rather than conclusive. This line of
questioning was intended to verify whether the groupings identified within the
literature which are confirmed as being related to propensity to default are reflected
in lending practice. Are borrower stability, affordability, economic conditions,
property data and product data, commonly recognised as being necessary
considerations in predicting mortgage behaviour?
When addressing this issue with those who use credit scoring various interesting
observations resulted. Generally the scorers confirmed the use of all groupings of
variable identified within the literature, with the exception of economic conditions.
One lender confirmed that they had previously used regional economic indicators,
but had dropped their usage as their market became broader and their scorecard had
become "badly misaligned". Several lenders confirmed the influence of the product,
and the differences exhibited in behaviour between fixed and flexible rate products.
The influence of payment protection insurance was also confirmed as being
correlated to propensity to default, with those seeking or agreeing to take protection
insurance exhibiting worse risk behaviour. However, the lender who confirmed this
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suggested that "we wouldn't dare put it in the scorecard". This confirms that the
actual ability of the scorecard to predict risk can be compromised by business needs.
The lender in question confirmed they were concerned about the potential negative
publicity should the inclusion of such a variable become common knowledge.
When addressing the issue to those who use judgmental evaluation, the subjectivity
of decisioning became apparent, "first time buyers buying a one bedroom flat in the
back end of a Barrett development are going to be pretty bad news". Those lenders
using judgmental evaluation had much more difficulty in presenting the groupings,
or indeed individual variables that comprised the credit decision. In the main they
confirmed that they are "much more interested in the person", than for example the
property or product. When asked specifically what sort of process the underwriters
are asked to follow, e.g. stability then affordability, lenders responded that no formal
process really existed, not even in terms of structure "it's a'loose arrangement".
Nonetheless the judgmental lenders suggested that "we probably go in to greater
detail (than scorers)".
However, much of the anecdotal evidence provided by non-scorers, which might be
interpreted as being without foundation might in fact reflect actual propensity to
default. Statements like "we don't like flats", might, if analysis were to be done, be
found to be an accurate reflection of loan outcomes, with this particular property type
being found to be associated with propensity to default. What is more difficult to
ascertain is how these lenders can make such judgements when they are not collating
data formally. As they are not necessarily involved in arrears and collection activity,
they cannot be using the loan outcomes to inform their judgements. Additional
aspects of judgmental evaluation make it difficult to evaluate the process objectively.
One lender confirming that "a single person moving in to a four bedroom flat. we
would be highly suspiciousraises questions as to how such analysis fits in with the
risk profiling of applicants. However, the flexibility of approach was confirmed
with a lender confirming that "sometimes we do want to lend to seventy five year old
people". This type of loan to an older person, would not necessarily be acceptable
only to a non-scoring organisation. Loans with a profile such as this would normally
require a policy override in any sort of lending environment.
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The implications of the responses relative to the credit decision, seem to confirm the
benefits of scoring in presenting a decision based on past performance and
comprising those variables known to be most strongly related to default. Whilst
suggesting that judgmental evaluation was conducting a more thorough analysis,
lenders failed to present any convincing evidence that this was the case.
5.6.6. Measuring Profit on the Individual Mortgage
The means by which individual mortgage profitability is measured produced a range
of responses. This reflects the diverse nature of organisations represented. The
responses also reflected the placement of the product within the overall product
range. Three respondents confirmed an organisational ethos that was not wholly
profit driven. This highlights divergent strategies within the financial services sector.
However, lenders themselves were aware of the pressure on such an ethos surviving.
The challenge to organisations which wish to retain their mutual status, is proving to
be a forceful one. The divergence within the industry is reflected within individual
organisations, with lenders confirming that the sales-focussed branch network is
much more aware of profitability than the underwriting department. This may result
from a variety of methods of incentivising staff co-existing within organisations. The
sales staff in some of the organisations interviewed, were remunerated relative to
volumes, despite other lenders being vociferously opposed to such a practice. The
opposition to incentivising lending staff to "sell" loans, is understandable, as
evidence was presented of staff manipulating the data input; "they tweak the profile",
in order to ensure loan acceptance. Whilst staff are unaware of the scorecard
contents, they do become familiar with the "typical" characteristics of accepted and
rejected loans. Whilst not a universal problem it is one which is acknowledged to
exist, and is managed by increasing the remit of either the inspection or credit risk
department to include management of scorecard manipulation within their brief.
All lenders were aware of the desirability of being able to evaluate profitability at a
"customer" rather than a "product" level, however in reality they confirmed that the
ability to compute such a figure was "some way off\ Commonly, the profitability of
the mortgage is viewed in one of two ways. Either as a stand-alone loan, with costs
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and interest rates determining profitability, or as part of a "bundle" of associated
products. This results in the profitability of the mortgage loan being augmented by
the profitability of associated insurance products. Such insurance products are
sometimes optional, but often compulsory. In such a circumstance the mortgage loan
might be offered at a low "teaser rate" to attract business. The profitability of the
actual loan is negatively affected by the teaser rate, but is then bolstered by the profit
on the insurance. Critical in calculating profit is accurate prediction of the length of
time that loans "stay on the books". This appears to be shortening from an anecdotal
seven years to a new norm of five years. No data was presented which confirmed
means by which lenders currently assess "loan life" for mortgages. Again the credit
literature reflects developments in profitability with the move to using survival
analysis techniques to evaluate profitability. The shortening life of the loan may
have a knock on effect on product pricing, with loans requiring to generate profit
within shorter periods. One lender confirmed that they were moving towards a more
sophisticated measure of profitability. Whilst currently calculating individual loan
profitability on the product alone, they were moving fairly swiftly towards
calculating profit by the overall loan package. It should be noted that this particular
lender offered a limited product range. However, what was unique about his
approach was that there was an intention to make credit decisioning staff aware of
the profitability profile of the loan being decisioned. A move such as this would
require a meteoric increase in risk control, as it suggests that staff would be weighing
up risk and return. A relatively dangerous practice if conducted in an uncontrolled
manner.
The implications which can be drawn from this evidence on profitability
calculations, is that lenders acknowledge that the calculation of profitability at a
credit decision level is currently negligible. This suggests that when lenders
override policy rules or credit scored decisions based on the "value of a relationship"
they are unlikely to be conducting an objective evaluation of financial value.
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5.6.7. Key Performance Indicators on the Mortgage Portfolio
Within the survey evidence, lenders had provided evidence of the benefits of
adopting credit scoring. The interview sought to identify whether lenders could
quantify such benefits achieved. They were therefore asked what common measures
of mortgage loan success were routinely gathered and quantified. Those lenders
who did not score were also asked to quantify how they measured success.
Depending on the focus of the organisation, e.g. growth, risk management etc. the
performance indicators understandably vary. An unexpected outcome of the
interviews, was confirmation from lenders that performance indicators differ across
the different organisational functions. Whilst the marketing department might focus
on volumes of new business, and the sales department on volumes of cross sales of
associated products, the risk department is quantifying it's success relative to levels
of arrears and losses. These disparate measures of performance can lead to some
inter-organisational conflict, and this was evidenced. Lenders interviewed confirmed
that the need to "align corporate goals" across departments is an issue which
organisations are aware of.
The measurement of growth has also been subject to a change in focus. Lenders no
longer measure only the increase in sales volume. The current emphasis is on net
growth of the portfolio. This shift in focus is a result of both the increased mobility
of the borrower, and the resulting increased attention paid to retaining existing
customers. Customers who are retained over the longer term are confirmed to be
more profitable than "revolvers", those who move between providers within time
periods of typically less than five years. The costs of attracting new customers
impacts on the profitability of the mortgage loan. This results from the increased
processing cost associated with each new applicant, and also the extremely attractive
conditions that must be offered in the extremely competitive market place. Lenders
complain of "shaved margins" and "unrealistic teaser rates" within the industry,
suggesting that the pricing war is causing concern. Customer service levels and
perceptions also feature prominently as a measurement of success. These are
measured by a variety of means, including questionnaires, turnaround times and
again retention rates.
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The quality of mortgages is also measured, and this is not strictly a performance
measure but a risk measure, which is linked to performance. Lenders analyse the
portfolio in a variety of ways, segmenting by loan to value, by the credit score
values, by the level of arrears, and by level of default. Discussion as to whether
maintaining low levels of arrears had a positive or negative effect on profitability
provided some lively debate, but no consensus.
The outcomes of the performance measurement section, provided the basis for the
development of the benchmarking survey document which is discussed in greater
detail in chapter seven.
5.6.8. Appeals Against Credit Decisions
Two areas of interest were discussed during the appeals section of the interview.
Firstly, are customers provided with a decline reason, when they are refused credit?
One of the main criticisms of scoring has been that customers are turned down "out
of hand" without being offered any reason. This has led to press comment referring
to scoring as the "Dark Science of the Credit Industry''' Anderson (1996). Secondly,
are applicants offered the means to appeal against a decision, which declines their
application for credit. This matter also discussed by Anderson who found that even
following an appeal, applicants are "unlikely to be given much information about why
your application has been turned down". This conflicts with US experience, where
under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act "when a creditor declines to grant a request
for credit, it must give the applicant a statement of the reasons for the adverse
action" (Hsai, 1978).
When the questions are presented to those who do not credit score, the decline
process seemed fragmented for several lenders with a respondent confirming "do you
know, I don't even know if they get a letter", and another confirming "/ wouldn 7 say
there is" (an appeals process). When asking about the specific reasons provided to
applicants who were declined credit, every possible response was received. From
giving a reason for every decline to giving a broad indication of the reason, and
finally giving no reason at all. The request for an appeal was more commonly from
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the branch network or via intermediaries than driven directly from individual
customers. However, this may reflect centralised decisioning whereby the first level
appeal is made to the interviewer who then decides whether or not to escalate the
appeal. No major differences were evidenced between those who score and those
who do not. Those using credit scoring also presented little appetite for an appeals
process. This was again partly due to the centralised nature of decisioning which
resulted again in most appeals being branch or intermediary generated. Respondents
cite the games of "ping pong" that result from the combination of centralised
decision making and branch accountability to the customer. The impression given
was that of lenders who would prefer that they did not require to have a formalised
process. The tension between a centralised decisioning team, and those at the
customer interface was a feature of several interviews. Part of the tension certainly
resulted from credit scoring being in place. One lender went as far as to describe "a
war of attrition going on". The perception gained, is of a group within the
organisation who have faith in the ability of the credit scorecard. This group who
"have faith" are normally risk based staff, and they are trying to manage
relationships with branch staff, whose focus is on loan volumes and achieving sales
targets. This poor relationship and dissonant view of credit scoring, is reflected in
the lack of structure and form around the appeals processes in place. It seemed
that there was little encouragement for applicants to appeal. Appeals were driven by
lending staff or intermediaries whose desire for the loan to be granted might result
more from personal motivation, than a customer focus.
When asked specifically about the provision of reasons for credit declines, those who
did score confirmed the provision of decline reasons to be "a thorny issue for credit
managers". This results from a fear that providing decline decisions compromises
the confidentiality of the scoring system. This conflicts with the credit industry's
own Guide to Scoring (1993), which confirms that lenders should provide "as clear
an explanation for the refusal as possible by providing the principal reason for the
decline". However, another scoring lender, did confirm that where the decline
reason was adverse credit they were legally bound to provide the customer with
details of how to obtain further data, and this was done. Non scorers variously did
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and did not provide reasons, in concert with the scorers. The ability of non scoring
lenders to provide a decision presents an interesting problem. If, as they say, they
consider more information than a scoring system, they would require some structure
around the decision that offsets the value of one variable against the other. As no
such structure was commonly found, it might be surmised that if a clear decline
reason does exist it might well have been reached in a subjective manner. This of
course precludes policy overrides, which are declined on that basis.
5.6.9. Other Issues Related to Credit Decisioning
The final section of the interview, comprised a general discussion of some current
issues relating to the use of scoring. The potential for credit scoring to be used as a
mechanism for risk-pricing, arrears management and for securitisation pricing exists.
However, as credit scoring usage for mortgages has been found to be in its infancy,
the practical applications are found to lag behind the potential applications. Despite
this lender's views are included to give an overview as to the pace of development in
these areas.
One topic discussed was risk-pricing. Lenders regardless of scoring status
confirmed that risk-pricing does exist. This is currently based variously on loan
values, loan to value ratio, new borrowers, existence of MIG, and one non scorer
confirmed pricing based on credit history. The credit score's role in risk pricing had
been confirmed within the survey. The difficulty in adopting risk-pricing for some
mutual societies, stemmed from an ethical dilemma. This was confirmed by one
lender stating "if one gets charged 8% all customers get charged 8%", we feel it isn 't
fair to offer new borrowers a discount". The reality of the situation was presented
by another mutual society who suggested that "purely on lending terms the interest
rate charged should be based on risk, but the market cloesn 't work like that".
The issuance of Mortgage Guarantee Certificates was also discussed. Mortgage
Guarantee Certificates are issued in advance of the borrower finding a suitable
property, and confirm the maximum loan value which will be advanced, (subject to
confirmation of some key information). Typically the additional information is the
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survey confirming that the property affords suitable security to the lender. The
relationship between such certificates and credit decisioning is that they confirm that
property variables are forming little part of the decision to lend as the property has
not been chosen. However, borrowers might be being asked to indicate the likely
property variables, e.g. type, number of bedrooms, LTV ratio etc. in order that the
decision can be made "in principle". The lenders view of the certificate, "of course it
isn't really worth the paper it's written on, there are so many caveats", is reflected
by scorers and non-scorers alike.
Securitisation formed the basis of the next part of the interview. As securitisation of
mortgage loan portfolios is a recent and developing activity in the UK market, it was
unclear how aware lenders would be of this form of mortgage activity. Without
exception all lenders were found to be aware of the securitisation activity (or lack of)
within their own organisation. Actual securitisation activity was stronger amongst
the credit scoring organisations. The non scoring organisations had several problems
with securitisation. For several the problem resulted from their acknowledgement of
weak management information systems, which meant that "we couldn't securitise
our book easily as we wouldn 't be able to produce the background information on
each case". However, others simply cited that they did not require to raise capital
by this means. For some of the mutual organisations particular problems existed
regardless of scoring status. This results from the relationship with their customers
who are also their members. A lender confirming that "we would probably have
ethical problems, people are our members, and if you securitise you are passing on
your members to somebody else"; a perspective reflected by another lender who
suggests "it wouldn't sit very well with the ethos of the society".
Those who did securitise confirmed recent volumes of activity. One lender had a
plaque on his desk. This was an example of a plaque given to all staff as a result of a
recent European "record breaking" securitisation which their organisation had
undertaken. He confirmed that being involved in this had been a "big thing, and we
should show it off'. Another lender giving details of recent securitisation also
confirmed that "size matters", "at that time it was the biggest transaction of the
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year". Regardless of current levels of activity, lenders had either recently changed
documentation to ensure that they could securitise or were currently involved in
initiatives which reflected a need to do so "it's something we're dealing with at the
moment". When asked whether the credit score values had been used in setting the
price of the securitisation, or as a means by which to "bundle" the mortgage loans for
securitisation, lenders were less clear. No lender confirmed the link, the majority did
not know whether or not the score value was being used. The actual securitisation of
the loans was being conducted by other functions within the organisation. Generally
the view was that the credit score was not being used, but responses were vague "/
don't think it has, no".
5.7. Addressing the Research Questions
The richness of the interview data, provided a new dimension to the research. The
complexity of the issues, highlighted by the fact that even within the organisation a
different perspective would be provided from individual departments.
What became evident was a relatively unstructured approach to risk management for
a proportion of cases. These were the credit score and credit policy overrides.
Evidence provided later via the benchmarking survey, suggests that this group might
comprise as much as thirty percent of applicants. For lenders approaching this level,
a substantial proportion of the portfolio might be being compromised from a risk
management perspective.
In relating this evidence to the research questions presented at the commencement of
this chapter, the following answers are presented:
□ Do the credit decisioning systems used, contain sufficient data to be able to
predict mortgage default risk?
When this question is addressed to organisations which do credit score the answer
would appear to be yes. Scoring lenders are aware that information relating to the
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borrower, product, property and affordability require to be considered, in assessing
mortgage risk. This data is included in the scoring systems. The lack of economic
data is not an oversight. Lenders suggested that the size and nature of their markets
made the inclusion of such data, un-necessary and un-realistic. Indeed a single
lender had dropped economic data from the scorecard. It would seem therefore that
overriding the credit scoring system is not done on the basis of additional risk related
information.
When related to those organisations that do not credit score, but instead use
judgmental evaluation, the answer to this question would appear to be no. The lack
of formal processes and procedures suggests that information on the borrower,
product, property economic conditions and affordability are not consistently applied
in reaching a judgmental decision. Not only does a considerable volume of such data
need to be considered, but each variable also requires to be weighted for risk. The
lack of structure, when combined with the lack of analysis of previous lending
outcomes, and the volume of data required would make it almost impossible for all
underwriters to include all relevant data consistently.
□ Does organisational culture determine the rate and means by which lending
policy alters from judgmental to empirical "
The answer to this question would appear to be yes. Respondents alluded to difficult
relationships between "scoring teams", both technical and operational, and the staff
who operate the scoring systems. Additionally, the existence of a lending hierarchy,
confirmed that issues of status and seniority might be affected by a move to
empirical decision making. The confrontation between the supporters of scoring and
the traditionalists, is highlighted by the overt manner of the confirmation to
underwriters that the scorecard could outperform them. The confirmation of the
"macho culture" which prevails, highlights that respondents are aware of these
cultural issues. The response from non scorers also confirmed that in many respects
they considered themselves to have a unique organisational focus and culture which
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considered relationships and customer service to be a priority, which scoring might
compromise. Again evidence that they believe the "culture" of the organisation is
unsuited to empirical decisioning systems.
□ Are lending decisions made based on profitability profiles of customers, rather
than risk profiles ?
For scorers and non scorers alike the answer to this question is no. No lender
interviewed appeared to be in a position to calculate profitability at the time when the
credit decision was being made. Indeed lenders considered an evaluation of product
profitability at the time of credit decisioning to conflict with the concept of good
credit risk management. This suggests that, for the moment, at least risk-based
scorecards will be of more value to mortgage lenders than a profitability scoring
system. Chapter six of this thesis presents the development and performance of such
a risk based scorecard for an UK mortgage lender.
5.8. Conclusions
In considering the research output generated following both the survey and the
subsequent interviews it has become clear that credit scoring can offer potential
advantages to mortgage lenders. However, what has also become clear is that the
combination of policy rules, overriding, and the location of scoring in the lending
process reduce the effectiveness of scoring and limit the benefits actually derived by
the lender.
In order to clarify the current situation the problem is depicted graphically and
presented in figure 5.4.
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The shaded section in the centre of figure 5.4, highlights those benefits which are
not currently being achieved by all lenders. This failure to derive benefits is a result
of the following reasons.
5.8.1. Credit Policy and Credit Scoring
One of the most significant failings is that in general credit policies have not been
rewritten to reflect the goal, or role of scoring in the organisation. The objective of
the scorecard is not clearly defined. Whether the scorecard is intended to provide
decisions for all applicants, or only a certain group of cases is never overtly stated.
This results in overriding of the scorecard taking place in an ad-hoc fashion, which
impinges on the ability of the scorecard to deliver it's key objectives.
5.8.2. Overriding and Credit Scoring
The ad-hoc nature of scorecard overriding, results in a potentially detrimental impact
on risk management. The scorecard cut off has been set to deliver a pre-determined
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ratio of potential good applicants being accepted relative to potential bad applicants
being declined. By compromising the cut off value, the agreed ratios of good and
bad accounts will be altered, by either accepting more risk and thus potentially
decreasing profitability, or by accepting less risk with the same potential impact.
The failure of organisations to make over-riding a more cohesive and scientific
practice is evident. Despite some lenders acknowledging that the overrides
performed badly, almost no tracking of override reasons relative to loan performance
was in place. Within some organisations little evidence of override tracking relative
to the performance of the rest of the portfolio takes place at all.
5.8.3. Policy Overrides and Credit Scoring
Reflecting the situation of overriding credit score decisions, is the overriding of
mortgage policy rules, or lending criteria. The rules are based on a variety of mainly
historic features, and do not seem to have been in any way "married" with the
predictive ability of the credit scorecard. Indeed some seem to have no direct
relationship with either risk or profitability. Again, the situation becomes more
confused as these rules are often subjectively overridden. A lack of tracking and
management information is evident, and suggests that organisations are not using
their experience in an manner that permits the organisation to learn from their
lending experience in a formalised manner.
Overriding of both credit score generated lending decisions, and of policy rules
prevents credit scoring from delivering consistency, objectivity and the assurance of
compliance with legislation which seeks to prevent discrimination.
The practice of overriding credit scoring, need not be discontinued. Where
overriding does take place, organisations must seek to gain control of the practice,
and marry the override procedures and policies with the abilities and objectives of
the scorecard. Improved tracking of lending outcomes is required, particularly
related to the override reasons. This will provide the management information
which allows organisations to begin to use their discretion in overriding.
Discretionary overriding which is more tightly managed will allow organisations to
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move towards the achievement of consistency and compliance. Discretionary
overriding will also provide data that will improve scorecard performance. This in
turn will result in the derivation of improved levels of customer service.
5.8.4. The Lending Process and Credit Scoring
The lending processes also require to be reviewed if credit scoring is to add
maximum value, and achieve its potential. The location of scoring at the centre of
the organisation compromises the ability for maximum speed to decision to be
offered. However, additional practices like delays in loading data, double checking
of all applications prior to data input, paper based applications, and retrospective
scoring of applications after a judgmental evaluation has been made were evident.
This places in question the efficiency of scorecard management by some lenders.
Significant streamlining of the lending process could be achieved without
compromising risk management.
Market research requires to be undertaken by lenders to establish at what point the
customer perceives that he has received a commitment to lend that he is satisfied
with. If this is indeed at the "agreement in principle" stage, lenders might focus on
reducing time to this initial decision. This could for example be achieved by
separating the categories of data required for risk assessment, and gathering this
information first with all other data being gathered sequentially as it is required.
Thus the application data, which is needed to determine the loan outcome, would be
gathered initially producing a very fast decision. This would significantly reduce the
volume of data being requested at the first customer interview or contact. The
security, marketing and other data could then be gathered when the loan had been
agreed.
It is acknowledged that the level of technology available to lenders is varied.
Lenders reported systems often derived from a legacy of bolt-on systems, and also
derived as a result of mergers. The resulting systems are often delivering
performance and functionality which lenders acknowledge to be sub optimal. Until
higher levels of technology are in place, real-time, on-line, point-of-sale decision
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making may be some way away for many lenders. However, lenders should consider
how best they can simulate this optimum solution, in order that applicants get a
quick, consistent decision whilst the organisation maintains risk which is controlled
at acceptable levels.
This thesis thus far, has summarised the incidence and manner of usage of mortgage
scoring in the UK. Additionally, evidence has been presented within this chapter
which suggests that the derivation of business benefits has been compromised by the
manner by which credit scoring has been adopted and managed within the operating
environment. The diversity of lenders both in terms of their operational capacity and
their business objectives means that no single "blueprint" as to how scoring should
be operationalised would be appropriate. However, some suggestions have been
made as to the means by which lenders could practically improve their scorecard
management. It is believed that by adopting some of these suggestions lenders
would derive a real improvement in achieving consistency, compliance, speed and
customer service benefits.
Chapter six of this thesis will now report the findings of a case study undertaken with
the co-operation of a non-scoring mortgage lender. The development and
performance of a bespoke mortgage scorecard will be reported.
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Chapter Six
6. Case Study Data and Analysis
6.1. Introduction
Thus far within this thesis a sequential approach to the research problem has yielded
valuable data. The literature review introduced credit scoring, and the development
of credit scoring. The range of techniques used to build scorecards was also
considered. Additionally, the literature introduced the mortgage loan, confirming
that a wider group of variables need to be included in the credit decisioning of this
particular product. Finally, within the literature we confirm that the complexity of
the operating environment requires to be considered, when we examine how lenders
implement new technologies. Chapter four presented an overview of how credit
scoring is currently used in the mortgage environment, and showed extensive use of
mortgage credit scoring, but ad-hoc adherence to the system generated decision.
Chapter five addressed the contradictions evident between lenders goals for credit
scoring, and their subsequent behaviour when scoring had been introduced. Despite
the work undertaken during the interview programme, which sought to uncover a
logical reason for overriding based on risk or profit, none was found to exist.
In combination, the foregoing research generated a further research question. Given
that within scoring organisations a strong judgmental element still exists in the
lending process, evidence requires to be presented which compares the outcomes of
judgmental and empirical decisioning when applied to a mortgage portfolio.
Chapter six of this thesis addresses the following research question:
□ Can a mortgage credit scorecard outperform judgmental evaluation of mortgage
loan performance?
The research design is presented in chapter three, and the decision to select the case
study method as a means to address this research question is explained. Chapter six
will now describe the case study, which was undertaken in order to obtain data to
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enable the research question presented to be resolved. In conclusion chapter six
answers the research question.
6.2. Shaping the Case Study
6.2.1. Organisations Targeted for Case Study Analysis
It was necessary to identify those firms within the research population who were
potentially suitable for case study analysis. The respondent population was examined
to find suitable organisations to approach. The criteria indicating suitability
combined lending characteristics, with geographic considerations. The lending
characteristics identified as desirable were as follows;
■ Mortgage loan decisions made judgementally
■ High volume of mortgage loans granted (relative to survey respondents)
■ Application data available
■ Performance data available
■ Access to staff who undertook decisioning permitted
It was desirable that the participant organisation was located within a particular
geographic zone as it was likely that data gathering would take some time, and
resources required to be managed efficiently. Two organisations emerged as being
most suitable for case study analysis. A meeting was arranged with each of the two
organisations during which they were introduced to the research in more detail.
6.2.2. Presenting the Research to Participants
It was considered vital that the case study objectives meet the needs of both the
researcher and potential participant organisation, if a mutually rewarding relationship
was to be achieved. Equally importantly, the case study required to offer some
incentive to the potential participant, if they were to be persuaded to provide access
to valuable data. It was therefore deemed necessary in the first instance, to provide
both potential participants with a document, which provided an overview of the
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intended outcomes of the case study. This initial outline was provided in a document
entitled "Mortgage Credit Scoring - An Evaluation". This document is included as
Appendix J, and describes the key areas which were intended to form the basis of
this phase of the research. The document was initially presented to both target
participants.
Both lenders were generally receptive to the initiative, but both were concerned
regarding issues of data access and confidentiality requirements. However,
following further informal discussions both at interview and via telephone and email
contact, the larger of the two1 (by volume of new lending), was formally approached
with a personally tailored research outline which reduced the number of areas to be
covered. The actual areas of investigation will be outlined in more detail later within
this chapter. The negotiations for access to data were protracted. From the initial
interview, which took place in February 1999, meetings took place both at the offices
of the participant organisation and at the University. It was not until May 1999 that
final agreement was reached and work could commence. The delays resulted from a
combination of restructuring within the case study organisation, busy schedules of
participants, and confidentiality requirements. Some very specific confidentiality
requirements were appended to the standard University confidentially agreement,
and these required negotiation. Thus some four months after negotiations had
commenced, the case study research was finally underway.
6.2.3. Case Study Objectives
The research thus far has identified three key areas where credit scoring can add
value to the organisation; those are risk, process and cost benefits. During the initial
discussions with the lender, it became clear that detailed financial cost information
would not become available. The research objectives were therefore amended to
reflect a focus on two key benefit areas, process and risk. At a process level it was
agreed that the mortgage process be examined and documented, in order that
' The organisation which became the focus of the case study research will here-after be referred to as
the Lender
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potential inefficiencies could be highlighted. At a risk level, it was determined that
the performance of the judgmental decisioning method would be compared with the
performance of a bespoke mortgage scorecard. This objective reflects the key
research question being addressed. Such a direct comparison of judgmental and
empirical lending outcomes has not previously been undertaken using data from an
UK based mortgage loan portfolio.
6.3. Organisational Profile
Without compromising confidentiality, it is useful to consider some characteristics of
the organisation, which was the focus of the case study research. The lender is an
established participant in the financial services market place, in which they have
operated successfully for many years. They maintain a strong branch network, and
individual branches have considerable autonomy of mortgage decision making.
This reflects a traditional de-centralised culture, within which the individual branch
manager has considerable influence and decision making authority. This profile
reflects the traditional hierarchical approach to lending previously identified. Within
such an environment, value is attached to traditional lending skills and the resulting
level of authority, which is associated with such skills. Again reflecting earlier
research findings, we might expect an environment such as this to be one in which
some conflict might arise were empirical decisioning to be introduced. During the
earlier interviews, evidence of conflict and disparate views were presented. These
had sometimes resulted from new strategies supporting change from a de-centralised
branch based approach to lending, to an empirically based centralised lending
function. Such an organisational change might also result in the de-skilling and
subsequent re-skilling of personnel. The alternative to re-skilling as evidenced in
other similar organisations is the redundancy of some senior roles within the branch
network, and a move towards a less hierarchical environment with a stronger focus
on the role of the sales person.
The senior members of management who participated in the discussions as to
whether to proceed with the research were exclusively male. However, it would be
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wrong to present this as confirmation of a "macho culture" existing, a feature which
was also confirmed within the interview findings.
Whilst maintaining a strong branch network, with considerable autonomy, a
centralised credit underwriting function also exists. The role of the underwriting
team is to make lending decisions for those applications, which, are outwith the
credit policy guidelines. On occasions where the branch receive such an application
they should forwarded it to the underwriters where a lending decision is made by one
of an experienced team of underwriters. The underwriters are graded on a policy
rules basis, and are managed within a hierarchical team. The underwriting team
leaders are highly experienced in making lending decisions on mortgage loans.
However, no performance data on the lending outcomes of the loans they grant,
which are outwith credit policy was held by the lender prior to this research. The
underwriting team does also have a second function. When branch officers have
made a decision to approve a mortgage application, the application is then sent to the
processing centre. At the processing centre the clerks key the application data on to
a mortgage management system. During this process the process clerks are checking
that the application meets lending criteria. If this is not the case the application is
passed to the underwriters who contact the branch, in an effort to clarify the reason
why a non-criteria application has been decisioned by the branch. This is usually due
to the ambiguity of the credit rules resulting in a variety of interpretations existing.
The underwriting team then makes an attempt to convince the branch to withdraw the
application. This negotiation involves the underwriters convincing the branch of
"the error of their ways". This is not always successful, as the branch has often
committed the bank to lend, and will not withdraw the application. This
underwriting role results in some areas of conflict and will be examined further as
the mortgage process is outlined.
The overview presented is one of a "typical" established lender, who values the
"specialised" knowledge of the underwriters, and has only recently come to terms
with the potential value of new technologies. Thus a follower, rather than a leader
in the mortgage market. However, as a fairly large volume lender this organisation
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was ideal for case study analysis, as it did not suffer from a lack of data which was
cited by smaller lenders as a reason for not scoring.
6.4. Establishing Relationships
Having set up the research project, the senior personnel stepped back from the
research and appointed various personnel to act as liaison officers with the
researcher. The personnel appointed seemed to be genuinely interested in the
research being undertaken, and provided assistance where required. This was an
unexpected response, as an investigation of the role of mortgage scoring in a
judgmental lending environment might have been expected to set "alarm bells"
ringing amongst an underwriting team. This appeared not to happen as the
underwriters seemed absolutely confident of their status within the organisation as
that of a "specialised" team". All individuals had heavy workloads, and beyond
providing information as requested they were not actively involved in undertaking
any element of the research. They remained very "hands off', and seemed happy to
allow the researcher to "get on with it", without supervision or their active
involvement. These key personnel were from a variety of functions and are now
introduced.
6.4.1. Mortgage Underwriting Personnel
The first point of contact, and the most senior contact, was with the most senior
member of the underwriting team. The underwriting team operates from a
centralised decisioning unit. The centralised unit is housed within a processing
environment as opposed to a branch environment. A variety of meetings were held
during which the lending process was outlined to the researcher. Documentary
evidence regarding credit policy was also provided to the researcher as background
material in order that the mortgage process be fully understood. Following these
meetings, it was determined that the application data to be gathered would be from
February 1998. This time period was selected as it provided the oldest data
available on which reports could be produced, which would result in lists of
application numbers becoming available. Application numbers were required in
order that the application details could be tracked. The lender has only relatively
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recently utilised technologies which allowed such tracking to be conducted. The key
outcome of the initial discussions was the production of an Excel spreadsheet
providing the application details for February 1998. This spreadsheet was the
"starting point" from which applications could be tracked, to establish their fate.
The credit personnel were revisited at later stages in the research to clarify file notes,
and actions taken during the application process.
6.4.2. Application Processing Personnel
Despite the mortgage lending decisions being taken at individual branches, mortgage
application processing is conducted centrally. The senior officers in charge of the
processing centre also became liaison staff. They allocated working space to the
researcher, and provided a security pass, which allowed unrestricted access to the
operating environment. When it became necessary for the researcher to become
familiar with the automated systems, staff were allocated to "walk through" the
various processes in order that the researcher could then access data as required. The
data being gathered within the application processing centre, related to the status of
applications, and the current status of accounts which had been opened. Using the
spreadsheet provided by the underwriting team, the fate of the applications made in
February 1998 was tracked using the computer based systems at the processing
centre. The processing staff also provided details as to the likely locations of various
files, when files were required. They also provided a useful liaison function which
ensured that the researcher could get access to the data storage warehouse.
6.4.3. Data Warehousing Personnel
Armed with the account details gathered from the processing centre, the researcher
spent several months at the data warehouse. Two members of personnel at this
location acted as liaison, having been contacted by the processing staff. Again
working space was allocated to the researcher, and involvement of staff was limited.
The liaison staff assisted in providing a "walk through" of their systems. The
warehouse had a different technology based file tracking system. It was therefore
necessary to input the account numbers obtained earlier, in order to obtain a bar code
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for each file. Using this bar code, the location of the file could then be tracked to a
single box, on a specified shelf at a particular point in the warehouse. This allowed
the researcher to identify and gather files. The files when tracked were taken to the
allocated desk where they were examined and data gathered. The warehousing
personnel assisted where codes indicated that files were missing for a particular
reason, and provided insights as to where they might be held.
6.4.4. Arrears Management Personnel
As the research progressed, it became necessary to track down files relating to those
accounts which had gone into arrears. These files were variously held at branches or
at the centralised arrears management centre. This centre was being established
during the earlier stages of the research, and was in its infancy when the files were
required. Thus files were being "called in" from branches to the centralised arrears
unit during the research period. The centralised arrears function is housed in a new
building, again remote from the other processing centres. The processing liaison
staff contacted members of arrears staff, and access was arranged for the researcher.
Despite the researcher conducting analysis, beyond that which the arrears staff
conducts, again staff were not at all defensive about their role. Despite expressing an
interest in the results when they became available, they accepted that the results
would be forwarded only to a very senior member of management. This seemed to
confirm that the hierarchical nature within the organisation, was accepted. On
request the arrears files were passed to the researcher, who gathered data as required.
6.4.5. Credit Risk Personnel
Towards the very final stages of data gathering a new group showed interest in the
research, and invited the researcher to a meeting. The Credit Risk staff, who are in
charge of writing credit policy within the organisation, were interested in the arrears
analysis being conducted. This was a somewhat surprising development, as the
existence of a risk team had never previously been acknowledged by any of the
personnel, whom the researcher had encountered. The credit risk team is housed in a
processing environment, which is unrelated to the main mortgage processing centre
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and the arrears management centre. Very limited interaction with this team took
place, as their requirements could not easily be met within the research brief. The
credit risk personnel would have liked more detailed analysis to be conducted on a
subset of the population chosen for analysis. However, the limited number of cases
in the subset, would have rendered any analysis statistically invalid. Additionally,
the outcome would not have contributed to the research study, and as such was not
undertaken, as it would have put an unhelpful strain on resources.
However, the risk team did request, and were provided with, a list of all accounts
from the sample examined which had gone in to arrears, along with data on the
extent of the indebtedness. This was a surprising request indicating that the internal
reporting mechanisms were not providing a level of management information, which
could usefully support in depth portfolio analysis. This was confirmed within the
meeting, as staff expressed surprise that they had any accounts which were ten
payments in arrears at a time period twelve months after opening. Information
which they might reasonably have been expected to be aware of. Reporting which
did exist, appeared to be at a macro level, e.g. the proportion of accounts in arrears
across the portfolio rather than segmented in variety of ways.
6.4.6. Summary - Personnel Involved
The picture presented is that of a somewhat fragmented staff structure supporting the
mortgage process. This is an accurate reflection of the organisation during the
research period. However, it should be noted that this picture was taken during a
period of change. The organisation, like many others, had maintained de-centralised
control of mortgages for many years. Applications and arrears had traditionally been
dealt with at branch level. Central support had previously been available for those
applications which were clearly outwith policy, and for those arrears cases which had
reached a particular "status" i.e. at a pre-determined level of arrears. What was
witnessed was a move to centralisation in order to improve efficiencies. Thus the
processing, file storage and arrears functions were being centralised. As with any
centralised functions, the intended outcomes were confirmed by the lender to be a
combination of improved control, consistency of approach and cost savings.
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However, the decision making function was not at this point being centralised. The
participant lender was quite frank in confirming that the research being undertaken,
might usefully assist them in deciding whether to centralise the decision making
function also.
A lack of cohesion between functions was also evident. The fact that functions such
as mortgage processing, arrears management and credit risk were geographically
remote could have contributed to the fragmentation evident. However, in
discussions with the various staff, it became apparent that they had a very "functional
mindset". Staff within each function, appeared to have little interest in the role of
the other functions. This held true even when the functions appeared to the
researcher to require to have close relationships in order to meet business goals. No
evidence of the processing, arrears and credit risk teams having regular meetings was
found. This suggests that the potential for valuable organisational learning is being
missed. No feedback loops or iteration processes seemed to have been formalised.
In order to maximise learning opportunities, the mortgage process might usefully be
viewed more holistically.
6.5. The Mortgage Process
6.5.1. Mortgage Documentation
Initial assessment of the documentation provided, confirmed that staff had written
guidelines on all aspects of mortgage lending. These included elements of an
introduction to mortgage related topics, as well as detailed instructions regarding the
mortgage process. The instructions which guided staff focussed on process related
issues, and included the following broad topic areas:
□ General mortgage guidelines
□ Types of mortgage
□ Application assessment
□ Procedures following a successful offer
□ Mortgage arrears management
145
The information available to staff which provided a broad overview of issues related
to mortgages generally included the following:
□ MIRAS an introduction
□ Mortgage analysis reports
□ Sources of mortgage business
□ Securitisation
The content of these documents is not reproduced in detail, due to issues related to
confidentiality. However, it is possible to confirm that the focus of the
documentation was process and task driven. The uniqueness of the mortgage product,
the drivers of mortgage default, or risk management generally did not feature within
the various documents. The purpose of the documentation was to provide basic
procedural instructions.
The documents provided confirmation that written information was available to staff
which informed them about their ability to take lending decisions on behalf of the
lender in a variety of circumstances. Analysis of the quality of the written
guidelines was made subjectively by the researcher, again in order that
confidentiality would not be compromised. In examining the written guidance given
to staff the research focus was in trying to "tie in" the guidance given to staff with
aspects of risk, profitability and customer relationships. These aspects having been
identified as being important in reaching a mortgage loan decision.
The outcome of the examination of documentation, was a view that the guidance was
presented to staff in a manner not wholly supportive of risk management. Guidance
was worded loosely, and in a way which allowed many interpretations to be made by
individuals. This compromises the need for control and consistency. The only
aspect of risk, which received attention, was the potential for mortgage fraud. Again
this information was worded in a fairly ambiguous fashion. An example was the
need for staff who are trying to ensure no fraudulent applications are accepted to
"scrutinise the proof of identity to ensure that it is not a forgery". Due to the nature
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of the mortgage loan, and the fact that legal security is taken over the underlying
property, one might assume that mortgage fraudsters are capable of producing some
high quality forged documents. By giving such general guidance it is unclear what
the lender expects of individual staff members. How much checking is attached to
the instruction to "scrutinise"? Does this involve cross checking or simply giving
the document a visual examination only? Such criticism is not intended to be trite,
rather to exemplify that it was often hard to find a relationship between the
instructions given to staff, and the need to manage the process in a way which
manages risk and meets customer service needs. Additionally, some aspects of the
guidance on avoiding fraud were linked to loan to value ratios. This resulted in the
different levels of activity which were focussed on fraud avoidance, being
determined by the LTV ratio. This in turn suggests that a risk:return trade-off is
being made centrally. Whilst the trade off between risk and return is a given in the
lending environment, it was something of a surprise to find it related to fraud
avoidance. The desire to avoid fraud, might be expected to produce guidelines which
are adhered to in all cases. Profitability (return) might be expected to become a
consideration, only where a level of certainty about the applicant was assured.
6.5.2. The Mortgage Process
As has been alluded to in the earlier discussion of the role of the underwriter, the
process was extremely fragmented. And the extent of the fragmentation is evident
in figure 6.1.



















What figure 6.1 shows is that several different scenarios can exist depending on the
nature of the application. The first determinant of action is whether the mortgage is
within or outwith credit policy criteria. If the loan is within criteria, the branch can
give agreement in principle to lend. They then take up references, and when they
have all the required documentation the application and supporting paperwork is sent
to the processing centre. The processing clerks then check that the loan is within
criteria, and that the documentation is in order. If everything is correct the offer
papers are produced. If however the loan is found to be outwith criteria, the loan is
passed to the underwriting team. This part of the process is indicated by the dotted
lines in figure 6.1. The underwriters then contact the branch by telephone or fax,
and try by means of pointing out the branches "error" to prompt the branch to
withdraw the application. This may or may not happen. If the branch officer has
interpreted the credit policy rules differently to the underwriter he will maintain that
he was "within his rights" to make the loan. Also if the branch has committed the
bank to lend, the application will proceed. The number of negotiations and the rate
of underwriter success in making the branch withdraw the application was not
known. However, of the applications approved, 30% had been passed to the
underwriting team, either directly from the branch or via the processing staff.
Another scenario evidenced when the loan has been approved at the branch office, is
that the processing clerks find that some supporting evidence is missing. In this
instance they will liaise with the branch to obtain the missing documentation.
Where an application is acknowledged by the branch to be outwith the lending
criteria, it should be sent directly to the underwriting team. The underwriters then
either give a decision in principle without obtaining further information, or may ask
the branch to provide some additional information. Again this liaison is either by
telephone or fax.
The key process problems mainly arise due to different interpretation of the policy
rules which result in branch lending staff, considering loans to be within criteria,
whilst the underwriting staff consider them to be outwith lending criteria. This
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results in considerable friction and "ping-pong" of applications between the branch
offices and the underwriting team. The credit policy rules, which cause many of
these problems, are now considered in more detail.
6.5.3. Credit Policy Rules
As evidenced in figure 6.1 the credit policy rules, determine whether the branch
rather than the centralised unit should grant a mortgage. The credit policy rules, like
the general procedures are open to interpretation. Having examined the credit policy
documentation, the researcher believes that the rules contain some apparent
contradictions. Applicants who had displayed previous poor credit behaviour in a
relationship with this lender were to be declined. However, applicants who had
displayed poor credit behaviour with another lender (identified by bureau
information) were only to be declined if the poor behaviour had taken place within a
given timescale. This would seem to penalise existing customers, who in analysis
conducted later in this chapter, are found to be less risky than new borrowers.
Many extremely subjective assessments were encouraged within the credit policy
rules. Staff were expected to be able to evaluate "marketability of applicant skills'''
where applicants were employed on short-term employment contracts. Likewise
the ability of the potential borrower to meet the loan repayments (service the loan)
was taken subjectively by lending staff who were given very few guidelines as to
what should be included. Staff were advised to consider "all regular monthly
outgoings", and to ensure that "this figure appears accurate". Within the
examination of files which followed, it became apparent that interpretation of this
"rule" varied immensely. A common occurrence was that an individual previously
living at home with parents often provided outgoing figures of nil. This somewhat
unlikely figure was accepted by staff as being accurate. The existence of no
outgoings was often presented by applicants who earned substantial sums and had no
capital assets or savings. Neither the loan officer nor the centralised lending team
challenged this apparently contradictory evidence.
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6.5.4. Process Inefficiencies
As identified the branch officer examines the loan application to ensure compliance
with the various rules which exist, prior to making a lending decision. To help ensure
compliance he completes an assessment form, which is a rule-based form in which
confirmation of the loan's adherence to the various policy rules is requested.
However, within the form are various options for the loan officer to confirm that the
application is in fact outwith the criteria, and to provide supporting reasons as to why
he has made his decision despite conflict with the rules. According to the
procedures, applications outwith the criteria should have been sent to the central
underwriting team in order that a decision be made by them. The existence of this
anomalous rule based form, is not supportive of the policy which states the branch
should not be making these decisions.
An additional process problem is identified. When the branch assess the application,
they are then responsible for obtaining supporting information. A combination of
credit search details, bank statements, property survey and suitable identification
required to be collated. The branch therefore make the initial loan assessment, and
give a decision to lend in principle subject to this back up data being provided. This
then led to a period during which the branch requested and "chased up" the
supporting information. Following this period, the completed application and
supporting data was sent to the centralised team for preparation of a final offer to
take place. The final offer is the legal document, which finally confirms that the loan
will be made on a given day. Problems resulted when gathering the supporting data
required a protracted time period, or indeed where the customer wished to move
quickly to purchase a property. In these cases the borrower had often received
agreement in principle and had heard no further, assuming that the offer papers were
being produced. When all documentation was finally sent for processing it might be
found not to conform to criteria and be passed to the underwriting team. The
underwriters then often found themselves trying to decline a loan, which the
customer believed, had already been approved. Thus the underwriters found
themselves to be in a situation where the branch had "committed the bank to lend",
and they could not then decline the transaction.
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Thus a process or procedural problem metamorphoses into a risk problem. The
underwriters find themselves "accepting" (albeit grudgingly) loans which they
believe pose an unacceptable level of risk.
A further risk problem evident, is that the duty of identifying "non-criteria" loans
which are being presented for processing via the "within criteria" channel falls to the
processing clerks. The processing clerks have had no formal risk or lending based
training, and must identify the loans via a checklist of criteria. This suggests that a
proportion of loans, which are being accepted might be non-criteria loans which are
eluding the scrutiny of the processing clerks. This would result in a mistaken view
of the risk inherent in the portfolio.
The combination of risk and process inefficiencies identified, often resulted in
customer service problems. These were evident in file notes and letters or faxes of
complaint within the files or noted on the screen based mortgage system. The "ping-
pong" of applications between two decisioning bodies (branch and underwriter),
resulted in delays in producing offer papers, and on occasion customer
disappointment when the decision to lend was changed.
6.5.5. Summary - the mortgage process
Figure 6.1 shows that the mortgage process is complex. Liberal interpretations of
credit policy rules and ill-defined procedures have a negative impact on both risk
management and customer service. Additionally the many actions taken, and
interactions between various groups are inefficient and potentially costly. That the
responsibility for "spotting" non-criteria loans at the processing stage rested with the
processing clerks, was a further compromise of risk management.
The written mortgage procedures contain many amendments and are in the process
of being updated. What became apparent, was that within the organisation a move
was afoot to "force" more structure around the mortgage process. The staff was
being provided with new mortgage documentation, to encourage them to follow the
rules. An example was the mortgage "checklist", which required to accompany each
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application. This sought to ensure that staff acknowledged when the application was
truly within credit policies or not. Where accounts were clearly outwith policy rules,
the branch officer should not have made a commitment to lend money. However, the
checklist did not appear to be having the desired effect.
In the environment which prevailed, the lender appeared to be attempting to impose
structure without removing all autonomy from individuals. This resulted in the large
number of exceptions to the stated process being permitted. What is unclear is the
level of improvement that the lender was achieving in both the process and risk
aspects of the lending process. No formal analysis was conducted which measured
the extent of risk and process improvements, as data was unavailable.
It was apparent that the processes in place would not achieve consistency, control or
improved customer service to the same degree that a more directive approach would.
What is not clear is the kind of organisational backlash that might have resulted from
a directive approach. What was confirmed during discussions is that the lender had
aims to improve both risk management procedures and the mortgage process. The
reasons why they were moving towards this in stages was never established with
absolute certainty. However, by combining anecdotal evidence with the procedural
evidence, it seemed that they were making incremental shifts towards such
improvements in a manner that was designed to be non-confrontational with those
who wished to retain autonomy of decisioning. Thus the lender appeared to be
moving towards the potential to introduce centralised decisioning in stages. The
current situation is almost that of "parallel running" which is a recognised
implementation strategy when new systems are being introduced to the organisation.
As an implementation method, parallel running is confirmed to be useful when "the
proposed changes will have a dramatic affect on the system and associated systems",
(McCalman & Paton, 1992).2. Personnel involved are considered to be part of the
system. Parallel running allows familiarisation with the new system, which in this
2
A full review of all change management strategies is felt to be outwith the scope of this thesis.
case is centralised decisioning, until the new system becomes reliable and is
understood. This is believed to be likely to reduce resistance to the new system.
When compared with researcher experience gained in similar environments this is a
common approach, and is intended to deflect criticism of centralisation. Such
criticism is often partially based on many of the cultural issues that have already
been alluded to. What cannot be determined is the cost to the organisation of
making the desired changes incrementally. The trade off between risk and process
improvements, which lower costs and improve control and service, and retaining
staff autonomy in decision making, cannot be quantified within this research.
However, that such a trade off exists, is confirmed within the literature, the interview
evidence and the case study phases of this research. The rationality or otherwise of
such a trade off, is a question which is likely to have a variety of responses when
considered relative to a variety of lending organisations and their circumstances.
6.6. Application Data Gathering
Having conducted the initial examination of the mortgage process, it was then
possible to commence gathering the application data that would facilitate the creation
of the bespoke credit scorecard. The Lender processes approximately twenty
thousand mortgage applications per annum via a network of branches. In view of
this large number forming the loan population it was impossible for all the available
data to be used. This is due to the resource limitation of a single researcher gathering
data, and limited time available. Additionally, not only was application data to be
gathered, but subsequent performance data was required, which also had to be
gathered manually. It was agreed during an early meeting that as a proportion of the
overall population, all applications made during a single calendar month would form
the research sample. This common time period offers the benefit of ensuring that all
applicants were subject to the same economic conditions, both at the time of
application and during the life of the loan. Additionally, the applications were
subject to the same application and management procedures during their lives. This
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was particularly important due to the large amount of change taking place within the
lending environment under examination.
6.6.1. Tracking the Applications
The month selected for analysis was March 1998. The lender had provided an Excel
spreadsheet containing application numbers and applicant surnames for 1484
applications, which had been received during March. The applicants listed were
those who had formalised their application by completing a paper based application
document. Thus, omitted from analysis are those who had made a verbal enquiry
about a mortgage loan product, and had either been dissuaded from applying or had
chosen not to apply. No data was retained on such potential applications, and it was
noted that gathering data on the enquirers who fail to convert to applicants could
prove useful to the lender. In particular gathering the reasons for non-conversion
could provide valuable data on the suitability of either the products on offer, the
information being requested, or the process which requires to be followed prior to a
lending decision being reached.
In order to track the 1484 applicants, it was necessary to use the mortgage processing
system to gain access to the actual account number issued. Armed with the list of
application numbers, the researcher spent time at the mortgage processing centre
signed on to the computer based processing system, using the application numbers to
obtain the account numbers. The system supporting such tracking was very recent,
yet despite this the search process was not straightforward. On occasion when
application details could not be traced, the search required to be done by branch sort
code and surname of applicant rather than application number. This means of
searching uncovered additional applicants who appeared to have "slipped through"
the system, and whose existence was not recorded on the system which produced the
Excel based list of applicants. Thus more searching revealed that during March
1998, 1660 applicants had formalised a paper-based application for a mortgage
facility, almost twelve percent more applications than the lender originally believed
had been received. When this information was presented to the processing staff,
they seemed quite unconcerned by the lack of data accuracy. They seemed very
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accepting of the problems, which can be encountered when establishing new
procedures and using new technologies. This evidence suggests that depending on
the supporting procedures, when new systems go live it may take some time before
acceptable levels of efficiency are achieved.
6.6.2. Fate of Applications
Having tracked the applications received, the fate of each application was then
established. This required that a systems enquiry be executed on each individual
application. This was done and it was established that of the 1660 applications
received, only 932 were completed. The term completed or completion refers to
those applications which were both approved by the lender and accepted or "taken
up" by the applicant. The 932 completions give an overall completion rate of
56.14%. Further enquiries were processed to examine the fate of the 728
applications, which did not result in mortgage accounts being opened. The final
status of the 1660 applications from March 1998 is presented graphically in figure
6.2.




□ no application data
■ duplicate record
□ pending/incomplete
932 429 183 106 6 4 total = 1660 accounts
The categories in figure 6.2 are now explained. 932 applications completed, a
completions level of 56%. No publicly available data existed which allowed this
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figure to be compared to industry norms. However, the subsequent benchmarking
study conducted within this thesis, confirms that 56% is below the mean respondent
level of 72%. Further analysis was attempted in order to gain further useful insight
into the 44% of applicants who did not complete, and these are now considered
individually.
429 applications are categorised as "withdrawn". The categorisation is
insufficiently specific to allow analysis. Withdrawal of an application might occur
where applicant circumstances change, and either the applicant or the property
vendor decides not to proceed with the transaction. This withdrawal can take place
at any time between the formal offer being placed and the missives being concluded.
Due to the nature of the application process at the lending organisation, withdrawn
might also refer to those applications that were technically declined, following
negotiation between the branch and the underwriting function. Thus some of the
429 applications withdrawn are likely to belong in the category "declined" which
contained 183 applications or 11% of the applicant population. Declines at a level
of 11% are low when compared to 1997 evidence, which suggests that "as many as
30 percent of applicants are turned down by traditional mortgage lenders''' (Brown-
Humes, 1997). Evidence on a single lender collated in 1999, confirms the 1997 data,
"Northern (Rock) turns down one-third of mortgage applications because of poor
credit risk" (Merchant, 1999).
The remaining categories of no application data, duplicate records and incomplete
applications can not usefully be analysed. These represent seven percent of the
sample, and mainly refer to applications which could not be traced. This suggests
that some tightening up of procedures might be required to ensure that no
applications fall into a "black hole", which precludes their inclusion in portfolio
analysis.
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6.6.3. Status of Completed Accounts
The completed accounts were subject to further analysis. This level of analysis was
descriptive. It was undertaken to provide an overview of the data, and in response to
the needs of the participant organisation which required feedback reports as the
research progressed. Several variables were examined both at sample and individual
branch level;
□ Current status (arrears or up to date)
□ Level of arrears across portfolio (2 payments missed)
□ Level of arrears relative to number of branch applications
□ Closed accounts and where possible reasons
□ Product type
Feedback was provided to the lender on the analysis undertaken. Due to the
sensitivity of these figures much of this output data is not included within the thesis.
However, industry wide data relevant to several of these issues is presented within
the benchmarking survey in chapter 7. Some general observations are now made
without compromising confidentiality.
The level of arrears amongst the sample examined at a time period 12-15 months
after account opening, was significantly higher than expected. It can be confirmed as
being between five and eight percent without compromising confidentiality. This
figure reflects the view within the literature, that there may be a high number of
individuals who experience difficulty in meeting their mortgage repayments.
Lenders typically cite the final possession figures of less than half of one percent,
when discussing the extent of repayment difficulties. However, the portfolio default
figure, which highlights all accounts with serious repayment problems is often
quoted at around two percent. This study reports an early arrears figure of between
five and eight percent. The maturation pattern of arrears clearly requires further
study. However, what is particularly necessary is to establish how many of the two
percent in default (serious arrears), give up their home, rather than face forced
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possession by the lender. Thus the possession figure might significantly understate
the numbers who lose their home as a result of repayment difficulties.
When the arrears evident within the case study organisation were examined stratified
by branches, it was possible to examine whether those branches processing higher
number of applications granted loans, which performed significantly better than
those branches with less experience. This analysis was undertaken, as branches
obtained humans resources partly relative to the volume of lending, therefore an
experienced mortgage lending team would be available at the busier branches.
The branches with lower than average numbers of applications, do in fact display
arrears levels almost half of that of the portfolio as a whole. This suggests that their
lending policy was more stringent than the high volume branches, which might be
related to their lack of mortgage experience. However, such "pre-screening" of
applications whilst turning down potentially bad applications, is likely to result in a
significant number of good applications also being declined. Thus the impact of an
overly strict lending policy, might in fact be a reduction in overall profitability.
Unfortunately this could not be examined further due to lack of data. Branches with
high volumes of loan applications variously displayed arrears levels above and below
the mean value. What was striking was that two branches whose lending volumes
were very significantly higher than the others displayed arrears performance almost
double that of the average across the sample. This resulted in part from the higher
proportion of applications at those branches, which were from intermediary sources.
This high volume of intermediary business was due in part to the location of these
particular branches in city business districts, and in close proximity to the offices of
lawyers and estate agents.
The mean level of arrears relative to the mean rate of completions were examined
with a view to finding those branches with low completions and high arrears, or high
completions and low arrears. These branches and their experience could provide
useful information, which might be useful in shaping credit policy. A chi-squared
test was performed to test the hypothesis that branches displayed relative arrears
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performance that was statistically significantly different. This analysis was
undertaken despite the fact that the data did not lend itself to rigorous statistical
testing as many of the expected arrears values exhibited by branches were less than
the five desired for chi-squared to be considered robust.
Figure 6.3 presents the findings of the subset of the data, with the greatest
contribution to the chi square statistic. The chi square value of 69.023 with 81
degrees of freedom rejects the hypothesis that branch performance differs with
statistical significance. Despite lacking statistical significance, chi squared
highlighted the branches that are most noticeably different in performance from the
others. These, as you would expect are those with few approvals and high arrears,
and those with high approvals and relatively low arrears. The fifteen branches
presented, is a sub-set of all branches. The number of branches in the population
cannot be divulged, but it is important to note that only thirty percent of all branches
had any arrears to report.
figure 6.3: Branch Arrears Performance
Branch Code Number of Number of % Arrears at Contribution
Completions Arrears Branch to Chi-
squared stat.
confidential data 2 1 50.00% 7.615354
2 15 3 20.00% 6.200872
3 8 2 25.00% 5.930805
4 3 1 33.00% 4.497861
5 99 10 10.10% 4.417469
6 12 2 16.66% 2.971037
7 12 2 16.66% 2.971037
8 12 2 16.66% 2.971037
9 99 9 9.09% 2.767088
10 5 1 20.00% 2.066957
11 7 1 14.28% 1.085227
12 27 0 0.00% 1.419528
13 19 0 0.00% 0.998927
14 18 0 0.00% 0.946352
15 49 1 2.04% 0.964352
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When examined by product status, it became clear that the majority of mortgages
were endowment based rather than capital and interest. The poor performance of
endowments, which grabbed the headlines during 1999, had not generated much
publicity at the time the applications were made. It is likely that a reduction in the
level of endowment based mortgages might now be evident. Analysis of the
performance of accounts by product interest status (product type) was conducted.
This confirmed the findings within the literature, that flexible rate mortgages "are
riskier than fixed rate mortgages" (Webb, 1982)
The final descriptive phase of the initial data analysis examines the closure of
accounts within the period 12 months after drawdown. Almost three percent of
accounts had been closed, with just over two percent of these being transferred
externally from the lender i.e. migrating to another lender. No information or
analysis was possible to determine why borrowers moved so quickly. What is
important is that this sort of data enters into a "feedback loop" that allows the lender
to learn from his actual lending experience. Migration rates impact on pricing and
profitability issues, and lenders ought to collate data that allows them to track and
manage migration actively.
6.6.4. Summary - Mortgage Application Data
The confidentiality of the data has not compromised the overall findings of the initial
phase of the case study research. The difficulties experienced by lenders using new
technology based systems effectively was evident in that some data was incomplete.
Where data was complete there was also evidence that recording mechanisms had
not been fully "thought through", e.g. inadequate codes available to describe
applications that did not complete. However, this reflects what you might expect to
find where many systems changes are taking place at once. What is clear, is that a
major change in the level of analysis of the mortgage portfolio is underway. Much
of the reporting, such as that on non-completion reasons, is entirely new to the
organisation. This desire for more knowledge across many aspects of portfolio
performance reflects the views of interview participants. Lenders, who found
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themselves surprised by their exposure to negative economic conditions during the
80's recession, vowed to improve data recording and analysis.
The relatively high levels of early arrears, also reflects the view that lenders present
only the "tip of the iceberg" by relying on possession figures to suggest a high
quality loan book view (Doling, Karn & Stafford, 1985). More detailed analysis of
the maturation of arrears, from arrears to default and possession is required. The
data relative to account closures seems intuitively to be high. However, as no
comparative figures are available in the public domain, no inferences as to the
normality or otherwise of this data can be drawn at this stage.
One of the most interesting findings of the application data analysis was that the
descriptive data when presented to the lender was in fact new to him. That more
applications had been processed than they knew about, the number of those accounts
which had completed, and subsequent status of accounts opened was all new
information to the lender. Whilst they believed that they knew the number of
applications, the figure they held significantly understated the true volume. Likewise
some arrears and closure data is available, but it cannot be generated relative to
"tranches" of applications. That the credit risk team requested account and arrears
information which, appeared new to them, confirmed this. The analysis is currently
available to the lender only at a portfolio level.
This suggests that some lenders might require to improve their data gathering, and
reporting mechanisms. Only by knowing accurately the current risk levels, and the
impacts of various process changes, can lenders begin to make real improvements on
both the risk profile and process efficiencies of their lending operations.
6.7. Building the Scorecard
6.7.1. Introduction
It is outwith the scope of this thesis to offer a detailed comparison of statistical
techniques commonly used in scorecard development. This work has been done, and
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results are available within the literature. Having evaluated the various comparisons
which have been undertaken it was ascertained that the selection of a suitable
technique was largely a matter of preference, as no single technique is without it's
critics. This view is supported by McCahill (1998), who confirms that "differences
in predictive power between credit risk models are more a function of the differences
in the skill, experience and care of the model developers than of the technologies
used". Thus with the choice being that of the researcher it was decided that a linear
regression technique would be used to in order that a scoring model could be
constructed which would afford a comparison with the judgmental evaluation system
in place. It is not asserted that the scorecard that resulted offers the optimum
predictive performance possible. However, as confirmed in the literature review
the regression technique used, has been found to afford comparable performance
when judged alongside other techniques.
The data sample used to build the scorecard has many features, which are desirable
when creating a scoring model. The application data is from a single time period,
and is drawn from a population applying for a specific product. Additionally the
data is drawn from all applicants during the given period. The data quality is good, as
the researcher had the opportunity to gather primary data from the actual applications
and other file based data such as survey and bureau reports. All required files were
tracked down with the exception of five individual cases. Some limitations are found
in respect of several variables which are incomplete, but this only applies to those
applicants who were declined a facility. This results from the nature of the business
process, which allows "speculative" applications for mortgage loans prior to a
property being found. Such speculative applications are seeking an "agreement in
principle" subject to satisfactory survey and references subsequently becoming
available. A further limitation is acknowledged in relation to the volume of data
available on which a scorecard may be developed. This limitation is the result of
compromises being reached in order to balance the access to data allowed by the
lender, and the limited time and resources available.
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6.7.2. Mortgage Application Data
The data comprises application data on mortgage loans applied for during March
1998. The performance data for these loan accounts at a time period 12-15 months
after opening was also available. The application time period self selected as
constraints existed in identifying a block of applications prior to 1998. Thus it was
necessary to gather 1998 application data and 1999 performance data in order to
complete the research within a pre arranged timescale. Whilst twelve months
performance data for a loan which is expected to survive at least five-seven years,
might appear to be something of a compromise, this is not entirely the case.
Anecdotal evidence from lenders presented in chapter five, suggested that lenders are
most interested in predicting those loans which default in the first twelve to twenty-
four months. Loans which default at a later stage, may do so due to "life cycle
events", and data enabling prediction of such events is not currently gathered at the
application stage. Additionally by reviewing the data twelve months after
drawdown, subsequent research, tracking default maturation patterns became a
possibility for the participating lender.
6.7.3. The Development Sample
As the data was being gathered manually from paper based files which are stored in a
variety of locations this physically limited the volume of data that could be gathered.
Thus, data was gathered on just over twenty percent of the approved applications.
These applications comprised 152 good accounts and 44 bad accounts. The good
accounts were selected using a random number generation programme using Excel.
This selected accounts by their reference number from the good population. The bad
sample comprised all bad accounts. These were needed to provide sufficient bad
experience to allow scorecard development. Additionally data was gathered on one
hundred applications which were declined during the period. In order to be wholly
objective regarding which data to gather, analysis of all data which could potentially
be gathered, was undertaken. In order to do this, each organisation which had been
a participant in the survey phase of the research was asked to provide a mortgage
application form. The contents of each form were collated and analysed on an Excel
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spreadsheet to examine the type of data lenders considered to be useful, and the
purpose of each piece of data gathered. The research output from this subset of the
main research is presented as appendix L. This appendix discusses the role of the
various pieces of data gathered. The role of each piece of data varies, between risk
assessment, marketing, security and in meeting the requirements of the mortgage
code.
As a result of this analysis of possible characteristics, sixty-two variables were
identified as being potentially useful. All sixty two were therefore gathered from
each application. A full list of these variables is provided in Appendix M. Of the
sixty-two only the reference number formed no part of the subsequent analysis.
As confirmed earlier, data was also gathered on one hundred rejected applications.
However, the rejected applications form no part of the subsequent analysis at this
stage, as they were found to contain many missing variables. This was particularly
true of product and property variables, suggesting that the nature of the rejected
applicants was mainly "speculative". Some limitations of the data finally used in
the scorecard development are acknowledged to exist and these are now discussed.
6.7.4. Sample size
Sample size is less than may be considered desirable. However, this does not
compromise the quality of the data. The limited data set which contains one hundred
and ninety six cases, is enhanced by comprising sixty-two application variables for
each case. The data quality is further enhanced by the availability of subsequent
performance data. Previous research in the field has also been conducted using
relatively small samples. (Myers and Forgy, 1963) conducted a study using a total of
six hundred cases, of which three hundred were used in development and three
hundred in testing. (Orgler, 1970) used three hundred loans in development and one
hundred and twenty in testing during his analysis of commercial loans. (Orgler,
1971) went on to expand his sample size by bringing in data from another bank.
However, by combining the data of more than one lender in creating a scorecard, he
confirms that variations in application forms, and control techniques exist. Thus the
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models are compromised by only comprising those elements, which are commonly
available from both lenders. This potentially limits the predictive ability of the
scorecard, by not using the most predictive elements from each bank. (Rakes, 1973)
examined mortgage loans based on data from 152 good and 48 slow paying loans,
almost identical to the sample used within this study. These figures seek to confirm
that previous researchers in the field, have worked with relatively small volumes of
data, and produced some interesting results.
6.7.5. Reject Inference
The construction of a scorecard based solely on those applications which have been
approved, is acknowledged to result in bias. Inferring the behaviour of rejected
applicants is a popular pastime amongst statisticians. However, regardless of the
technique used, the true class (bad or good) of rejected applicants is never known.
The development of the scoring model within this thesis supports the view of Kelly
in 1998. Kelly confirmed the importance of reject inference, but concluded that it is
acceptable in certain contexts not to "concern ourselves with this extra
complication". As the reject data did not lend itself to inclusion due to a number of
missing variables, it was decided to build the scorecard without making inferences
about the rejects. This does not preclude work being undertaken at a later stage to
utilise the reject data more usefully.
6.7.6. Initial Data Analysis - Coarse Classification
Following common practice in scorecard development, each individual value that is
found within each variable, is initially coarse classified. This procedure allows the
"relative goodness" of each individual value within a variable to be identified. The
procedure is explained in detail within the literature (Lewis, 1982) in the seminal
book "Introduction to Credit Scoring". For the purposes of this research the
definitions good and bad followed classifications used within the case study
organisation and remain confidential. However, those classified as bad were not
formally in default (three or more payments missed). The definition bad is closer to
two payments missed. This is a perhaps not an unreasonable definition of bad in a
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mortgage of between 12-15 months old. The number, and then proportion of goods,
is compared to the bads. By dividing percent goods by percent bad, the "good odds"
or relative goodness is computed. It must be borne in mind that this is the relative
goodness of the value only ifno other information is available. Coarse classification
of the data in this way is time consuming but can yield interesting results, and
ensures that no useful information is "lost". Figure 6.4 illustrates the coarse
classification procedure being carried out on part of the variable "age". Here we see
that borrower behaviour does not improve directly with age. We can also see some
unexplained very good odds for those aged 29 - 31 and particularly poor behaviour
for those aged 32-33.
figure 6.4: Coarse Classification
Attribute
Age
Category No. Good No. Bad of goods of bads relative
% good %bad goodness
18 to 21 X Y 9.21 13.64 0.68
22 to 23 X Y 11.84 6.82 1.74
24 to 28 X Y 26.97 40.91 0.66
29 to 31 X Y 15.79 2.27 6.95
32 to 33 X Y 3.95 9.09 0.43
34 to 39 X Y 15.79 13.64 1.16
40 plus X Y 16.45 13.64 1.21
100.00 100.00
The process of coarse classification continued, refining each variable in order that
"relative goodness" could be grouped where appropriate without losing interesting
features within the data. The relative goodness figure provides the basis of the
scoring weights for each variable.
The coarse classification undertaken at this stage was entirely rigorous and made no
assumptions about the underlying data. Conducting this process rigorously ensures
that the resulting scorecard is as predictive as possible. Where assumptions are
made about what data should be included, then developers might "skip" some of the
coarse classification stage and start analysis with a reduced number of variables,
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based on prior knowledge of what is likely to be predictive. Again this information
could be rendered less effective where the prior knowledge relates to alternative
products, alternative geographic regions, or alternative time periods.
6.7.7. Exclusions following coarse classification
Each of the original sixty-one variables was analysed using coarse classification
techniques. Following coarse classification several were excluded on the basis of the
strong relationships which existed between variables, such as between annual net
income and monthly take home pay. Additional exclusions resulted from some
categories having very small numbers of bad accounts. This was only undertaken
where differences in the "good/bad odds" were very small. Figure 6.5 provides an
outline of data used at the final stages of analysis when only 18 of the original 61
variables remained. Those retained are those, which exhibit the lowest "good odds"
12 months after drawdown, and could legally be included in a scorecard. The only
other variable strongly associated to being in arrears and excluded is "referred to
credit assessor". This is because being referred to the central credit assessor was part
of a process, rather than a reflection of applicant characteristics.
Figure 6.5: Variables Retained in Scorecard Development
Source of application (branch or intermediary)
Existing customer (yes or no)
Application type (sole, joint, guarantor)
Age
Occupancy (owner, tenant, with parent/friends, tied)
Time at address
Occupation code
Time in present employment
Monthly income
Free funds
Product interest (fixed or flexible)
Product type (endowment, capital & interest, PEP,discounted)




Number of previous delinquencies recorded
Number of previous searches noted
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6.8. Building the Model
Having coarse classified the data, the development of the scorecard could commence.
In accordance with Guide to Credit Scoring (1993), the following industry principles
are acknowledged, and are amended to reflect the research being conducted.
Purpose
The scorecard was developed to allow the performance of an empirical evaluation
tool for mortgage loan applications to be examined.
Scope
The scorecard being developed, is for the purposes of comparison and analysis only,
and would require further testing and refinement prior to implementation
Sampling Method
All data used to build the scorecard is typical of the credit grantor's own total
experience, and obtained using appropriate sampling methods.
Development
Points given to each applicant are derived from a comparison of the repayment
experience of good and bad accounts. The sample groups do not include rejected
applicants, as insufficient data was retained on rejected applicants to allow their
inclusion.
Validation
The scorecard has been validated using appropriate statistical principals relevant to
"hold out".
6.8.1. The Hold Out Sample
In order to facilitate the building of the scorecard, and in common with industry
guidelines the model was built using a hold out technique. A random sub-sample of
accounts was selected within SPSS, selecting 60% of good accounts and 60% of bad
accounts. The model was then built on the 60% and the performance tested on 40%.
6.8.2. The Technique
The technique adopted was least squares linear regression, which is a popular method
amongst scorecard developers, and is acknowledged to be "one of the most widely
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used techniques in scoring"{Kelly, 1998). Despite the popularity of linear regression
for scorecard development, the method is critiqued based on the underlying
assumption of normal data distribution. However, the failure of the data to meet the
normality assumptions is not found to impair the predictive power of the models and
this is confirmed within the literature, (Kelly, 1998) (Reichart, Cho & Wagner,
1983).
The regression model is used to compare a group of bad accounts with a group of
good accounts. The coarse classification discussed earlier produced a value for the
"relative goodness" of each variable. The linear regression is then computed, with
loan status (good or bad) presented as the dependent variable, and the application
variables regressed to determine the strength of their relationship with the dependent
variable. The relationship is presented as the regression co-efficient. The regression
methods tested are presented in figure 6.6. All were tested at a 95% level of
significance.
figure 6.6: Regression Techniques Used
Approach
(i) Linear regression using all predictive variables used, thus "forcing" all the
variables in to the model
(ii) Stepwise forward regression, this programme uses multiple linear
regressions, which start with the most predictive variable, adding one step,
at a time the new variable which makes the greatest improvement in
goodness of fit. This continues until the specified level of significance of
improvement fails to be reached.
(hi) Backward regression, this programme enters all of the variables as a block
as in (i) above, but then removes them one at a time in line with the
procedures identified in (ii).
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6.8.3. The Models
Taking cognisance of existing literature on the groupings of variables required to
predict mortgage default, it was decided to examine the data in several ways. The
variables were split into three groups. Group 1 comprised all 18 remaining variables
as presented in figure 6.5. Group 2 comprised variables identified as being personal
and financial. Group 3 comprised variables related to product or property. Each
group was subject to linear regression, firstly forcing in all variables, and then using
stepwise and backward approaches.
6.8.4. Building the Scorecard
Having developed a regression model, the regression co-efficient values are then
used to build the scorecard. The regression is developed based on the sixty percent
of data held in the development sample. When the most predictive models have been
identified, the models are then tested on the hold out sample. The co-efficient
values are multiplied by the weighted value of each variable that remains in the
model. Therefore if age was weighted at 6.95 "relative goodness", this would be
multiplied by the relevant co-efficient value. This same procedure would be
undertaken for each variable in the model. The resulting values are then summed,
and this summed value is the "credit score" given to each application.
Again using the test sample the cases are ranked by credit score. At each credit
score value the number of good accounts correctly predicted, and the number of bad
accounts correctly predicted is established. Thus it is possible to determine that at
"cut off' value X, y percent of goods and z percent of bads will be accepted.
Dependant upon the organisations risk profile, they will then select a cut off score
which reflects the level of risk which they wish to undertake. As economic or other
conditions change, so the lender can raise or lower the cut off value to quickly and
surely manage the risk he accepts. Again reflecting earlier comments, over-riding of
score values diminishes the risk management capacity of credit scoring.
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6.8.5. Results
The results are considered in several ways, all of which are commonly used in
comparing the performance of credit scoring models. The regression coefficients
and the attached levels of significance are presented in figures 6.7 and 6.8. Figure
6.7 provides coefficients and significance for all variables "forced in" to the model.
Figure 6.8 provides the results of the backward stepwise regression. The results of
the forward stepwise regressions have been excluded as this model generally
performed less well than the backward stepwise analysis. The results are then
presented graphically in figure 6.9 and 6.10 using ROC curves to show the
performance of the models. Finally, in figure 6.11 the results are presented in a
manner which describes their performance relative to lending performance. This
enables us to determine how the models actually perform. Thus we can identify how
many good accounts a lender would decline, relative to the number of bad accounts
which he would also rid himself off. It is this final presentation of results that is
most likely to be of use to the practitioner, and would allow him to conduct a
cost:benefit analysis of introducing credit scoring.
6.8.6. Regression Results
The regression output in figure 6.7 present the results, which are achieved when all
variables are "forced in" to the model. Group 1 comprises all 18 variables, and here
we can see that the majority of the contribution to the model is derived from the
personal and financial variables. Of the product and property variables only the
product type, loan-to-value ratio and to a much lesser extent property type make a
contribution. This is reflected in figure 6.8, where using the backward regression
technique on all variables at a 95% level of significance, only LTV remains in the
model from the product and property group.
When we examine group 2, the personal and financial variables alone, we see that in
figure 6.7 when all variables are forced in to the model, several are not significant.
When we then look at group 2 when a backward regression is applied, figure 6.8
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shows that source, application type, occupancy status and delinquencies have all
been excluded from the model.
Group 3 follows this trend. When all property and product variables are forced in,
several are not significant. In figure 6.8 we then apply the backward regression to
only the product and property variables,. The result is that product type3 and LTV
are the only two variables remaining in the model.
figure 6.7: Regression Results
Coefficients Variable Group 1
Linear
Regression
Sig. Group 2 Sig. Group 3 Sig.
source 3.325 .609 6.282 .312
existing customer 8.514 .120 7.949 .140
application type 2.658 .580 4.214 .358
age 4.715 .003 3.206 .002
occupancy -3.164 .666 -1.387 .845
time at address 17.080 .004 15.687 .008
occupation code 1.333 .121 1.686 .040
time employed 7.579 .023 6.935 .037
basic income 6.105 .025 5.622 .019
delinquencies 12.777 .258 16.705 .128
searches 35.609 .000 37.535 .000
product 1.336 .852 2.049 .815
product type 35.701 .080 54.671 .032
LTV (purchase) 2.071 .057 3.885 .002
property type -10.524 .225 0.057 .996
property age -3.868 .831 .533 .981
bedrooms 15.694 .293 1.273 .206
intercept -97.914 .015 -65.361 .000 -17.159 .692
R2 474 R- 468 R2 084
result when all variables are "forced" in to the model
3
The variable product type distinguishes between products, which exhibit either fixed or variable
interest rate structures.
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figure 6.8: Regression Results
Coefficients Variable Group 1
Backward
regression
Sig. Group 2 Sig. Group 3 Sig.
source
existing customer 8.659 .054 12.259 .005
application type
age 4.627 .002 4.494 .003
occupancy
time at address 17.536 .002 16.418 .005
occupation code 1.500 .065 1.808 .027
time employed 7.124 .028 7.084 .031
basic income 6.884 .003 6.042 .010
delinquencies
searches 37.004 .000 38.931 .000
product
product type 47.424 .039




intercept -45.399 .000 -45.438 .001 17.259 .474
R" .519 R" .468 R- .098
result when backward regression selects most significant variables
The inclusion of variables with limited statistical significance, reduces the predictive
ability of the models. This is now exhibited graphically in the ROC curve results.
6.8.7. ROC Curve Results
This next presentation of results, shows the performance of the models graphically.
These results are presented in figures 6.9 and 6.10 as receiver operating curve (ROC)
analysis. ROC curves are a useful way to evaluate the relative performance of
classification schemes, where there is one variable being classified in either one of
two categories (good and bad). In this application the ROC curve is used to present
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the proportion of good applications accepted against the proportion of bad
applications. The figures on which the ROC curves are based, are the proportions of
good and bad lending accepted subject to various cut off values being adopted. The
closer the ROC curve appears to the top left hand corner of the diagram, the better
the discrimination, as this suggests a high level of good accounts being accepted,
whilst a low level of bads is being accepted. One measurement used to quantify
what the graphic is depicting is the area under the curve. The higher the area under
the curve, the better is the performance of the classifier in distinguishing between
good and bad accounts.
Figure 6.9 shows ROC results, which reflect performance when all variables are
forced in to the model regardless of significance levels. Figure 6.10 shows the
results of the backward regressions. It is useful to compare the three groups of
variables considered, and the performance between the two regression methods. The
first ROC in figure 6.9, shows very good performance when all variables are forced
in to the model. However, if this is compared to the first ROC in 6.10, we see that
the area under the curve (and thus performance) is better using backward regression.
This is due to the inclusion of variables with low levels of significance being retained
in 6.9, which actually negates the predictive power of some of the other variables.
If we consider the second ROC in each model we can compare the performance of
only the personal and financial variables. On this occasion the bigger grouping of
variables perform better, as less of these variables are as insignificant as those in the
other group. The grouping of all personal and financial variables in figure 6.9
provides the best performance of all the combinations tested.
Finally the contribution of product and property variables alone is considered. The
final ROC in each model, as expected performs much less well than the personal and
financial variables. However, what is interesting is that they do present an element
of predictive ability. This suggests that these variables should be included in
analysis and scorecard development, as they are slightly relevant. Thus on a
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different data set, they may have an increased significance and be worthy of
inclusion in the final model.
In summary the ROC curves on the groupings of all variables, and on personal and
financial variables, exhibit very good performance. However the product and
property curves, whilst being much less good are also exhibiting a subtle predictive
ability.
figure 6.9: ROC Curve Results








figure 6.10: ROC Curve Results







Area under the curve .828 .807 .615
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6.8.8. Loan Performance Results
A final analysis of the results is presented in figure 6.11. This provides examples of
the number of bad accounts, which would be eliminated relative to the resultant loss
of good accounts, at a variety of cut off scores. Dependant on the risk profile of the
organisation, the priorities might be focussed either on accepting risk, or minimising
risk. Likewise, some lenders might want to ensure that they reject very few good
accounts, whilst accepting that this might reduce the number of bad accounts which
they will decline. The selection of a cut off value is an organisational issue. The
information presented in figure 6.11 allows the lender to make a judgement as to
whether the mortgage scorecard could offer significant benefits to the organisation.
Additionally, this information allows the lender to determine pricing and debt
provisioning requirements.
figure 6.11: Performance of Various Models
Performance of Various Models








value 5 84.48% 15.52% 50.00% 50.00%
value 4 91.38% 8.62% 42.86% 57.14%
value 3 94.83% 7.17% 57.84% 42.14%
value 2 94.83% 5.17% 42.86% 57.14%
value 1 100.00% 0.00% 42.86% 57.14%
The results shown in figure 6.11 are those most interesting to lenders. Interpreting
and analysing the results from a lender's perspective requires a knowledge of
average profit on a mortgage with a "good status", and average loss on a mortgage
with a "bad" status. Several models are predicting more than ninety percent of the
good accounts whilst eliminating between forty and fifty percent of bad accounts.
The highest prediction of bad accounts is 57%. At this level of bad prediction a very
high proportion of good accounts are still being accepted.
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6.9. Conclusions
The case study research confirms that the results obtained using a mortgage
scorecard can outperform judgmental lending evaluation. Exhibiting consistently
good performance, several models predict over ninety percent of the good accounts
correctly, whilst declining around half of the bad accounts. A single model correctly
predicts 100% of the good accounts whilst eliminating forty two percent of the bad
accounts. However, it is acknowledged that these results are achieved on a small
dataset, and that the models also contain an element of bias as they do not consider
reject inference. With regard to the suitability of credit scoring techniques for
application in mortgage lending, the results confirm that bespoke scoring models can
perform well. In particular, the results presented in figure 6.11 show that exclusion a
significant proportion of bad accounts is possible for relatively low losses of good
accounts. This makes scoring a potentially useful tool, either as a stand alone
decisioning option, or to augment the existing process by offering a "fast tracking"
mechanism. Fast tracking allows those identified as lower risk, via the credit score
value to be processed differently to those higher on the risk scale. Earlier work
within this thesis confirms that in practice lenders presently authorise loans, mainly
based on risk criteria. In such a circumstance a risk based scorecard such as those
developed within this thesis can usefully augment the lending process, providing
control, consistency, risk assessment and speed of decisioning.
However, when customer profitability, and the strength of relationships influence
lending decisions, a scorecard predicting risk of default requires to be augmented by
other data. This other data might result from augmenting the risk based score with
underwriters who consider other factors which do not form part of the applicant
profile. Alternatively this might be achieved by using more sophisticated techniques
which facilitate profitability scoring. At present it appears that the scorecards in use
are not being augmented by additional data in a considered fashion.
With regard to how a mortgage scorecard might comprise different data from a
consumer loan or credit card scorecard, the influence of product and property
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variables is considered. This research confirms that product and property variables
do contribute slightly to the predictive performance of the model. However, the
majority of the predictive ability is derived from personal and financial attributes of
the applicant.
The work undertaken in collating the data, which could usefully be combined to
build a scorecard, confirmed that despite presenting a technologically advanced
facade, lenders are still working on improving their basic management information
systems. The pace of development is immense, and lenders are beginning to realise
the benefits of taking a more analytical approach to data. As a result they are now
preparing themselves technologically in order that they will be able to derive value
from data, which is increasingly being viewed as a valuable asset of the organisation.
In presenting the predictive ability of the scorecard, it appears that credit scoring is a
superior method of decisioning to judgmental evaluation. However, the potential for
scoring to improve organisational performance is limited by the way in which
lenders operationalise scoring. Chapter six has shown a fragmented lending process,
focussed on process and task to the detriment of risk management. It is therefore
impossible to assert that lenders who adopt credit scoring will achieve the potential
benefits. Credit scoring can offer risk, process, and customer service benefits.
These benefits in combination can offer cost savings. However, the benefits of
scoring will only be achieved if credit policy rules and lending processes are aligned
with the empirical decisioning method adopted.
The evidence from this thesis suggests that credit scoring may be incongruous with a
situation whereby individual lending officers having designated authority to lend.
Unless a control structure is in place to ensure that the scorecard decisions are
adhered to, the process will not be significantly improved.
The case study organisation favours evolutionary rather than revolutionary change
management strategies. The incremental changes evidenced, suggest that they are
aware that centralisation of arrears and processing can deliver benefits. The
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evidence from the research undertaken suggests that credit scoring, if implemented
wisely could also offer significant benefits to this lender.
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Chapter Seven
7. Benchmarking Mortgage Lending - Survey Evidence
7.1. Introduction
This final stage in this current research seeks to determine whether those
organisations, which use credit scoring display performance levels which are
superior to those who do not. Whilst not providing conclusive evidence that credit
scoring is the single source of improved performance, this phase intends to identify
any differences in performance between scoring and non scoring organisations.
Another driver for conducting this phase of the research is found within the
literature. Leonard (1996) in presenting his views on scoring generally, presents a
view which reflects the current UK situation relative to mortgage scoring. He
confirms that within the credit scoring industry, both developers and users have, until
now, been concerned with the efficiency of scoring models. "Very little
concentration has been on the effectiveness of scoring - are we using the models
correctly?, Can we use these models to satisfy our customers?, Who is using the
models better?" One means by which Leonard suggests that we might begin to
address the issue of measuring the effectiveness of scoring was by developing a
"benchmarking programme".
As well as quantifying the benefits derived by scoring organisations, it is hoped that
the provision of benchmarked data to lenders will offer them the chance to compare
their performance relative to others. This in turn might contribute to a more open
dialogue about the actual benefits which organisations derive from scoring, and help
to develop and extend the discussion about how scoring must be operationalised if it
is to add value to the organisation. This study also helps to identify the quantity of
data that lenders are willing to provide, and the appetite amongst lenders for the
existence of a dialogue about how best to achieve value from credit scoring.
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7.2. The Survey
7.2.1. The Survey Instrument
The presentation of the survey instrument was based on the design of the previous
survey document. This continuity was intended to provide an element of familiarity
within the research, which is revisiting the same population several times. A copy of
the survey document, is provided in appendix K.
The content of the survey was driven by the measures identified during the earlier
survey and interview phases of the research. Collating the views of lenders the
researcher had confirmed that several groups of benefits can be derived from
adopting credit scoring. These are risk benefits, process benefits, customer service
benefits and cost benefits. These measures reflect some of the recommendations by
Leonard as to what criteria can usefully be evaluated. Within this benchmarking
survey, the cost data, which Leonard recommends for inclusion, was not requested.
This is due to the fact that the case study had established that this data is
commercially sensitive. Customer service data, which Leonard does not suggest
gathering is requested from lenders. Customer service levels are identified as being
important performance measures by lenders themselves.
Taking into account the lack of cost data, the benefits examined are presented in two
groups. These are risk benefits and process benefits. The process category includes
some aspects of customer service. The ways in which the benefits are measured,
and the links to business and portfolio performance are now discussed.
7.2.2. Risk and Process Measures
Risk is measured by considering the levels of arrears and default across the portfolio.
An outline as to when such status is afforded to accounts is included. Additionally
data on the proportion of lending conducted, which is outwith published credit policy
rules is presented. The arrears data is intended to identify whether those
organisations which use credit scoring, have levels of arrears which differ from those
who use judgmental evaluation. The credit policy data allows further insight into
the anomaly of having published lending criteria and then lending outwith these. No
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figure has previously been empirically established which quantifies the volume of
lending conducted, which is outwith the published criteria. Establishing the true role
of lending criteria might have implications for the non-vociferous potential applicant
for credit, who is deterred from applying by the existence of published terms. If
these terms are intended to be indicative rather than prescriptive, lenders might
actually be deterring a proportion of the potential borrower population by having
such terms. The proportion of new business which is received from intermediary
sources, along with the maximum loan to value ratios at which lenders offer
mortgage loans are also identified within the survey. These final criteria are
included due to their relationship with portfolio risk.
The process measures seek to ascertain "usual" levels of approval of applications,
and also to confirm whether organisations do in fact track this data. The length of
time to both approval in principle, and to the production of a formal offer is also
examined. This data is required in order to identify whether those organisations
which are scoring, typically derive the benefit of speed to decision which scoring
offers. Due to the various ways in which customer service can be measured, no data
was requested on perceived levels of service. Instead frequency of measurement of
customer service was gathered. This is intended to identify the level of importance
which lenders attach to the measurement of customer service.
The unique dimension of this benchmarking survey, which underpins the work
carried out within this thesis, is that each of the various benchmarks are analysed
relative to the method of credit decisioning used.
7.2.3. The Survey Process
The survey document was initially produced in draft format. The document was then
proof read by two industry practitioners, both of whom had been involved in
proofing the initial survey document. The proofing took place at the practitioner
workplace, during a meeting, which had been pre-arranged. The proofing process
was intended to ensure clarity in questioning, and also to ascertain whether the data
requested appeared "reasonable" in the context of a benchmarking survey.
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These initial meetings resulted in no changes being made to the survey document,
and the document went to print in October 1999. Participants were invited to take
part in the survey via a letter. Each letter was sent to the named respondent who had
been targeted at the time of the initial survey. Where lenders had participated in
subsequent stages of the research process, the benchmarking survey was sent to the
most recent contact. A copy of the letter inviting participation is included as
Appendix N. The incentive to lenders to participate was the promise of a
personalised and confidential feedback report, which would rank their performance
relative to other respondents. As part of the research output it was therefore
necessary to prepare individual research reports for each participating lender. An
example of an individualised report is presented in Appendix O.
7.3. The Survey Population and Respondents
In concert with the previous research, the survey population comprised the members
of the Council of Mortgage Lenders. The profile is identical to those surveyed in
chapter four of this thesis, and comprised one hundred and eighteen lenders.
However, unlike the previous survey which achieved a 56% response rate, this
benchmarking survey achieved only a 20% response rate. Only twenty four lenders
provided the data requested. Of those who did not respond fifteen contacted the
researcher providing confirmation that they would be unable to respond. Thirteen of
these responses were via letter and two via telephone call. Ten organisations simply
stated they would not provide the data, or that they considered that providing the data
to be inappropriate. Two other lenders confirmed that the sensitivity of the data was
the reason for not participating, and one other cited pressure on staff time and
workloads. The others confirmed that they were involved with commercial
benchmarking schemes and would not be taking part. The final combination of
reasons for this somewhat disappointing response rate are now put forward.
□ The nature of the data requested might have been considered too confidential to
share with a researcher from an external body. This was confirmed as being
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correct by some lenders. Levels of arrears, completion rates, approval times and
background information relating to portfolio size and source of new applications
were all requested. It may be that as a pilot study, the range of data requested
was too broad, and thus acted as a deterrent to lenders.
□ Several initiatives were underway to establish commercial benchmarking forums.
KPMG had been benchmarking mortgage performance for about 12 months.
Despite contact with the researcher, they provided little detailed data on their
initiative and their research output was not in the public domain. Another group,
Performance Benchmarking was also in the process of establishing a
benchmarking group. Again despite contact with the researcher, little
information on participants or results was forthcoming. Finally the Mortgage
Credit Managers Forum were considering such a scheme. Some liaison
suggested that they might be interested in University involvement in the scheme,
and negotiations on this are ongoing. Thus it might have been that the industry
was swamped by such initiatives, thus dulling the appetite of participants to take
part in the survey.
Given that commercial benchmarking has "taken off' it would seem that lenders are
keen to benchmark their performance relative to others. However, it is clear that the
data is considered to be sensitive, and that a non professional survey was perhaps not
the ideal forum in which lenders might chose to share data.
7.3.1. Respondent Profile
The respondent population is examined relative to the whole population and is
segmented by organisational type. When we examine the respondents by
organisational status, we find that as a proportion of the overall population the
banking sector is over-represented to the detriment of the building society sector.
However when we look solely at the number of responses received, we see that most
of the organisations responding are in fact building societies. This is evidenced in
figure 7.1.
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figure 7.1: Respondent Population
Number
Surveyed




Org. type as %
of Respondent
Population
Bank 22 18.64% 7 29.16%
Building Soc. 74 72.17% 13 54.16%
Other 22 18.64% 4 16.66%
118 100.00% 24 100.00%
However, if the analysis is conducted using number of loans processed, the picture is
quite different. The respondent population was responsible for granting 461,862
loans in the twelve month period preceding the survey. Of these loans the seven
bank respondents were responsible for 331,857 loans or 72% of all those granted.
Building societies had granted 114,596 or 25%, with the others issuing the remaining
3%, or 15,409 loans. It becomes apparent, that when dealing in small numbers such
as this, the data may be interpreted in various ways. Therefore it should be borne in
mind that despite the small number of organisations involved, the banking
respondents are the more influential in the market place if considered by lending
volumes.
In order to describe the data in more detail some additional measures, which might
be indicative of response bias are considered. The volume of lending conducted by
the respondents was examined relative to the whole population. As identified in
chapter four, the CML had confirmed that 1.3 million loans had been approved in the
period 1997/98. Respondents in the initial survey had been responsible for 83% of
these loans. All respondents, with the exception of one, provided new data to the
benchmarking survey. Respondents to the benchmarking survey had granted
461,862 loans in the previous financial year. This equates to 35% of all loans
granted, and might appear to be high for organisations which equate to 20% of the
population. However, this reflects anomalies of reporting whereby the CML figures
exclude re-mortgage business from their building society figure. Given the high
proportion of building societies that are survey respondents, this may account for the
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seemingly high proportion of loans granted. The benchmarking respondents therefore
conduct a respectable proportion of all mortgage lending within the UK. Whilst as a
proportion of all lenders their numbers are small, they undoubtedly have some
influence in the market place.
The mean loan value of the survey population from the first survey was calculated at
£46,595. Those who used credit scoring displayed a higher mean value than those
who do not score. Amongst the benchmarking population the mean loan value is
£57,467. However, as evidenced in figure 7.2 this mean value is inflated by the
presence of two outlying values. When these outlying values are removed, the
benchmarking mean is £48,432, which is very slightly higher than the whole
population mean evidenced in the first survey.






Reflecting the work conducted in the earlier survey, the mean benchmarking survey
values are considered relative to the method of credit decisioning. Again it is
found that contrary to commonly held perceptions, those who do credit score,
process mortgages with a higher mean value than those who do not. Analysis was
conducted both including and excluding the outlying values. Those who do credit
score display a mean mortgage value of £63,673, or £56,408 excluding the outliers.
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Those who do not use credit scoring display a lower mean value of £52,841 or
£45,600 excluding the outliers. These figures reflect the previous findings in
respect of the whole population.
Having examined the mean value of loans, the volume of loans granted is also
examined. This analysis supports earlier findings, that generally scoring is utilised
by high volume lenders. However confirmation is also presented that this is not an
entirely volume driven relationship, as several high volume lenders do not use credit
scoring. The data is presented relative to scoring status in figure 7.3.
figure 7.3: Scoring Status
Number of Do not score Do score Do not score Do score




0 - 4,999 65% (11) 0 8% (20,496) 0
5,000 -9,999 12% (2) 0 5% (11,600) 0
10,000-104,000 23% (4) 100% (7) 87% (224,184) 100% (205,582)
100.00% (17) 100.00% (7) 100% (256,280) 100% (205,582)
7.3.2. Summary - Respondent Population
The perception of a low response rate is accurate when compared to the response rate
achieved in the earlier survey undertaken in support of this thesis. However, the
20% response rate achieved by the benchmarking survey is not unusually low for a
survey response rate from industry. Some of the possible reasons for the low
response rate were presented. What is encouraging is that fifteen lenders took the
trouble to explain their non-response, which suggests that they at least considered the
survey. Due to the limited number of organisations which responded, a mainly
descriptive analysis of the data gathered is presented thus far. However, the analysis
confirms that when examined by organisational type the profile of respondents
reflects the lender population. This confirms the earlier finding that those who do
use credit scoring, process mortgages with a higher mean value than those who do
187
not. Confirmation is also presented that credit scoring is the favoured method of
decisioning by high volume lenders, although this is not exclusively the case.
7.4. Benchmarking Risk
7.4.1. Definition of Arrears
Lenders were asked to define the point at which an account is classified as being in
arrears. Twenty three organisations provide this data, with thirty percent of these
confirming that arrears exist when any monetary value is overdue. The majority,
forty eight percent define an account as being in arrears when 1 - 1.99 monthly
instalments are overdue. Only one lender defines arrears as existing when 2 - 2.99
instalments are overdue. The remainder of respondent organisations uses alternative
definitions. One defines the arrears position as existing at a point in time where a
subjective assessment determines that the relationship between lender and borrower
has "broken down". Two other lenders use financial values rather than actual
number of instalments in arrears. One other used a proportion of the monthly
repayment, and the other a small financial sum. The variety of definitions of arrears,
mean that industry wide figures relating to arrears levels may not be a good overall
indicator of credit quality. This might also suggest that industry wide statistics on
arrears do not present a cohesive account of the actual situation, as one lender's
accounts in arrears might be another lenders good accounts.
7.4.2. Arrears - 12 months after account opening
Lenders were asked to provide data on the level of arrears that exist twelve months
after accounts have been opened. This data was requested, as earlier findings had
suggested that arrears which occur later in the loan life, might arise from events
which lenders believe cannot be predicted at the time the application is assessed.
Therefore by asking about early arrears, we might minimise the chance of "life style"
events being the primary cause. We might also presume that this 12 month old loan
behaviour might have been predicted at the time of application. As the variety of
different ways in which lenders quantify arrears had been anticipated, respondents
were asked to provide data on those accounts that were not "up to date". Specifically
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they were asked for data on accounts not up to date at a time period twelve months
after account opening. This very specific request was to ensure consistency of
reporting. Only seventeen lenders provided this data. Of the seven lenders who
failed to provide this information six did not credit score mortgage loans. This may
present confirmation of the improved management information obtained via credit
scoring. The range of arrears levels was from a minimum of 0.002% to a maximum
of 22.6%. The overall mean value was 5.98%.
This analysis is presented in two ways in figure 7.3. It is presented by scoring status
only, and then more specifically by scoring status and number of loans granted.
Figure 7.3
% of accounts












0 - 0.99% 55% (6) 16.66% (1) 47% (114,192) 13% (21,225)
1.00%-9.99% 27% (3) 33.33% (2) 51% (125,200) 15% (24,500)
10% and above 18% (2) 50.00% (3) 2% (4,870) 72% (121,707)
100% (11) 99.99% (6) 100% 244,262) 100% 167,432)
When organisational and scoring status are considered, those organisations that do
not use credit scoring are found to have lower mean arrears levels than those who do
credit score. Non scoring organisations have mean arrears levels of 4.99% at the
time period twelve months after opening. Those who credit score display a mean
arrears level of 7.66% at the period 12 months after opening. When the data is
examined further to look at ranges of arrears values the differences are more
pronounced. Whilst fifty five percent of non scoring organisations have less than
one percent arrears, only sixteen percent of scoring organisations maintain such a
low level of arrears. At the highest levels of arrears 12 months after opening, we
find that fifty percent of scorers have more than ten percent of accounts in arrears.
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When compared to non scorers, we see that only eighteen percent of those
organisations maintain arrears levels of above ten percent.
Due to the relatively small number of respondents it is useful to consider the impact
of such figures by examining the actual loan population. The second part of the
analysis shown in figure 7.3 does this and presents arrears experience relative to the
number of loans. The seventeen respondents being considered granted 411,694
loans. The analysis using number of loans highlights more clearly the differences
between those who credit score and those who do not. Seventy two percent of all
loans granted by organisations which do credit score, reside in portfolios where more
than ten percent of loans are in arrears twelve months after opening. A striking
comparison is made with the non scorers, who have only two percent of loans in this
category. At the opposite end of the spectrum, thirteen percent of all loans, which
were granted by scoring organisations, reside in a portfolio where the 12 months
arrears level is less than one percent. A considerable contrast with the forty seven
percent of loans granted by non scorers which are in a portfolio where less than one
percent are in arrears 12 months after opening.
7.4.3. Arrears - Level of Indebtedness
The extent of borrower indebtedness is examined in greater detail. Lenders were
asked to break down the arrears levels into the extent of the indebtedness, which
exists twelve months after account opening. This breakdown, into the actual number
of loan instalments which are unpaid, provides an insight into the seriousness of the
arrears position. The results are in line with expectations, in that the number of
accounts in arrears decreases in line with the seriousness of arrears increasing. The
exception is the figure for those accounts between five and nine months in arrears
which shows an increase. A single lender is responsible for this anomaly. The
lender in question confirmed that eighteen percent of his accounts were between five
and nine months in arrears twelve months after opening. Interestingly this figure was
presented by an organisation not using credit scoring. When this outlying figure is
removed from the data, the adjusted maximum level for accounts which are five to
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nine months in arrears is nine percent, and the adjusted mean value is 1.24%. This
supports the general trend. Figure 7.4 presents this data.
figure 7.4: Extent of Arrears
Instalments Minimum Maximum Mean
0-0.99 0 98.40% 31.51%
1-1.99 0 51.00% 10.36%
2-2.99 0 33.00% 4.23%
3-3.99 0 9.00% 1.36%
4-4.99 0 5.00% 0.96%
5-9.99 0 18.00% 2.30%
10 + 0 3.00% 0.48%
7.4.4. Arrears - Portfolio Level
Having ascertained the level of arrears for relatively youthful accounts, a broader
view of arrears was requested. Lenders were asked to provide figures confirming the
level of arrears across the whole mortgage loan portfolio. In total twenty three
lenders provided this data, which is now presented in figure 7.5. This data is not
presented compared to number of loans, as the number of loans which comprise the
whole portfolio, is unknown. The numbers of loans which have thus far been
considered, reflect the volume granted over the previous 12 months, representing
lenders recent mortgage activity.
figure 7.5: Portfolio Arrears
Do Not score Do score




0 - 0.99% 56.25% (9) 14.28% (1)
1 - 1.99% 18.75% (3) 28.57% (2)
2% and above 25.00% (4) 57.14% (4)
100.00% (16) 99.99% (7)
Reflecting the earlier presentation of data, the organisations are stratified by scoring
status. The data shows that that those who credit score experience higher levels of
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arrears across the whole portfolio, than those that do not credit score. Again the
figures are quite striking with fifty six percent of non scoring organisations
displaying portfolio level arrears of less than one percent, compared to only fourteen
percent of credit scoring organisations.
7.4.5. Definition of Default
Mirroring the data gathered on arrears, lenders were asked to define how they
categorise mortgage default. Twenty three respondents provided this data. Fifty
two percent of respondents considered an account to be in default when it was 1-1.99
instalments in arrears. This is similar to the previous responses which asked about
the definition of arrears. It would therefore seem that the terms arrears and default
might be used interchangeably. The traditional view is that accounts migrate
through various states, from being in order, to being in arrears and then to a more
serious arrears situation referred to as "default". Just over 17% of respondents
considered that default occurred when 2 - 2.99 instalments were unpaid, with a
further 13% defining default as being at 3-3.99 instalments unpaid. Again
relationship breakdown and financial values were used by the remainder to identify
when default has occurred.
7.4.6. Portfolio Level of Default
Default is also examined across the whole mortgage portfolio. The default levels are,
as expected, lower than arrears levels. The default levels are categorised only by
organisational type, as again the number of loans, which comprise the total portfolio
of each lender is unknown. The minimum default level is reported as zero percent.
Whilst this might seem unlikely, more than one lender had default levels of less than
a tenth of one percent, so it has been assumed that a single lender had no default.
The maximum level of portfolio default was seven percent, and the mean value
2.03%. This data is categorised by organisational status and is now presented in
figure 7.6.
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figure 7.6: Portfolio Default
Do Not score Do score




0 - 0.99% 46.67% (7) 28.57% (2)
1 - 1.99% 20.00% (3) 28.57% (2)
2% and above 33.33% (5) 42.86% (3)
100.00% (15) 100.00% (7)
Again mirroring the findings on arrears, the level of default exhibited by
organisations that credit score is higher than those who do not credit score. Forty six
percent of lenders who do not score have less than one percent of the portfolio in
default. This is compared to twenty eight percent of those who do credit score. On
this occasion, unlike the figures presented for overall portfolio arrears, the figures for
most serious indebtedness are closer for scorers and non scorers. Thirty three
percent of non scoring organisations exhibit portfolio default rates of two percent and
above. This is compared to forty two percent of scoring organisations As indicated
earlier, the percentages are not extrapolated to suggest the number of loans currently
in default as the overall size of the loan portfolio is unknown,
7.4.7. Possessions
Whilst the benchmarking survey has examined levels of arrears and default, no
information has been gathered on levels of possession. As indicated earlier within
this thesis the published figures on "mortgage failures" often refer to the level of
possession which occur. This is the point at which the extent of mortgage failure,
evidenced by default, is such that the lender takes possession of the property. The
property is then sold in order to repay or partially repay the mortgage debt.
According to published figures (CML, 1998), possessions in 1997 amounted to
0.31% of all mortgages held in the portfolio. This figure represents 0.31% of
10,738,000 mortgages, which the CML quotes as being the number of mortgages
held by their members. 1998 figures recorded are similar, with 0.16% of all
mortgages held being re-possessed in the first half year.
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Figure 7.6 presented confirmation that the scoring organisations have 2% of their
portfolio in default. In order to understand the impact of default on the organisation,
we can relate the possession rate, not to the overall portfolio size overall, but to the
number of loans granted in a year.
Using the CML figures and assuming an annualised possession rate of 0.31%, we can
now relate the figures to mortgages granted. The average number of mortgages
granted in a twelve month period, by respondents to the benchmarking survey was
19,244. A possession rate of 0.31% means that of those mortgages granted, on
average sixty properties would be possessed by each lender. This confirms that for
all lenders the cost of each bad loan is offset by the profit on 320 good loans.
Unfortunately the possession data is not available at an organisational level which
would allow the possession rates of scoring and non-scoring organisations to be
directly compared.
However, given the lower cost bases of the scoring organisations, and the higher loan
volumes and values involved we might presume that the scoring organisations can
generate a higher profit per loan. This might contribute to an explanation as to why
they feel comfortable carrying higher levels of early arrears, and slightly higher
levels of portfolio default.
However, the evidence which suggests that scoring lenders experience higher early
arrears, and slightly higher portfolio default presents an anomaly when considered
alongside the reasons for introducing scoring. In chapter four of this thesis lenders
confirmed that they introduced scoring, to improve risk management. This leaves us
with two possible reasons for the evidence from the benchmarking survey. Firstly,
improved risk management is not necessarily derived from lower arrears. Improved
risk management might be achieved via improved control of lending, and an
improved knowledge of the likely "bad experience" that will occur. As alluded to
by lenders, riskier lending can be profitable. The move from minimising arrears to
maximising profits has already been suggested within this thesis, and the findings on
increased arrears may reflect this. Secondly, the arrears figures being quoted, may in
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fact be a real achievement for lenders. Certainly the arrears figures quoted by the
CML (1998) of 0.31% in 1997, are lower than the 1991 levels of 0.77%. However,
whether this results from improved risk management or an improved economic
environment cannot be determined within this thesis. There is considerable scope
for more research in the field to specifically consider issues related to mortgage
arrears.
7.4.8. Lending Outwith Published Credit Policy
The final measure that might be related to the risk inherent in the loan portfolio is the
volume of lending that does not comply with the published credit policy rules.
Previous work within this thesis questioned the role of credit policy rules, and their
relationship with either risk or profitability. Lending outwith credit policy rules in a
non scoring organisation can be compared to overriding credit score values in a
credit scoring organisation. However, an anomaly has already been highlighted in
that credit scoring organisations also have credit policy rules, so the comparison is
not absolute. No previous data about the extent of this non-criteria lending is
available. Nineteen organisations provide data on the extent of lending outwith
published loan criteria. Without exception those who did not provide this data did
not credit score. Again this might be a symptom of the less well developed
management information systems in the non-scoring lending environment. This data
is now presented in figure 7.7.
figure 7.7: Non-Criteria Lending
Do Not score Do score Do Not score Do score
Level of non number of number of number of number of
criteria lending organisations organisations loans loans
0 - 4.99% 33.33% (4) 42.86% (3) 68% (87115) 64% (131332)
5 - 9.99% 16.67% (2) 42.86% (3) 6% (8281) 30% (62250)
10- 14.99% 25.00% (3) 14.28% (1) 11% ( 14372) 5% 12000)
15% and above 25.00% (3) - 15% (18812) 0%
100.00% (12) 100.00% (7) 100% 128580) 100% 205582)
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The minimum level of lending outwith credit policy was zero; some lenders did not
make exceptions to their policies. The maximum level was thirty five percent. This
was a surprising result as it would seem to be contradictory to have credit policy
rules and then ignore them for such a large proportion of applicants. The mean level
was eight percent. When lending outwith credit policy is examined relative to
decisioning status, it is clear that the scoring organisations exhibit lower levels of
non-criteria lending. Eighty five percent of those who credit score have less than ten
percent of their lending outwith credit policy rules, this compares to fifty percent for
judgmental lenders.
The analysis is again augmented by consideration of the number of loans involved.
Again a slightly different picture emerges. Considered by number of loans, the non
criteria lending of both groups is mainly maintained at less the five percent. The raw
loan numbers do however confirm the high level of non criteria lending by non
scoring organisations. Lending outwith criteria is acknowledged by lenders to be
"more risky". During the case study analysis within this thesis, non criteria cases
were found to perform substantially worse than others. Twenty six percent of loans
granted by non scorers reside in portfolios with over ten percent of lending outwith
credit policy. This compares to only five percent of loans in scoring organisations.
This again casts doubts on the role of lending criteria. Credit scoring organisations
conduct less lending which is outwith their published criteria, yet maintain slightly
higher levels of default. Non scoring organisations conduct high levels of non
criteria lending, but in the main have lower levels of default. We might expect to find
higher levels of lending outwith criteria to be related to high levels of default, and
this does not appear to be the case. Thus the role of credit policy appears to be
inconsistent, when considered relative to expected risk reduction outcomes.
7.4.9. Source of Business
Data is also now presented on the sources from which lenders derive their new
mortgage accounts. This is considered relevant for two reasons. Within the
interview phase, it had been asserted that mortgage intermediaries generally had a
poor opinion of credit scoring applied to mortgages. Also within the case study
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phase of the research it is confirmed that existing customers display loan
performance superior to non-customers. Therefore source of business might impact
on the method of credit decisioning chosen. Lenders were therefore asked to
disclose the proportion of new business received from mortgage intermediaries. The
data collected confirms that organisations that credit score applications, derive a
greater proportion of their loans from intermediaries as figure 7.8 shows. Not all
non-scoring lenders provided this data, thus the total loan figure for them is, in this
instance, lower than previously reported.















0 % - 29.99% 36% (5) 0% 68% (89,389) 0%
30% - 59.99% 21% (3) 14% (1) 8% (10,972) 19% (38,150)
60% plus 43% (6) 86% (6) 24% (31,919) 81% (167,432)
100% (14) 100% (7) 100% (132,280) 100% (205,582)
The figures presented in figure 7.8 are consistent with the higher levels of arrears and
default exhibited by scoring lenders. As non customers are riskier, and as levels of
non customer business increases, so we might expect the scoring lender who accept
intermediary introduced new business to display higher levels of arrears.
7.4.10. Loan to Value Ratio
The final risk measure considered is the loan to value (LTV) ratio which lenders
agree to advance monies against. Again, the findings of the case study confirm that
higher LTV ratio loans display worse performance. This ratio is therefore examined
relative to credit decisioning method. However, caution must be exercised when
reviewing these results. Lenders were asked to confirm the maximum loan to value
ratio on which they offer mortgage loans. This may bear no relation to the
proportion of loans which are actually granted at high loan to value ratios. During
the interview phase one scoring lender confirmed that no more than fifty percent of
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the overall loan portfolio could be at a LTV greater than 90%. Findings presented in
figure 7.9 confirm that those who do credit score do offer, but may not accept more
high LTV ratio loans.







80 - 89.99% 6% (1) -
90 - 99.99% 76% (13) 57% (4)
100% 12% (2) 43% (3)
101% and above 6% (1) -
100.00% (17) 100.00% (7)
These figures for 100% lending and above are generally in accordance with the risk
management benefits, which can be achieved following the adoption of credit
scoring. Lending organisations that credit score, seem to be comfortable in offering
products that attract potentially higher levels of risk. An interesting anomaly in the
data is that the single lender offering loans above the value of the property, does not
credit score. These loans might be specialised cases such as negative equity etc.
where credit policy rules are considered dominant over the credit risk rules.
7.4.11. Summary - Risk Measures
This data presents useful confirmation that credit scoring organisations generally
accept and manage higher risk levels. The data suggests that scoring organisations
chose to maintain higher rather than lower arrears levels. This is potentially due to
improved risk management resulting from scoring which might permit or encourage
higher levels of risk taking. Several reasons for this might exist. The use of credit
scoring facilitates high quality management information indicating portfolio risk. By
adjusting credit score cut-off values, lenders can quickly and conclusively alter the
risk profile of applicants being accepted (not withstanding over-riding). Lenders
therefore know that the risk is managed at a given and pre-determined level. They
also know how many bad accounts they will accept relative to good accounts.
Using profitability calculations they might therefore decide that it is worthwhile to
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accept a higher level of "bad" business, and reap the additional profitability from the
increased number of good applications being accepted. This potential shift in focus
from maintaining levels of arrears that may be considered unrealistically low,
towards a profit maximising culture, might have some ethical implications for
lenders. Should the credit score cut off value be set at a level which "anticipates" a
level of borrower difficulty in meeting repayment requirements, in order to maximise
profitability? This might force the lender to decide whether his first responsibility
is to his customer or his shareholders or members.
The alternative premise is that credit scoring might perform less well than
judgmental lending, and its use is therefore driving up levels of arrears and default.
This scenario is discounted for two reasons. Firstly chapter six presented
confirmation that credit scoring can outperform judgmental evaluation.
Secondly, the scoring organisations appear to maintain tighter control on the sort of
lending, which they conduct. They maintain more of the portfolio within agreed
credit policy rules. As the scoring lenders exhibit lower levels of non policy lending,
so we can confirm that they are achieving higher levels of consistency and control.
This is as a result of a higher proportion of loans authorised by scoring lenders, being
granted on terms that have been pre-determined at an organisational rather than
individual level.
However, the foregoing assumes credit scoring is being used effectively. There is a
possibility is that a high level of overriding, combined with bad performance from
overridden accounts is negating the risk reduction benefits of scoring. This makes it
imperative for lenders to examine their override strategies very closely.
The extent of lending conduced outwith credit policy rules, supports the earlier
assertion of this author that credit policy rules might usefully be reviewed.
Additionally, the potential deterrent effect of credit policy rules on borrowers might
usefully be considered. If thirty five percent of applicants can be granted loans
which are outwith the rules, then potentially a group of applicants who would be
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The acceptance rate refers to the level of applications received, which convert to
become mortgage loans "on the books". As indicated previously a wide range of
reasons may cause "non conversion", from borrower withdrawal to lender decline.
Within the literature figures of around sixty to seventy percent are cited as being a
normal acceptance rate, whilst the case study in chapter six found a conversion rate
of fifty six percent. It is not the raw acceptance rate per se that might have
importance for credit policy rules. Rather, understanding the reasons for non-
conversion might have a useful function. However, prior to considering reasons it
is first necessary to benchmark the overall acceptance rate, to establish the range of
rates that do exist. An astonishing range of data was found. And this is now
presented in figure 7.10.
figure 7.10: Acceptance Rate
Population Minimum Maximum Mean
Do Not score 17 22% 98% 73%
Do score 7 40% 98% 67%
The maximum acceptance rate is 98%. This is reported both by a very small non
scoring "other" lender and a bank which is credit scoring. The non scoring
organisation in question is responsible for less than one thousand mortgages per year,
whilst the bank accept twelve thousand mortgages per year. The minimum
acceptance rate is 22%, again this seemed surprisingly low. The organisation
reporting this level, also process less than one thousand mortgages per year and is a
non scorer. The lowest conversion rate amongst the scoring lenders is forty percent
of all applicants.
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In order to look at the figures in a more relevant fashion it is useful to consider the
level of acceptance related to volume of applications processed. Therefore a
weighted average is now presented in figure 7.11, which examines acceptance
against number of loan applications.











Do Not score 304,386 256,280 75%
Do score 343,010 205,582 60%
By weighting the approval rates by number of loans processed we see that the gap
between scorers and non-scorers broadens. This confirms that credit scoring
organisations convert a lower proportion of applications than non-scorers do.
The lower rate of conversion for credit scoring organisations must be viewed in
conjunction with the high levels of business which they receive via mortgage
intermediaries. Figure 7.8 confirmed that 86% of scoring organisations receive over
sixty percent of new business from intermediaries compared to only forty percent of
non scoring organisations.
Additional useful data could be generated if lenders were to maintain accurate
records on those applications which fail to convert. In particular applicants that
withdraw because they have found a better product elsewhere, or because the process
was perceived to be "too slow" or otherwise unsatisfactory, could usefully inform
organisations on their product and process. Equally importantly organisations need
to maintain data on the declined applicants. Whether scoring or not, it might be
useful for organisations to compare the profile of declined applicants with those of
approved applicants when behavioural data relevant to the loan becomes available.
This will help to ascertain the effectiveness of the credit screening process. Whilst
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reject inference is variously supported and discredited within the literature, the value
of using relevant data to inform the credit process should not be underestimated.
Conducting analysis of the declines, even where scoring is not involved, helps to
ensure that lenders can vouch for consistency and objectivity in their lending
processes.
7.5.2. Enquiry Conversion
Whilst the figures for acceptance allow the lender to examine the population who
have formally applied for credit, survey evidence confirmed that a population exists
whose application for credit never becomes part of the data bank which the lender
uses.
This part of the credit problem receives no attention in the credit scoring literature,
but is confirmed to exist by lenders themselves. The interview evidence supports the
premise that very little as known about those applicants who make a verbal enquiry,
and who then fail to proceed to a formal application. The benchmarking survey
evidence conflicts with the interview findings. The interviewees maintained that they
did not collate data on enquiry conversion rates. However, nineteen of the twenty
four survey respondents provide a figure which they believe represents the
proportion verbal enquiries which convert to formal application. Again the range
is extensive. One lender who credit scores confirms that 80% of verbal enquiries
proceed to application. This figure is produced by a bank which process twelve
thousand applications per year. The minimum conversion rate is 16% which is
presented by another credit scoring bank. This bank processes over seventy thousand
successful applications per year. This surprisingly low conversion figure must be
placed in context. The 16% are derived from number of completed applications
received at a mortgage call centre when compared with number of telephone
enquiries related to new mortgages. None the less it is quite astonishing to think that
a potential loan population of some 437,500 is converted to an actual population of
70,000. The cost of dealing with the "lost" 84%, is being borne by the organisation
and ultimately by the live 16% of account holders. This clearly exemplifies the
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importance of lenders managing this particular interface more actively, rather than
only actively managing those who formalise an application.
When rates of verbal enquiries which convert are related to all respondents, the mean
value of non scoring organisations is 57%, which exceeds the rate for those who do
credit score. Organisations who do credit score have a mean enquiry conversion rate
of 45%.
Only seven of the lenders collate additional data on enquiries, which fail to convert
to applications. Those who do gather additional data, do so to identify the reasons for
non conversion. A variety of reasons were presented as follows;
□ products not meeting needs
□ lending criteria
□ withdrawn
□ declined at initial interview
□ shopping around
□ property does not meet criteria
□ customer does not fit target market
□ lost to competitor
□ indemnity requirements
Of the foregoing categories those relating to "lending criteria", "declined at initial
interview", "property failing to meet criteria", and "customer does not fit target
market", are all failures related to credit policy rules. Further evidence perhaps of a
need for review in this area. The categories, "product not meeting needs", "lost to
competitor", and "indemnity requirements" can usefully be used to inform marketing
and product development departments of the mis-match between customer needs and
product profiles.
7.5.3. Approval Time
During both the initial survey and the interview phases of the research, lenders had
confirmed the importance of reaching "agreement in principal" (AIP) as quickly as
possible. This is one of the key areas of process efficiency for lenders. Respondents
were invited to select from a range of times, and to present a "usual time" which it
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takes to reach agreement in principle. Twenty three organisations provide responses,
and as evidenced the majority does in fact reach a decision within one day. However
only a quarter are currently reaching a decision to lend within one hour. These
results are now presented in figure 7.12.
figure 7.12: Approval Time
less than 1 1 hour - 1 day 2 - 5 days 6 days- 1
hour month
%of 26.1% 47.8% 21.7% 4.3%
respondents
No. of 6 11 5 1
Respondents
When the time to decision is considered relative to the method of credit decisioning,
we see some evidence of the benefits being derived from scoring. Those who credit
score process a higher proportion of mortgages to AIP within one hour. Almost
forty three percent of scorers reach a decision within an hour, compared to nineteen
percent of those using judgmental evaluation. Strangely the only organisation
outwith the six day AIP criteria, also has access to credit scoring. This response was
offered by a building society which approves over 20,000 mortgages per annum. No
additional information is currently available which explains such an anomaly, but
this highlights the exploratory nature of the research and the need for further research
to be conducted. The results relative to decisioning status are presented in figure
7.13.






Less than one hour 18.75% (3) 42.86% (3)
One hour - one
day
50.00% (8) 42.86% (3)
Two - five days 31.25% (5)
6 days-one month 14.28% (1)
100.00% (16) 100.00.% (7)
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7.5.4. Time from application to offer
All twenty-four organisations responded with information on time to offer. Only
two produced a formal offer within 2-5 days. A further twenty one organisations
(87%) produced offer papers in a time period of six days to one month. A single
organisation confirmed that time to offer was usually in excess of one month. No
additional analysis was conducted on this data. The time between application and
offer is spent gathering evidence, which is used to corroborate the application details.
Due to the nature of the survey, which already contained many sections, data on what
information was being requested by lenders at this stage could not be gathered.
However, the determination of the amount of supporting evidence required is a topic,
which also requires further investigation. This topic is already under review by
lenders.
7.5.5. Customer Satisfaction
The final process measurement considered provides an insight into the level of
activity which lenders undertake in measuring customer satisfaction levels. Whilst
measurement of satisfaction does not confirm pursuit of customer satisfaction, it may
be considered indicative of general organisational awareness. Of the twenty four
respondents, nineteen (79%) confirm that they do measure satisfaction. Of the
nineteen who measure satisfaction only five of these measured the satisfaction of
each mortgage customer. The majority (14), used some form of random sampling,
variously monthly, quarterly or driven by some other time period.
When the satisfaction measurement is related to decisioning status, the results
confirm that all organisations that credit score do measure satisfaction. All five
respondents who fail to measure customer satisfaction do not use credit scoring.
This may be linked to the high levels of analysis conducted within the credit scoring
environment, where the levels of technology are supportive of extensive analysis of
many aspects of performance. Within the initial survey, credit scoring organisations
had reported improved data management and management information being derived
following the adopting scoring. Data is acknowledged to be an important asset by all
lenders, regardless of decisioning mechanisms in place.
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7.6. Conclusions
The benchmarking pilot study confirmed that issues of data sensitivity require to be
managed if lenders are to offer information into the public domain. This is
particularly important when the data is explicitly intended for sharing with their
competitors. Twenty percent of the population did however offer information for
this benchmarking study, and the results provide data, which might usefully inform
further research.
When examining risk measures, it appeared that those who used credit scoring to
reach lending decisions accept and manage higher levels of risk than those using
judgmental evaluation. The higher levels of risk result from a combination of higher
loan to value ratios offered, and the higher proportion of business received via non-
customers. Despite these loans presenting potentially riskier profiles, they are also of
higher value than the non-scored loans, and scoring lenders manage substantially
higher volumes of lending. Lenders might willingly accept higher levels of risk due
to the potentially increased profitability of doing so. As an illustration only, and
using averages, the possession data suggests that on average lenders possess sixty
properties per annum. Again using data on averages this suggests that for every bad
loan accepted lenders accept over three hundred good loans. Depending on the loss
on each bad loan, lenders might willingly accept higher levels of bad loans, as the
profit on the goods is more than enough to offset the losses anticipated. This of
course presents only a financial view of the cost of default, to the exclusion of a
consideration of the social cost. However, many lenders are highly risk averse, and
this was evident during the interview phase of the research. Therefore the use of
averages will not truly reflect the risk profile of all lenders in the market place.
When process measures are examined, we find that the speed to the initial lending
decision is faster for lenders who do use credit scoring. In addition to this customer
service benefit being quantified as having been delivered, those who do score do in
all cases measure customer satisfaction levels. This compares with the non scorers
who do not all currently measure customer satisfaction levels.
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One of the most interesting features of the analysis was the identification of the need
for more information to be gathered on both those who make verbal enquiries, and
then fail or make a formal application, and those who formally apply but
subsequently fail to convert to a "completed" account. Many individuals appear to
interact with lending organisations over house purchase, potentially the most major
financial transaction they will undertake, and then vanish into a "void". This author
suggests an "information gap" might exist which lenders might usefully seek to
resolve. The potential for increased levels of business and improved business
processes and thus profitability might be considerable.
This is presented in figure 7.14 in a way which mirrors the benefits gap described in
chapter four. This graphic depiction is intended to highlight the large numbers of
potential customers who "vanish" following an initial interaction with the lending
organisation. Whilst these customers might disappear for a variety of very good
reasons, the key issue is that lenders are unclear as to the reasons for the failure of
these potential customers to establish a relationship. Thus, by resolving the
information gap, so lenders will position themselves in a manner, which allows and
encourages them to be more responsive to market and customer needs.
figure 7.14: The "Information Gap"
Potential Costs
verbal enquiries verbal enquiry
does not apply
lost revenue - interest
lost revenue - sales
increased cost - customers
paper based application paper based applicant
withdraws
increased cost- organisatic n
customer dissatisfaction
on line application on line cancellation
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At present many lenders are failing to address the "information gap", which is
acknowledged by many lenders to exist. However, resolving the "information gap"
might go someway towards allowing lenders to improve organisational efficiencies.
As a result they might better meet the needs of their existing and potential customers.
7.6.1. Limitations of the Study
What is apparent is that the survey mechanism alone, will produce useful statistical
evidence. However, this requires to be augmented by more insight into the market in
which the lender operates and his risk and return profiles. A future survey might
usefully be augmented by the undertaking additional research that more closely
profiles respondent groups. Whether organisational type is the most appropriate
means by which to group respondents is now in question. A more holistic grouping
might be achieved if a wider variety of organisational characteristics were used to
create categories. The complexity of the market place makes "simple" groupings
less meaningful. Volume of loans, delivery channels, source of business, source of
profit (i.e. product or bundle), will all impact on shaping the performance desired by
organisations, and the performance achievable. Thus, additional research might
usefully be conducted to establish who lenders believe their competitors are. A
competitor grouping as a basis for benchmarking might more usefully inform both
the practitioner and research communities.
Chapter eight, which follows, will present the overall conclusions of the research




8.1. Aims of the research
Due to the exploratory nature of the early research which underpins this thesis, the
aims of the research have evolved as the subject area has been explored. Little was
known about the extent to which credit scoring is used as a decisioning method by
mortgage lenders. An initial survey was undertaken in order to meet the first aim of
the research, which was to establish how widespread the application of credit scoring
to mortgage loans is in the UK. During the initial survey the other important aim
was to establish the reasons why lenders use credit scoring (empirical) based
decisioning, rather than judgmental decisioning methods. These aims were
achieved, confirming that credit scoring is the method of evaluation used on over
sixty percent of loan applications. The benefits of credit scoring were identified and
these were presented in a new way. Rather than a single focus on risk, lenders also
confirmed the achievement of process, customer service and cost benefits.
Following the analysis of the survey results an interesting anomaly became evident.
All lenders were aware of the benefits which credit scoring can deliver. Despite this,
those lenders who adopt scoring confirm that they use scoring in tandem with, rather
than to the exclusion of, judgmental methods. The judgmental element of the
decision arises where lenders override the credit decision, which the scorecard
delivers.
This presented a further research aim, which was addressed via a programme of
interviews. The research now sought to ascertain whether the scorecard over-riding,
was compensating for a known deficiency in the scorecards being used. The
interviews sought to discover whether the judgmental input, which augmented the
scorecard decision, was based on identifiable risk or profitability criteria.
Additionally, the variety of ways in which scoring was operationalised was
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investigated via the interview programme. This sought to establish how credit
scoring must be implemented in the lending organisation, if the organisation is to
derive maximum value from its application.
The interviews established that overriding was not based on either risk or
profitability information that was not included in the scorecard. Overriding was not
a rational response to some known scorecard limitation. This presented a further
research question and this was now pursued. Lenders had been found to value the
judgmental input into the loan evaluation, despite the lack of identifiable risk or
profit criteria in evidence. It was therefore necessary to establish empirically which
method of credit decisioning performed better. This new aim led to the direct
comparison of credit decisioning methods on an UK mortgage portfolio. This
comparison was undertaken via a case study. Results of the case study, confirmed
that the credit scoring models developed could outperform judgmental evaluation.
The best scoring model accepted all of the existing good loans whilst declining over
forty percent of the bad loans.
Finally, in drawing together all of the evidence gathered which suggested that several
groups of benefits could be derived from the adoption of credit scoring, a final
research aim was pursued. The benchmarking survey was conducted in order to
identify whether organisations which use credit scoring, achieve levels of
performance superior to those achieved by lenders who do not use credit scoring.
Findings of the benchmarking study were not conclusive. Whilst confirming the
speed to decision, and the potential cost savings from speed to decision and high
volumes of loans, the risk results can be interpreted in several ways. The risk
benchmarks confirmed that credit scoring lenders, experience higher levels of early
arrears and slightly higher levels of portfolio arrears and default. When placed in
context with the earlier findings, this is perhaps unsurprising. Scoring lenders were
found to accept higher risk loans and higher volumes and values of loans. They also
exercise greater control of the profile of their lending, and using cut-off scores can
quickly and easily manage the portfolio. They can if they chose, outlaw the practice
of overriding to improve consistency and control. Taking these features into
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account, it is therefore not unexpected that they are willing to allow slightly higher
levels of arrears. As arrears increase, so do the volumes of profitable "good" loans.
Therefore, it is likely that the scoring lenders focus more on portfolio profitability as
a whole, rather than minimising risk by keeping arrears at the lowest possible level.
8.2. Contribution of the research
The key contribution of the research is the confirmation that the application of credit
scoring to a mortgage lending portfolio can achieve levels of loan performance,
which are superior to those achieved by judgmental lending.
A further contribution is made, in that the evaluation of credit scoring within this
thesis goes beyond the typical risk focus usually encountered within the credit
scoring literature. The benefits of credit scoring have been expanded following the
initial empirical work, and are now categorised in a new way. The benefits of credit
scoring are now presented in four categories:
□ Risk benefits
□ Process benefits,
□ Customer service benefits
□ Cost benefits.
The success of lenders in achieving those benefits is now considered.
8.3. Conclusions
8.3.1. The Benefits Achieved via Credit Scoring
This research has shown that mortgage credit scoring can be used effectively in order
to manage and mitigate mortgage credit risk. These results are achieved as the
performance of credit scoring is at a level above that achieved by judgmental
evaluation. This improved performance is achieved via the capacity of the scoring
system to objectively analyse and apply appropriate weightings to those application
characteristics, which are empirically established as being most strongly correlated
with poor loan performance. This result ensures that lenders, who credit score,
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accept a pre-determined level of credit risk across the whole mortgage portfolio. A
further benefit of mortgage scoring is the improved management information, which
is derived via using the credit score value to improve analysis and portfolio
management. This allows organisations to manage the loan portfolio more actively.
These efficiencies result not only from the improved loan outcomes, but also from
the ability to target customers, manage arrears and potentially to offer products and
securitised mortgage bonds, which have been priced to reflect risk.
The improved risk management is augmented by process benefits which allow
scoring lenders to achieve faster decisioning, retain less specialised staff, and
centralise processing in a manner which reduces costs. The evidence presented by
the initial survey respondents confirmed that cost benefits are being achieved. In
addition, evidence of lower cost:income ratios amongst credit scoring organisations
was found during the benchmarking survey, and this produces empirical
confirmation, which complements the views presented by lenders.
In confirmation of risk and process benefits being achieved, we find that credit
scoring lenders process larger volumes of loans, which on average have a higher
value. One fact which initially appeared as anomalous with other data gathered, is
the higher level of arrears which are experienced by those who do credit score
mortgage applications. However, closer analysis of the data confirmed that the
applicants which credit scorers do accept comprise of many more new applications
from customers who are new to them. This contrasts with the profile of applicants
to non-scorers who are more often drawn from the organisation's existing customer
base. Additionally, the credit scoring organisations do offer higher loan-to-value
products. Both non-customer business and high loan-to-value lending are proven to
be higher risk. Therefore, this applicant profile is in concert with the slightly higher
arrears levels evidenced.
Mitigating the perception of a higher level of risk being accepted, we find that the
scoring lenders accept loans, which much more closely adhere to a pre-determined
level of risk i.e. they are within lending criteria. Non-scoring organisations conduct
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much more lending which is outwith published guidelines. This non-criteria lending
usually comprises features or characteristics, which the organisation has determined
at a policy level should be avoided, as such lending often poses a higher level of risk.
8.3.2. The Benefits Gaps Identified
Despite the presentation of evidence in support of benefits being achieved via the
adoption of credit scoring, significant "gaps" in the benefits that are achieved are
identified. These result from the way in which scoring is integrated into the
operating environment.
Achieving risk benefits is limited by the ad-hoc approach to over-riding which is
evident. Despite attempting to identify a rational reason for overriding, none is
apparent. Lenders require to examine this area closely. The lending process must
be reconsidered, based on the lending organisation's knowledge of the ability of their
scorecard. This performance is determined to some extent by the data used in
developing the scorecard, and is evident in the results of testing the scorecard
performance. Where lenders determine that a judgmental evaluation is warranted
alongside the scorecard decision, they must identify on what basis this additional
evaluation is being made. If the scorecard has provided a risk ranking, which is
intended to manage risk at a pre-determined level, this decision should only be
overridden on the basis of profitability. Often lenders cite the "relationship value",
either as a reason for overriding the scorecard, or as a reason for not credit scoring.
However beyond a financial relationship, what sort of relationship is relevant in a
lending context? The decision to grant loans is surely a function of risk and return.
It is not as subjective as lenders would lead us to believe. Therefore by using the
scorecard to rank the risk, the lender should only override based on some function of
the financial return that is not captured in the credit scorecard.
By over-riding on an ad-hoc basis, several inefficiencies beyond increased risk enter
the lending process. Unless maximum over-ride levels are established, the portfolio
risk is compromised across the whole lending organisation. However, by setting
volume targets for numbers of overrides, the quality of overrides is ignored.
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Therefore the lending organisation must set strict criteria about the actual
circumstances which, in combination, would warrant an override of a system-
generated decision.
All over-riding compromises the consistency and control afforded by credit scoring.
Therefore the organisation must accept that they are intentionally compromising
consistency and control With this awareness they might find themselves being
rather more selective about the circumstances which prompt a compromise of the
empirical imperative.
In combining the evidence gathered within this research programme, two main
reasons as to why overriding is commonplace are suggested. Firstly, the loan
officers and indeed more senior bank officers, appear to be relatively remote from
the more technical aspects of credit scoring. This view is supported by the survey
evidence, which confirms that 86% of the population of scoring lenders used the
expertise of outside agencies in order to develop their scorecards. During the
interviews, varying levels of knowledge were exhibited as to what variables are
being used in reaching the mortgage decision. This view reflects the earlier findings
on credit scoring generally that "this judgmental intrusion (overriding) occurs
because creditor managements do not fully understand scoring systems", Hsai,
(1978). Lenders also confirmed that they "devolve" responsibility for analysing the
performance of the decisioning technologies to their technical partners, again
suggesting they may be somewhat remote from the "nuts and bolts" of the
decisioning. Confirming the view of credit scoring's perceived complexity, many
non-scorers cited lack of knowledge of credit scoring as a reason for its non-
introduction into the loan environment.
Whilst not conclusive evidence, these findings and views suggest that lenders may
not be wholly aware of the imperative to adhere to the scorecard decisions if risk is
to be managed and consistency and control achieved. The high levels of lending,
which are outwith published criteria, suggest that lenders achieve significantly
reduced levels of scorecard performance due to overriding. Non-scoring lenders who
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display even higher levels of non-criteria lending are likely to achieve even lower
levels of control and consistency in this respect. Scoring lenders consistently recount
reasons for overriding their scoring systems, despite the scoring systems being
acknowledged to deliver superior performance than the judgmental decision makers.
Despite this conflict of evidence being presented lenders continue to seek to validate
their actions. These actions are found to be invalid when measured against the risk
and return criteria normally associated with lending.
The second reason as to why organisations permit over-riding of the scorecard is the
influence of the culture within the lending environment. As was evidenced during
the interview and case study phases of the research, the skills traditionally associated
with judgmental evaluation of loans have a level of kudos attached. This kudos
confers seniority and status on the loan officers. The move from judgmental
lending to wholly empirical lending makes redundant a number of roles within the
organisation. Any redundancy of roles can lead to confrontation. Due to an
unwillingness within financial organisations to undertake this confrontation "head
on", there may be a willingness to delay the consistent adoption of scoring until the
incumbent senior staff are no longer in place in the senior roles. The roles can
themselves be gradually be made redundant without impacting on the senior staff.
This is achieved by the gradual integration of scoring into the lending process, where
loans are at first decisioned by the scoring system with the decisions being adhered
to within a flexible framework. As staff becomes more familiar with the decisioning
system, so adherence to the system's decisions becomes a rigid rather than optional
requirement.
Consistency is further compromised by the existence of credit policy rules, which
have no empirical foundation. The role of credit policy rules, was at best established
as a "screening mechanism" by which to dissuade applicants from applying for
mortgage loans. This might be perceived as an unusual objective for a lending
organisation. When this information is combined with the fact that as many as one
in three loans granted by some lenders are outwith the policy rules set, the lack of
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consistency is apparent. Further, the lack of a relationship between the various rules
and risk makes their existence even harder to justify.
For non-scoring lenders the credit policy rules might have been viewed as a "guide"
as to what characteristics an applicant for a mortgage loan should have. The evidence
presented found that the non-scoring lenders grant an even higher proportion of non-
criteria lending than the credit scoring organisations. When the credit policy rules
are considered in order to determine their relevance to the scoring organisation, their
role is even less clear. The scorecard provides the required risk ranking. The
scorecard will have considered all the issues normally included in policy rules such
as salary levels, age of applicant, and applicants prior credit performance. As
indicated earlier, only property characteristics, which confirm the types of property
which would form a suitable security, might usefully be contained in policy rules at
this time. The policy rules in contrast seem to have no identifiable relationship with
risk or return. No real reason has been established for their existence, beyond their
role as a deterrent to potential applicants.
The benefit of speed to decision is also compromised by the way in which credit
scoring is integrated into the credit process. Where scoring is located at the customer
interface, either in a branch office or at a telephone call centre, the time to decision is
greatly reduced. Where scoring is centralised the delay in getting the data to the
central unit can significantly reduce any speed benefits. However where scoring is
centralised and the process is such that the loan is first underwritten and then scored,
the speed benefit is almost removed altogether. The ideal location for credit scoring
is at the customer interface. This might require that scorecard management be
strengthened to ensure that data manipulation by lending personnel is avoided.
This leads to a further potential compromise, in that where scoring is in place at the
customer interface more staff might be required to manage and monitor the
scorecard. This may be to the detriment of the cost benefits, which can result from
having reduced numbers of specialised personnel involved in making lending
decisions.
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Finally, the cost benefits of scoring are themselves compromised by a combination of
the above. When scorecards are developed and tested, the performance exhibited by
the scorecard assumes adherence to the system-generated decisions. Adherence to
the scorecard is what ensures consistency, control, risk management and cost
benefits. Any deviation from the scorecard decisions results in a lessening of the
potential benefits. This might simply be as the result of an additional "action" being
taken by a member of staff, to judgementally evaluate the application. The time
and cost involved limit the scorecard benefit, regardless of the ultimate loan
outcome, which determines the impact on the risk benefit.
8.3.3. The Benefits Gap Resolved
Due to the complex nature of the lending environment, and the variety of
organisational profiles which exist, it is impossible to provide a "blueprint solution"
which would ensure that all lenders achieve maximum value from their credit scoring
system. However some suggestions are put forward as an indication of the type of
actions which might offer benefits:
□ Revisit credit policy rules. Those who credit score should consider the rules and
the relationship of the rules with the scorecard content. Those who do not
currently score should use coarse classification techniques identify the variables
most closely associated with default. This information can then be reviewed in
conjunction with the credit policy rules. All lenders, regardless of decisioning
methods must ensure that the true purpose of credit policy rules is established.
□ Identify the time period and location in the application process at which an
applicant, or enquirer, can first be given a "decision in principle" without
compromising risk management. Lenders must then focus their efforts on
ensuring that the decision takes place at this location and at this point in time.
□ Improve data gathering. Gather data on those applicants who are rejected, and
those applicants and enquirers who fail to convert to become account holders.
217
By bridging this information gap, lenders will be able to improve credit processes
and ultimately improve customer service.
8.4. Suggestions for further research
Several areas of research would usefully build upon the work within this thesis. It
would be beneficial to replicate the work on mortgage scorecard development using
a larger data set. The limitations of small numbers of bad accounts may raise doubts
about how truly robust the model is. By recreating the scorecard using a greater
volume of data, more assurances about the consistency of the model's performance
would be provided.
It would also be useful to compare the results of this bespoke mortgage scorecard
with results derived using a generic "consumer loan" card in order to measure the
improved performance afforded by a bespoke mortgage scorecard.
In order to compare the performance of the scoring and non scoring organisations
more holistically, more data which allowed organisations to be categorised in
"competitor groups" could usefully be used to revisit the results which are currently
based on scoring status and organisational type. Information regarding the mortgage
delivery channel could also be usefully included in categorising lenders. This might
reflect the different cost structures of "new lenders" and traditional providers of
mortgage finance.
More research needs to be conducted which establishes the true cost of mortgage
default. The average profit and loss which lenders make on mortgage loans is
unlikely to become publicly available at an industry wide level. However, a case
study which examined one lender's experience would provide a more holistic view.
This could establish the financial cost, to both the lender and borrower, and the social
cost to the borrower and society as a whole. Such an investigation would also allow
a closer examination of the many arrears accounts which exist, in order that arrears
maturation patterns can be identified. Establishing the proportion of borrowers who
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voluntarily "give up" their homes, rather than face default would confirm whether
possession figures really are only the tip of the iceberg when mortgage repayment
difficulties are discussed. This might also help to provide an insight into the true
quality of mortgage loan portfolios.
Trends in the financial services markets suggest that future research might usefully
take a more European view. As the potential for the expansion of lending
organisations across traditional European boundaries receives more focus in the
financial press, it is appropriate to consider the European mortgage market, and to
determine the similitude of the mortgage lending environment across Europe.
The US and UK both have well developed mortgage markets. The development of a
secondary mortgage bond market in the UK mirrors US experience. However, the
home ownership profile of the UK population is considerably higher than that found
in many European countries. Gaining an understanding of the determinants of home
ownership across Europe, the availability of mortgage finance, and the credit policies
and processes which exit would provide an interesting and potentially valuable pan-
European study.
Additionally, the development of securitisation in the UK, suggests that the role of
the credit score in pricing mortgage-backed bonds require study. This would
perhaps link with the need to review the role of scoring in relation to other aspects of
pricing, such as that of the mortgage indemnity guarantee premiums, and the pricing
of the mortgage loan itself.
Finally, the focus of this study has been on the impact of credit scoring on mortgage
lending organisations. Further research might usefully examine whether small
lenders who lack data can achieve some of the potential risk, process and cost
benefits associated with scoring. This would require that scorecards be built using
their pooled data. Such scorecards would be a compromise between traditional
bespoke and generic cards, but might well outperform judgmental evaluation. Such
analysis would allow inclusion of cost data, for the development and implementation
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of scoring in a variety of environments. Data on cost benefits would complement the
findings on risk benefits, process benefits, and customer service benefits already
identified within this thesis.
220
Bibliography
Abel, T., (1948), "The Operation Called Verstehen", American Journal of
Sociology, pp. 211-218
Adams, R. (1998), "Lenders Report 10% Growth in Repossessions", Financial
Times, 30th August
Ambrose, B.W., Buttimer, R.J., Capone, C.A.,(1997), "Pricing Mortgage Default and
Foreclosure Delay", Journal of Money Credit and Banking, Vol. 29, No.3, pp. 314-
325
Anderson, R., (1996), "The Secret Science of Credit Scoring", The Sunday Times,
15th September, p. 4
Ashton, J., (2000), "A General Test of Competitive Conditions in the UK Building
Society Mortgage Market", The Service Industries Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 86-94
Babbie, E., (1990), Survey Research Methods (2nd Edition), Belmont, Wadsworth
Balchin, P., (1995), Housing Policy, Routledge, Londong
Banasik, J., Crook, J.N., Thomas, L.C., (1997), "Not if but When", Credit Research
Centre Working Paper 97/4, University of Edinburgh
Berdie, D.R., Anderson, J.F., (1974), Questionnaires: Design and Use, Scarecrow,
Metuchen, N.J.
Bierman, J., Hausman, W.H., (1970), "The Credit Granting Decision", Management
Science, Vol. 16, No. 8, pp. 519-532
Birchall, J., (1992), Housing Policy in the 1990's, Routledge, London
Booth, P., Crook, T., (1986), "Low Cost Home Ownership Initiatives", in Low Cost
Home Ownership, Gower, Aldershot, pp 13-58
Boyes,W.J., Joffman, D.L., Low, S.A., (1989), "An Econometric Analysis of the
Bank Credit Scoring Problem", Journal of Econometrics, 40, pp. 3-14
Brennan, P.J., (1993), "Profitability Scoring Comes of Age", Bank Management,
Vol. 69, Pt. 9, pp 58-62
Brown-Humes, C., (1997), "Weighing the Risk", Financial Times, 25th June
Brown-Humes, C., (1999), "Abbey to Increase Incomes as Profits Rise 21%",
Financial Times, 30th August
221
Bryman, A., (9184), "The Debate about Quantitative and Qualitative Research: A
Question of Method or Epistemology", British Journal of Sociology, 35, pp. 75-92
Campbell, T.S., Dietrich, J.K., (1983), "The Determinants of Default on Insured
Conventional Residential Mortgage Loans", Journal of Finance, Vol. XXXVIII, No.
5, pp.1569-1581
Capon, N., (1982), "Credit Scoring Systems: A Critical Analysis", Journal of
Marketing, Vol. 46, Spring, pp. 82-91
Chandler, G.G., Coffman, J.Y., (1979), "A comparative analysis of Empirical Vs
Judgmental Credit Evaluation", The Journal of Retail Banking, Vol. 1., No. 3,
pp. 15-25
Chhikara, R.K., (1989), "The State of the Art in Credit Evaluation", American
Journal of Agricultural Economics", Vol. 71, Part 5, pp. 1138-1144
Church of Scotland, (1988), "The Ethics of Investment and Banking", Report of
Special Commission, Church of Scotland
Churchill, G.A. Nevin, J.R., Watson, R.R., (1977), "The Role of Credit Scoring in
the Loan Decision", Credit World, March, pp. 6-10
Cooperstein, R.L., Redburn, F.S., Meyers, H.G., (1991), "Modelling Mortgage
Terminations in Turbulent Times", AREUEA Journal, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp 473-493
Council of Mortgage Lenders (1996), Directory of Members, CML, London
Council of Mortgage Lenders, (1997), "Your Guide to the Council of Mortgage
Lenders", CML, London
Council of Mortgage Lenders, (1997), The Code of Mortgage Lending Practice,
CML, London
Council of Mortgage Lenders, (1998), Housing Finance, No. 39, pp. 68
Credit Industry Working Party on Credit Scoring, (1993), Guide to Credit Scoring,
JBL Printers, Warley
Creswell, J.W., (1994), Research Design Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches,
Sage, London
Crook, J.N., Hamilton, R., Thomas, L.C., (1992), "A Comparison of a Credit Scoring
Model with a Credit Performance Model", Services Industries Journal, Vol. 12, No.
4, pp. 558-579
Doling, J., Karn, V., Stafford, B., (1985), "How Far Can Privatisation Go? Owner-
Occupation and Mortgage Default", Nat West Quarterly Review, August, pp. 42-52
222
Doling, J. (1990), "Mortgage Default: Why Finland is not like Britain", Environment
and Planning A, Vol. 22, pp. 321-331
Doling, J., Ford, J., (1991), "The Changing Face of Home Ownership: Building
Societies and Household Investment Strategies", Policy and Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2,
pp.109-118
Doling, J., (1993), "British Housing Policy: 1984-1993", Regional Studies, Vol. 27,
No. 6, pp. 583-588
Donald, M.N. (1960), "Implications of Non Response for the Interpretation of Mail
Questionnaire Data", Public Opinion Quarterly, 24, pp. 99-114
Durand, D., (1941), "Risk Elements in Consumer Instalment Financing", National
Bureau of Economic Research, New York
Easterby-Smith, M, Thorpe, R., Lowe, A., (1991), Management Research: an
Introduction, Sage, London
Eisenbeis, R.A., (1977), "Pitfalls in the Application of Discriminant Analysis in
Business, Finance and Economics", Journal of Finance, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, pp. 875-
899
Eisenbeis, R., (1995), "Recent Developments in the Application of Credit Scoring to
Commercial Loans", presented at Credit Scoring and Credit Control IV, University
of Edinburgh
Ford, J., (1998), Risks, Home Ownership and Job Insecurity, Shelter, London
Fowler, F.J., (1984), Survey Research Methods, Sage, London
Frankfort-Nachmias, C., Nachmias, D., (1996), Research Methods in the Social
Sciences, St. Martin's Press, London
Gardner, E., Howcroft, B., Williams,J., (1999), "The New Retail Banking
Revolution", The Service Industries Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 83-100
Gua, G.W. (1978), "A Taxonomic Model for the Risk Rating of Residential
Mortgages", Journal of Business, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 687-706
Halfpenny, P., (1982), Positivism and Sociology, Allen & Unwin, London
Hand, D.J., Henley, W.E. (1997), "Statistical Classification Methods in Consumer
Credit Scoring: a Review", J.R. Statistical Society A, 160, Pt. 3, pp. 523-541
Haslem, J.A., Longbrake, W.A., (1972), "A Credit Scoring Model for Commercial
Loans, A Comment", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 4, Part 3, pp.733-
734
223
Homer, M.R., (1994), "The Asset-Liability Management Strategy System at Fannie
Mae", Interfaces, Vol. 24, pp. 3-21
Howells, J., Hine, J., (1991), "Competitive Strategy and the Implementation of an
New Network Technology", Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, Vol.
3, No. 4, pp. 397- 425
Howcroft, B., Hill, C., (1992), "Customer Service Quality: An Empirical Study in the
House Mortgage Market", International Journal of Bank Marketing, Vol. 10, No. 6,
pp. 3-10
Howcroft, B., Hamilton, R., (1999), "An Exploration of the Reaction to Mondex
Within the Financial Services Market", Journal of Financial Services Marketing, Vol.
4, No. 2, pp. 125-138
Hsai, D.C., (1978), "Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunities Act",
Hastings Law Journal, Vol.30, pp. 371-448
Hunter, A., Earp, S., (1999) "Influences on Questionnaire Response Rates", Working
Paper 99/11, University of Edinburgh
Jackson,J.R., Kaserman, D.L., "Default Risk on Mortgage Loans: A Test of
Competing Hypotheses", Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 74, pp.-678-690
Jick, T.D., (1979) "Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in
Action", Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, pp. 602-611
Kelly, M.G., (1998), "Tackling Change and Uncertainty in Credit Scoring", PhD
Thesis, The Open University
Kua, J.B., Keenan, D.C., Kim, T., (1994), "Default Probabilities for Mortgages",
Journal of Urban Economics, 35, pp. 278-296
Kuhn, T.S., (1970), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago
Lambert, D.M., Harrington, T.C., (1990), "Measuring Nonresponse Bias in Customer
Service Mail Surveys", Journal of Business Logistics, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp.5-27
Laughlin, R., (1995) "Methodological Themes, Empirical Research in Accounting:
Alternative Approaches and a Case for Middle Range Thinking", Accounting,
Auditing and Accountability, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 63-87
Leonard, K.J., (1996), "Information Systems and Benchmarking in the Credit
Scoring Industry", International Journal of Benchmarking for Quality and
Technology, Pt. l,pp- 38-44
224
Lewis, E.M., (1982), An Introduction to Credit Scoring, 2nd. Ed. Athena Press, San
Rafael
Lortie, D.C. (1982), remarks made at meeting of the American Educational Research
Association, Montreal (see Rossman and Wilson, 1994)
McCahill, L.J., (1998), "Organizational Issues in Building and Maintaining Credit
Risk Models", in Credit Risk Modeling Design and Application, ed. E. Mays,
Glenlake, Chicago
MacDonald, G., MaKuch, W., (1995), "Automated Application Technologies for
Home Loans", paper presented at Credit Scoring and Credit Control IV, University
of Edinburgh
Merchant, K., (1999), "Abbey Highlights Asset Backed Bonds", Financial Times,
22nd February
Merriam, S.B., (1988), Case Study Research in Education: A Qualitative Approach,
Jossey Bass, San Francisco
Mester, L.J.,(1997), "What's the Point of Credit Scoring", Business Review,
September/October, pp. 3-16
Myers, J.H., Forgy, E.W., (1963), "The Development of Numerical Credit
Evaluation Systems", Journal of American Statistical Society, Vol. 58, Sept., pp.
799-806
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, (1995), Securitisation an
International Perspective, OECD, USA
Orgler, Y.E., (1970), "A Credit Scoring Model for Commercial Loans", Journal of
Money Credit and Banking, Vol. 2, Pt. 4, pp. 435-445
Orgler, Y.E., (1971), "Evaluation of Bank Consumer Loans with Credit Scoring
Models", Journal of Bank Research, Spring, pp. 31-37
Overstreet, G.A., (1986), "Managerial Control in Credit Scoring Systems", Journal
of Retail Banking, Vol. VIII, No. 1 & 2, pp. 79-86
Outhwaite, W., (1987), New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics
and Critical Theory, MacMillan, Basingstoke
Potter, P., Drevermann, M., (1988), "Home Ownership, Foreclosure and Compulsory
Action in the Federal Republic of Germany", Housing Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 94-
104
225
Rakes, G.K., (1973), "A Numerical Credit Evaluation Model for Residential
Mortgages", Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, Vol. 13, Pt. 13, pp. 73-
84
Reichert, A.K., Cho, C.C.,Wagner, G.M., (1983), "An Examination of the
Conceptual Issues Involved in Developing Credit Scoring Models", Journal of
Business Economics and Statistics, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 101-114
Rosenberg, E., Gleit, A., (1994), "Quantitative Methods in Credit Management: A
Survey", Operations Research, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 589-613
Rossman, G.B., Wilson, B.L., (1985), "Numbers and Words, Combining
Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in a Single Large Scale Evaluation Study",
Evaluation Review, Vol. 9, No. 5, pp. 627-643
Rossman, G.B., Wilson, B.L., (1994), Numbers and Words Revisitied: Being
"Shamelessly Eclectic", Quality and Quantity, 28, pp. 315-327
Sangha, B.S., (1998), "A Systematic Approach for Managing Credit Score
Overrides", in Credit Risk Modelling, Ed. E. Mays, Glenlake, Chicago
Sexton, D.E., (1977), "Determining Good and Bad Credit Risks Amongst High and
Low Income Families", (1977), Journal of Business, 50, pp. 236-239
Silverman, D., (2000), Doing Qualitative Research, Cromwell Press, Trowbridge
Srinivasan, V., Kim, Y.H., (1982), "Credit Granting: A Comparative Analysis of
Classification Procedures", Journal of Finance, 42, pp. 665-681
Spector, P.E., (1982), Research Designs: Quantitative Applications in the Social
Sciences, Sage, Florida
Spicker, P., (1996), Low Income Owner-Occupation in Scotland, Shelter, West
Lothian
Thomas, L.C., (1998), "Methodologies for Classifying Applicants for Credit", in
Satistics in Finance, Ed. Hand & Jacka, Arnold Press, London
Thomas, L.C., Stepanova, M., (1999), "Survival Analysis Methods for Personal Loan
Data", Credit Research Centre Working Paper 99/4, University of Edinburgh
Vandell, K.D., (1978), Default Risk Under Alter Alternative Mortgage Instruments",
Journal of Finance, Vol XXXIII, No. 5, pp. 1279-1296
Vandell, K.D., Thibodeau, T., (1985), "Estimation of Mortgage Defaults Using
Disaggregate Loan History Data", AREUEA, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 292-316
226
Vandell, K.D., (1995), "How Ruthless is Mortgage Default? A Review and Synthesis
of the Evidence", Journal of Housing Research, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 245-264
Von Furstenberg, G.M., (1969), "Default Risk on FHA Insured Home Mortgages as
a Function of the Terms of Financing: A Quantitative Analysis", Journal of Finance,
Vol. 24, pp. 459-477
Wahl, C., (1997), "Credit Assessment Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow", paper
presented at, Risk Behaviour and Risk Management, University of Stockholm
Waller, N.G., (1988), "Residential Mortgage Default: A Clarifying Analysis",
Housing Finance Review, Vol. 7, pp. 321-333
Webb, B.G., (1982), "Borrower Risk Under Alternative Mortgage Instruments",
Journal of Finance, Vol XXXVII, No. 1, pp. 170-183
Yin,, R.K., (1994), Case Study Research Design and Methods, 2nd Edition, Sage,
California
Yobas, M.B., Crook, J.N., Ross, P., (1997) "Credit Scoring Using Neural and














and The University of Edinburgh
Mortgage Credit Scoring
This survey is part of a research project into Mortgage Credit Scoring within the UK.
The project will investigate the levels and areas of usage of Credit Scoring.- The
objective of the research is to evaluate the opportunities which exist in utilising
credit scoring to obtain competitive advantage. In particular it is intended to
examine the opportunity for utilising credit score values to facilitate risk pricing.
The findings of this survey will enable further work in the area of Mortgage Credit
Scoring to be undertaken.
This research will ensure respondent anonymity, at no time will any respondent be
identified in the research output.
Completion of this questionnaire should take approximately 20 minutes of your time.
Should you wish to obtain a copy of the findings of this survey please tick the
appropriate box below.
Yes No
Should you have any queries about any element of this research please do not hesitate to
contact the survey co-ordinator as detailed below:
Miss Ann MacNeill
Department of Risk and Financial Services
Glasgow Caledonian University
Glasgow G 4 OBA









Address of Registered Office
Value of mortgages granted during
previous financial year
Number of mortgages granted during
previous financial year
Current value of mortgage portfolio
Current number of mortgage accounts
Section 1: Current Status of Credit Scoring
Please indicate the current status of credit scoring within your organisation in























Where credit scoring of personal products is currently in use (in any capacity),
please indicate the length of time which credit scoring has been in operation:










Respondents who currently use mortgage credit scoring should turn to Section 2 of
the questionnaire, other respondents should turn to Section 3.
Section 2: Mortgage Credit Scoring
Prior to utilising credit scoring what procedure(s) were in place for granting
mortgage facilities? (Please indicate ifprocedures differed at different values,LTV
figures etc.)
What were the reasons for the change from your previous procedure(s) to
utilising mortgage credit scoring?
Who within your organisation, were the drivers for change in implementing
credit scoring?
Director of Credit □
Director of IT □
Audit Committee □
Other(s) □ Please specify
Was the system which is currently in use, developed by in-house or external
expertise?
In - house □
External □
Jointly with external help* □
(* continued overleaf)




Other (Please specify) □
System Usage:
Please indicate the mortgage business areas in which the credit score is used:
Initial "weeding out" of applications □
Accept/reject lending proposal □
Interest rate offered to customer □
Marketing (segmenting existing customer base) □
Marketing (other) □
In establishing level of mortgage indemnity guarantee □
Securitisation pricing □
Other (please specify) □
Where credit score is used in the mortgage lending decision, which of the
following applies?
Lending officer makes decision with credit score value considered
Credit scoring system provides decision which is always accepted
Credit scoring system provides a recommendation which may be overriden
Please detail the circumstances in which it is acceptable to over-ride a credit
score recommendation
Where the credit score recommendation is not adhered to please detail the
procedure that is then followed in reaching a lending decision:
Please indicate the frequency with which you update your credit scoring system
in any way (e.g. cut off score, variables, values etc.)
What external data sources are used in conjunction with the credit score result
in reaching lending decisions:
Credit reference bureaux □ Evidence of source(s) of funds □
Survey Report □ Bank reference □
Employers reference (wage evidence) □ Bank statements □
Other (please specify □
Please outline the business benefits that you believe are derived from the use of
credit scoring:
End of Section 2 - thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire,
please return it to us in the envelope provided.
Section 3: Non Usage ofMortgage Credit Scoring
Who holds the authority for granting mortgage facilities? (Please indicate if
authority differs at different values, LTVfigures etc.)
Please outline the main business reasons for utilising your current system in
preference to utilising mortgage credit scoring?
How likely do you think your organisation are to adopt mortgage credit scoring in
future?
Very likely □ Quite likelyQ Quite unlikely Q Very unlikely □
Please outline the business benefits (if any) that you believe could be derived
from the use of credit scoring
Please indicate any reasons which you feel make credit scoring unsuitable for
introduction to your organisation:
If your organisation has a negative experience or image ofmortgage credit
scoring, please provide a brief summary of how this has arisen:
End of Section 3: Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire




Mortgage Credit Scoring - The Business Benefits
Further to my telephone call to your organisation you have been identified as being
responsible many aspects of mortgage lending. I therefore enclose for your
attention an important research questionnaire. All members of the Council of
Mortgage Lenders are being asked to provide their views. I have provided a stamped
addressed envelope for ease of response.
Whether you do or do not use credit scoring your views are important to us. It
is equally as important for us to hear the arguments both for and against adoption of
scoring within organisations.
Feedback from the survey will be provided to you should you wish to receive it. A
tickbox within the questionnaire affords you the opportunity to request feedback.
In addition to the questionnaire I am pleased to enclose information regarding a
forthcoming credit conference which may be of interest to you.






28th August 1997 Tel. 01413313158




Mortgage Credit Scoring - The Business Benefits
May I thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaire which I recently
forwarded to you. The response rate has exceeded expectations, and will allow us to
progress the research.
Research findings will be forwarded to those who requested them when the results of
the survey have been fully analysed.
May I reassure all respondents that confidentiality and anonymity will be strictly
observed.








Tel. 0141 331 3158
Fax. 0141 331 3229
Email A.MacNeill@gcal.ac.uk
Dear
Mortgage Credit Scoring - The Business Benefits
I refer to the above, and to the questionnaire which I forwarded
date I have not received your response, and I understand that
normal pressures of business and to the holiday period.
However I would be grateful if you could forward a response
weeks in order that I may progress the research analysis.
If you would like a second copy of the questionnaire please do not hesitate to contact
me.
Yours sincerely,
to you recently. To
this may be due the







Mortgage Credit Scoring - The Business Benefits
Thank you for your telephone call with regard to the above. I am pleased to enclose
a copy of the questionnaire . I would be grateful if you would complete this and
return it to me in the envelope provided. I would emphasise that all responses will
be treated in a confidential manner, and the research output will at no time identify
individual respondents.
Within the questionnaire you will find a section offering you the chance to receive
feed back on the results of our research. We will be pleased to provide this to all



















Further to our previous correspondence I hope that you found the initial research
report of interest (further copy enclosed). The research is now moving into a second
phase during which I hope to conduct more detailed interviews.
The interviews which are informal in nature will comprise a discussion on some of
the areas of interest which have arisen both from the first survey and from other
recent research. These include; factors which make mortgage credit scoring
different from other forms of scoring, how to measure the value added by the
scoring system, methods of usage, and override mechanisms and management.
I would be grateful if you would take part in the interview programme. It is intended
that the interview last approximately forty-five minutes. The identity of companies
taking part in the interview will not be divulged at any time. Additionally, a
transcript of the interview will be provided to each participant to ensure accuracy of
reporting.
Whilst I am aware that demands on your time are considerable I would be most
appreciative if you would agree to see me. I will contact you by telephone within
the next few days to obtain your response and hopefully to agree an interview date.
Yours sincerely,
Ann MacNeill




Interview Guide - Scoring
The Mortgage Process
What are the sources of applications (branch, intermediary, telephone banking,).
How many mortgages will you have the capacity to process per annum.
Outline of mortgage process from receipt of application to credit decision
Introduction of Credit Scoring to Mortgage Lending
Method of introduction (pilot, bullet, etc.)
Initial usage and development over time
Discuss variety of uses as disclosed on survey document
Existence or otherwise of mortgage criteria? Role of criteria?
What sort of output does scoring comprise off?
Role of credit scoring in the credit granting decision
What source of data used to create scorecard?
What types of factors built into credit score (stability, affordability, economic
indicators, property characteristics, product characteristics, LTV ratio, etc.)
Have you done any work on determining whether taking out mortgage protection
insurance is a predictive variable? (explain link to other types of scoring)
Intuitive belief /experience of factors most predictive of mortgage default
(compare with what is built in to system)
Role of underwriting staff (overrides or all cases) Tracking of individual
performance
Number of underwriters employed and trends in terms of numbers of underwriting
staff
Method of training underwriting staff
Who triggers override? (customer request, branch, intermediary, underwriter)
Outline of override process
Existence of written procedures dictating situations in which override is appropriate
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Levels of overrides (decline to accept/ accept to decline)
Overrides, coded and tracked (Override performance, tracking and comparison with
the rest of the portfolio)
Override data being analysed and built back in to the system?
How (if at all) are staff incentivised to adhere to the system decision?
Measurement of Success ofMortgage Scoring
What data do you keep that lets you measure the success of the mortgage system.
(processing times, time to decision, customer satisfaction levels, retention levels,
default levels, arrears levels, costs ofprocessing, number ofstaff involved
Profit measurement method - by product (i.e. is this mortgage going to be
profitable), by package (i.e. depending on cross sales) or by customer
Profit measurement formalised and communicated , staff awareness of profit profile
of various mortgage scenarios. Influence of profitability on credit decision
Appeals
Who generates appeals customer or branch (or intermediaries)
Outline of appeals procedure
Method of notification of the appeals procedure (letter, leaflet etc.)
Appeal unsuccessful and application declined - information given to customer
regarding the decline reason
Existence of designated officer to whom appeals are sent, Are customers who have
been turned down notified accordingly of this persons contact details?
Other Issues
Factors currently affect mortgage price e.g. LTV, type of product, cross sales
Views on risk pricing.
Mortgage indemnity guarantee still in existence
Mortgage certificates in existence
Influence of credit score on arrears management
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Confirm transcript will be provided
Timescales of other interviews






This summary document provides an outline of the key areas of interest that arose
during the semi-structured interviews which were conducted during a three month
period earlier this year. The contributing companies included banks, building
societies, friendly societies and specialised mortgage lenders.
The Mortgage Process
This area is examined from a variety of perspectives. The impact of the mortgage
process on the overall processing costs leads to a focus on the number of 'actions'
required with each new application. This varies enormously, and determinants of
the number of actions required include, the existence of otherwise of lending
mandates, the delivery channels utilised and the level of technology in place. The
relationship between the mortgage process and the level of customer service is
highlighted by the variations found in both time to decision, and time to offer.
The source of applications also impacts on the mortgage process. Within
organisations with multiple sources, a variety of mortgage processing systems and
even varied credit policies often co-exist. The impact of such divergent strategies
and how they impact on overall credit policy is an area that is likely to receive the
attention of credit managers in the future.
The Credit Decision
All participants are keenly aware that the "time to decision" requires to be driven
down. There is consensus that "time to decision" refers to a decision in principle
subject to confirmation of information provided by the borrower (commonly salary
confirmation) and subject to survey confirmation that the property is an acceptable
security to the lender. In the majority of cases time to decision shows a marked
variation between scorers and non scorers. However this only applies where the
scoring is being conducted using an on line system at the first point of customer
contact. Where scoring is centralised and not in place at the customer interface, the
applications which are commonly paper based require to be sent to the centralised
unit. In such a circumstance the scoring system may offer no time advantage to the
lender. Whilst it is commonly perceived that the use of credit scoring reduces the
number of factors/variables being considered, the subjective nature of underwriting
does not allow for confirmation of this fact. Whether underwriters do in fact
consider more or less data than a typical scoring system, will be clarified as the
research continues. However what is clear is that a scoring system utilised at the
customer interface can offer a decision in principle in approximately ten minutes.
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The time advantage which can be gained depends to a large extent on the means by
which the credit scoring system presents a credit decision. Whilst the system
decision derives from a numerical score, the system output generated is commonly a
graded decision along the premise of clear accept, clear reject or refer to
underwriting department. Thus whilst a decisioning system can provide a clear
accept/reject decision very quickly, there remains a percentage of cases that require
to be reviewed by underwriting staff. Any time advantage gained must therefore be
viewed relative to the proportion of applications on which the scoring system can
present a lending decision, without referral to underwriters. Again the consensus is
that the objective must be to continually drive down the numbers referred by
improving the decisioning data utilised by the system.
The Manual Underwriting of Mortgages
The requirement to have underwriters is confirmed by all lenders, even those with
considerable scoring experience. The underwriting process varies considerably.
Methods of grading underwriters vary between value amounts and criteria driven
grading such as loan to value. Commonly the more 'junior' underwriters are given
low value mandates which combine with loan profiles that are strictly within criteria.
Those with more experience underwrite the higher value, higher loan to value, and
outwith criteria cases. Training is largely in-house. When asked whether
underwriter performance is tracked, few organisations responded affirmatively. Most
organisations have the ability to track individual underwriter performance, but do not
do so formally. This suggests a potential 'gap' in the iterative loop which could
improve lending performance by examination of previous experience both good and
bad. Sustained analysis of underwriting cases, particularly in respect of the cases
which are in the "grey area" (neither clear accepts or rejects), may well yield
valuable data which could be built into the scoring and underwriting processes.
Whilst the majority of organisations subscribe to the view of the underwriting
process as a subjective activity, there is evidence of a more structured approach to
manual underwriting. A structured approach would typically seek to drive the
underwriter to consider some combination of stability, affordability, economic,
product and property characteristics in a more formal manner. This may be
evidenced by either supporting documentation or reporting mechanisms which
confirm that each area has been considered in turn.
The Mortgage Criteria and Policy Overrides
All those who are currently lending confirmed that they operate a policy of
producing mortgage criteria. The criteria are issued to those at the front end of the
delivery channel, both within the lending organisation and to intermediaries. The
criteria are designed to indicate the profile of applicant which the lender organisation
is willing to consider. Worthy of detailed investigation is the commonality of policy
overrides which contravene the criteria published. Whilst the criteria provide
guidance to assist and direct those who initially discuss the mortgage proposal with
the prospective applicant, they are also incredibly flexible, a point which the more
experienced interviewer is no doubt aware of. The existence of criteria ensures that
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pre-screening of applications takes place. However what is not clear is the value of
such pre-screening. Whilst the cost of reviewing cases which are clearly outwith
policy criteria is obviously to be avoided, concern must be voiced at the potential
pre-screening of cases which, whilst strictly outwith policy may in fact be acceptable
lending propositions. For organisations which use credit scoring for the purpose of
credit decisioning, the existence of criteria seems somewhat anomalous. Given that
the system contains the variables believed to predict default, and that applicant
profiles provide valuable data, it seems unusual that such a potentially rich data
source be discarded. However several organisations remained convinced that should
they dispense with criteria, the volume of applications being presented would be
excessive when compared to the potential gains from increased volumes of accepts.
The role and impact of criteria will receive further consideration as the research
progresses.
Policy overrides are common, whether the credit decision process is manual or
automated. The level of data available on the performance of policy overrides varies
greatly. No lender appears to have a system that does not require some refinement.
The ability to code policy overrides in a manner which identifies the override reason
is something which most lenders recognise the value of. However much data
captured on systems is currently in a text only format. Likewise some of the
processes by which underwriters justify their policy overrides are such that specific
reasons are not given. Some lenders are able to produce evidence that policy
overrides perform equally well when compared with the rest of the mortgage
portfolio. However others confirmed that those applications which are approved
despite being outwith criteria, inevitably perform worse that the rest of the "book".
These contrasting experiences may result from variances in the quality of the
overriding process, or indeed in volume of overriding of criteria which is permitted.
When examining volumes of overriding the majority of organisations had no clearly
perceived upper limit on how many "outwith criteria" cases could be approved. All
discussion on overriding criteria focused on altering reject decisions to accept.
When questioned as to when an accept decision would be altered to reject, less
clarity exists. It would appear that a credit score decision accept would rarely be
converted to reject, whilst a manual underwriter with considerable experience may
be slightly more inclined to review accepts with a view to rejecting a case on "gut
feeling".
The matter of affordability is dealt with by a broad spectrum of approaches. For
some the affordability calculation is a manual process, which sits beside the actual
mortgage application and is considered almost separately. Others build affordability
models into credit decisioning systems, and such affordability criteria are combined
with other data driving the loan amount being offered. Not all organisations run
affordability tests on all applicants, which would appear to be in contravention of the
Mortgage Code. However as the interviews were informal in nature such findings
require to be revisited, in order that participants be given the opportunity to fully
clarify their position.
The matter of incentivising staff elicits very disparate opinions. There are those who
believe it wholly unethical to have those making credit decisions incentivised to lend
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money. The separation of the desire to lend which is acknowledged to be a driver in
an incentivised sales force, and the authority to lend is clearly deemed to be
important by several lenders. Others do not perceive the same dangers from
financially incentivising staff to lend. Clearly the removal of lending mandates from
branches and a move to centralised authority has lessened the threat of individuals
having a conflict of interests. However a move to point of sale decisioning could
bring this matter to the fore again. The "massaging" of applicant data is a matter
which organisations require to be aware off. Indications of developments for the
future, allude to staff being more aware of the profit profile of products at the
customer interface. Again a potential ethical dilemma that requires to be carefully
managed in order not to conflict with requirements of "best advice".
Credit Scoring
A key issue is the definition of those who are "using credit scoring". The research
focus is on the use of credit scoring for credit decisioning. However the practical
applications range from those who obtain a credit score which forms no part of the
credit decision, to those who rely almost wholly on the credit scoring system to
provide a lending decision. Commonly scoring is introduced as a fast-tracking
method. Interestingly it is viewed by several as an accept rather than a reject tool,
confirming it's role solely in speeding the process. The implication being that any
system decline will be reviewed by an underwriter prior to final decline. This
approach, whilst logical to lenders, forms an uneasy alliance with the statistical
processes which underpin credit scoring. However when an organisational
viewpoint is taken, and the change process reviewed, such a means of adopting
scoring may well be expedient in that acceptance and trust of the system may grow
over time. Whilst the variables which drive the various scorecards are company
confidential, it is worthy to note the move from solely stability characteristics to a
more sophisticated approach. Data mining is being undertaken extensively in order
to determine the true default predictors for individual portfolios. The improvement
in the volume and quality of bureau information is being exploited, resulting in more
payment behaviour models being considered. Likewise affordability and product
characteristics now appear to be common currency in scorecards. Less common is
the use of property characteristics, such as property type and number of bedrooms
within the scorecard. As one would expect existing customers often merit their own
scorecard, and any behavioural score from the key money transmission account
would commonly be included. Several lenders allude to Payment Protection
Insurance and the strength of the correlation between PPI and default. Many issues
surround the inclusion of PPI as a scorecard variable. However a discussion of this
issue does not form part of this summary document.
Of the non scorers, several are convinced that no improvement in credit quality
would result from adopting scoring. However they do concede that they believe
overhead cost savings could be achieved, were credit scoring to be adopted.
Key Performance Indicators
The key performance indicators are predictable, but each organisation focuses on
different indicators. Additionally it is clear that the key performance indicators vary
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between functions within organisations with credit risk focusing on default and
marketing on market share etc. The measurement of growth has seen a shift in
emphasis. Several lenders have moved from a volume of sales measurement to an
emphasis on net growth. This confirms the increased importance of customer
retention to today's lenders. Customer service features prominently as a
measurement of success, measured variously by customer service questionnaires,
turnaround times and again by retention rates. The quality of mortgages is also
measured in a variety of ways, by segmenting loan to value, by score value, and by
the level of arrears and defaults. Discussion as to whether the desire to maintain
arrears at a very low level is actually the most profitable way to proceed, provided
lively debate.
Measuring Profit
The variety of organisations interviewed provided a range of responses, each in
keeping with the placement of the mortgage within their own product range. For a
minority the mortgage product is viewed strategically as a means of customer service
provision. The mortgage being offered as a peripheral product in order to
complement the organisation's other product ranges. This highlights the divergence
amongst financial service strategies in the current market. This divergence is echoed
within individual organisations. Branch networks are portrayed as being more keenly
aware of the profit potential of individual mortgages than the underwriting
department. As alluded to previously this may be a result of the varied ways in
which staff within organisations are incentivised. For the majority, the mortgage
requires to be a substantial contributor to overall profitability. Everyone is aware of
the move towards measuring profit on a "by customer" basis, but it would seem that
the reality of being able to compute such a figure is still some way off. Commonly
the profitability of the mortgage is viewed in relation to a "package" of products.
Such packaging results in the mortgage profitability combining with the profitability
of insurances which are variously optional or compulsory. Detailed investigation of
profitability measurement is not appropriate within the context of the interviews, but
will form a key part of the next phase of the research. Critically the length of time
which mortgages "stay on the books", would appear to be shortening. This may
well have a knock on impact on product pricing, with future products requiring to
reach profit "maturity" sooner.
Risk Pricing
Risk pricing is commonly delivered via the product profile. The commonest means
of doing this is obviously loan to value. Targeting of customers to whom
organisations are keen to lend involves the promotion of special deals based on the
risk profile of the target applicant. However, when seeking to obtain views on the
growth or otherwise of risk pricing mortgages, all respondents are cautious about
such a development. Whilst many believe it to be fair, a substantial number believe
it would be unpalatable in the market place, and very difficult to justify offering
customers different rates particularly based on the credit score value. Where a
potential to risk price is perceived to exist is at the retentions end of the market.
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Rather than overtly penalising high risk customers, by reducing pricing in order to
retain customers, so risk pricing may arrive as an incentive to remain. Some
variations on this theme are already acknowledged to exist, however such covert
product offerings may soon become more visible. Linked to this, the question of
mortgage indemnity guarantees was discussed, with the majority retaining MIG at
starting rates which varied from 75% to 90%. Concerns are voiced about both no
MIG being required, and about customers who take steps to force themselves into a
lower MIG band. The former, no MIG, is somewhat cynically perceived by those
who charged MIG. The consensus being that as no lender can take risks without
such contingency insurance, the MIG is simply being hidden and funded in an
alternative manner. Conversely it is the concern about those customers who drive
themselves into a lower MIG band, which is one of the drivers that has prompted
lenders to incorporate MIG into their product offering.
Anecdotes
The foregoing is supported by anecdotes. Inclusion of them all was impossible.
However the following may well strike a cord with many of the interviewees;
" I think before too long there will be figures about customer worth and profitability
in front of the sales people, possibly even driving the sales people"
"the vastmajority are declined before they've even filled in an application form"
"I don't think a broker pre-screens anything, tarted up by the broker and pre-
screened by the branch maybe "
"the residual mandates remain in branches because of the macho culture"
"we see a lot ofping pong between the branches and the lending authority holder"
we would be looking to use scoring to get the price of risk, but that's some way
away "
"any idiot can say no, there's no skill in that at all"
"because of the government's paperwork on home ownership we're going to be
forced into ripping our customers offby flogging them insurance's they don't need"
(on arrears) " we ask the underwriters to do the home visits, they can't just walk
away they have responsibility throughout the mortgage's life
"we used an information terrorist approach to scare people into accepting scoring
by showing them the previous arrears figures"
"the challenge lies in customer worth, ultimately the credit assessment will be one
variable in that"
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"we're not getting full value (from scoring), because we're not using the information
as well as we should"






Mortgage Credit Scoring Research
Further to previous discussions about my research, I am pleased to enclose a
summary document which outlines some of the issues raised during the most recent
phase, which comprised interviews. The interview themes were developed from the
findings of the initial survey document.
I am now planning the next phase of the research, whereby I intend to quantify the
benefits which organisations derive from scoring. This will take into account the
variety of ways in which credit scoring is operationalised, and will seek to identify an
optimum means of integrating credit scoring into the mortgage process.
Please do not hesitate to contact me to discuss the research, or any of the points

























This document provides a framework for discussion with a view to a partnership being
developed between the researcher and the participant organisation. The project
proposal outlines the key areas of interest, and is intended to provide a stimulus for
more detailed discussions. Such further discussion would set the project within a
more tightly defined set of boundaries with specific deliverables.
On agreement of the scope of the work, a full research project contract will be drafted
for each participant organisation which will include timescales, milestones and
deliverables as agreed during discussions.
Such terms of reference, once agreed, will ensure that the research project provides the
maximum value to both the participant organisation and the field of credit research.
Project Background:
This proposal forms part of an ongoing research project funded by the Economic and
Social Research Council. The project examines the impact of the adoption of credit
scoring on both the lending organisation and potential and existing consumers. Thus
far the following have been completed;
• An empirical evaluation of the extent of usage of mortgage credit scoring
• An empirical evaluation of the methods of adoption of mortgage credit scoring
• An analysis of the reasons why some organisations deem credit scoring to be an
unsuitable means of making mortgage credit decisions
• An analysis of the benefits which organisations sought to derive from mortgage
credit scoring
• An analysis of the benefits which organisations believe they have obtained from
utilising mortgage credit scoring
In addition to the foregoing, qualitative analysis was undertaken via interviews. This
provided insight into the mortgage process, mortgage underwriting and mortgage
credit scoring within the operating environment. The results of the qualitative
analysis were combined with other published data, in order to augment the empirical
study. By combining data from a variety of sources the research has been grounded
in the operating environment of today.
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Project Contract
Each participating company is assured of complete confidentiality Documentation
will be provided which confirms this. In return for access to personnel and data
within the organisation, levels of which require to be agreed by negotiation,
participant organisations will be provided with an analysis of the costs and benefits
associated with the current mortgage process. This will include a complete overview
of the mortgage process, and where appropriate an examination of the way in which
credit scoring is being operationalised. Whilst participant organisations have
expertise in abundance with which to conduct such an exercise, resources are often
utilised in a manner which impose artificial boundaries on expertise. By providing an
holistic study the project will cross organisational boundaries to look at
administration, sales, arrears, strategy, marketing, customer service and costing
procedures all of which form important parts of the mortgage process. Such an
approach will allow additional insight to be obtained. Additionally, time may be
available to conduct special project work to provide additional management
information. Such work might examine areas such as;
• revisiting and coding previous non policy applications approved (policy overrides
or system overrides) with a view to examining performance relative to the portfolio
• conducting examination of defaults with a view to eliciting default reasons
Project Objectives:
This research project will compare the mortgage process and credit decisioning in a
variety of lending organisations. A comparative analysis will be undertaken which
will evaluate the benefits which are derived from credit scoring, and the limitations of
the scoring system. The ultimate goal will be to identify the optimum means of
integrating the scoring system into a variety of lending organisations where it is
deemed that this is the means by which maximum value can be achieved. In order to








This evaluation does not seek to replicate the standard accounting practices which
exist within the organisation. Rather the focus will be on determining the profits and
costs associated with mortgage lending, and the impact on profitability of alternative
means of credit decisioning. The examination will review the cost:benefits of
mortgage lending, the cost:benefits of credit scoring and the costs and benefits of
alternative methods of credit decisioning. Areas of interest include:
The cost of processing each application to the decision stage
The cost of applications decisioned solely by credit score
The cost of applications decisioned solely by underwriters
The cost of applications decisioned by a combination of credit score and underwriting
The quantification of the volume which do not progress to a formal application
The cost of processing each enquiry which does not progress
An analysis of the reasons why applicants do not progress to formal application
The full cost of getting each application "on the books"
The length of time it takes to recoup such set up costs
The length of time mortgages stay on the books
The reasons why mortgages migrate
The profitability profile of the mortgage portfolio
The cost of arrears and default management
Speed of response:
In today's customer driven environment, speed to decision and offer is increasingly
important. This area will be examined with a view to examining the timescales for a
variety of types of lending proposal. This will include those within and outwith
lending criteria, existing customers and potential new customers. An examination of
differences in service standards which each category receives will be undertaken, with
a view to streamlining the process where possible.
Customer Service
As with all other evaluations, the intention is for non intrusive research to be
conducted. The research will be conducted within the lending organisation. The
customer service evaluation will seek to utilise existing reporting mechanisms where
they exist. If no measures exist to currently evaluate the following, the research
project will support the development of reporting mechanisms should the participant
organisation wish to do so.
Customer service questionnaire responses
Level of retention
Percentage of enquiries which proceed to formal application
Percentage of applications approved
Reasons for declines
Percentage of applicants offered an alternative product
Level and nature of supporting documentation required from applicants
4
Credit Quality
Credit quality will be reviewed from the perspective of both trends within the lending
organisation and a comparison of industry figures. An overall assessment of quality
will consider the following:
Credit score values (where appropriate)
Loan to value ratio's
Levels of applications accepted and declined
Reasons for declined applications
Levels of non criteria applications accepted
Reasons for non criteria applications accepted
Levels of arrears
Movement and trends from minor arrears to serious arrears
Proportion of those in arrears who are making and adhering to repayment agreements
Level of voluntary surrender of property
Level of repossession of property
Credit Strategy
In recognition of the various credit strategies which exist in the market place, the
individual credit strategies of participant organisations will be documented. This will
ensure that the research recognises disparate strategies, and the variety of objectives
which will exist in support of differing strategies. In order to fully understand the
credit strategy, the examination will include:
Credit policy documentation
Marketing focus
Product placement and variety
The existence or otherwise of lending criteria
The adherence to published lending criteria
The extent to which maximising profits is mitigated by ethical lending
Timescales
Timescales will be confirmed by negotiation with participant organisations. However
it is intended that an intensive period of access of up to three months may be required
in order that all data be gathered to facilitate the research. On completion of access to
each participant organisation a summary document will be provided within six weeks
which will provide feedback on key deliverables. The full case study research over
several organisations will take up to a year. On completion of the full research
programme, it may be desirable to revisit organisations for a short period in order to
examine additional new areas of interest, or to update data. This, as with all other




Credit scoring research has evolved over the past fifty years. Much of the current
research focuses on the ability of the credit scorecard to accurately predict default.
However the manner by which credit scoring is adopted into the operating
environment has received little attention. The multiple methods via which credit
scoring has been operationalised, result in a variety of differing benefits being
obtained. This research seeks to quantify the value and benefits of a variety of









The University of Edinburgh
Benchmarking Mortgage Performance
Objectives of the Research:
This study complements previous research which examined the impact of credit scoring being
adopted by mortgage lenders. Within the research already undertaken key performance
indicators have been identified. This new study, asks organisations to provide
"benchmarking" data relating to both risk and process measurements. The provision of such
data will allow lenders access to industry wide data on risk and performance measurements
within the mortgage lending environment. The objectives of the research are as follows;
■ Gather industry wide data to allow the creation of a benchmarking dataset
■ Create a benchmarking tool based on mortgage risk measurements
■ Create a benchmarking tool based on mortgage process measurements
■ Provide segmented benchmarking data based on primary means of credit decisioning
Confidentiality:
Respondents are assured of complete confidentiality. No organisation or individual will be
identified within the research output.
Feedback:
A research report will be circulated to all participants. Recipients will be provided with
information which enables them to "benchmark" their own performance in a number of key
areas of both credit risk, and mortgage process efficiency. Of particular value will be the
focus on how performance differs between those who credit score and those who do not. This
will allow lenders to compare themselves against those using the same decisioning
techniques, and to examine whether alternative techniques appear to be associated with
particular performance trends. The research report will be circulated in January 2000.
Should you have any queries about any element of this research please do not hesitate to
contact the survey co-ordinator as detailed below:
Ms. Ann MacNeill




Telephone 0131 650 4644
Email Ann.MacNeill@ed.ac.uk
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Section 1: Risk Measures:
Arrears levels:
What percentage of mortgage accounts are not up to date
12 months after drawdown? %
Please break down the percentage given above based on
the number of instalments in arrears:
0 - 0.99 instalments %
1-1.99 instalments %
2 - 2.99 instalments %
3-3.99 instalments %
4 - 4.99 instalments %
5 - 9.99 instalments %
10 + instalments %
At what point does your organisation first define an





What is the current level of arrears (as defined by your
organisation) across your entire mortgage-lending
portfolio as a percentage of portfolio value? %
At what point does your organisation first define an





What is the current level of default across your entire
mortgage-lending portfolio as a percentage of portfolio
value?
%
Commonly lending institutions lend outwith their
published lending criteria. What proportion of mortgages
which your organisation approves are typically outwith
your published lending criteria?
Ifyou do not measure this data, please indicate this fact
as your reason for non-response.
%
• Please continue overleaf
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Section 2: Process Measures:
Acceptance Rate:
What is the level of mortgage applications which are
converted to completed mortgage accounts? %
What proportion of verbal enquiries are converted to
actual applications (either paper or electronic)?
Please provide an estimate ifyou do not formally record
this data
%
Do you gather data on why enquiries which fail to
convert to applications? Yes/no
If yes to the above, what are the most common reasons
cited for enquiries failing to convert to applications, e.g.
wrong products:
Approval Time:
What is the usual length of time between an application
being completed and the customer being offered an
"agreement in principle"?
Agreement in principle being defined as "subject to
receipt ofeither suitable employers reference or property
survey"
Less than 1 hour
1 hour - 1 day
2 days - 5 days
6 days - 1 month
1 month +
What is the usual length of time between application
being completed and offer papers being issued?
1 hour - 1 day
2 days - 5 days
6 days - 1 month
1 month +
Customer Satisfaction:




If random measurement of customer satisfaction, please




Do you accept intermediary introduced business, and if
so do you measure introducer satisfaction?
Accept business Yes/No
Measure satisfaction Yes/No
Please indicate the frequency of measurement of
introducer satisfaction.
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Section 3: Background Information:
What is the primary means of reaching a mortgage
lending decision within your organisation?
Please tick one box as appropriate
Lending decision reached with no
input from credit score.
Credit score value comprises part of
the lending decision.
Credit score value determines the
lending outcome.
What is the number of mortgage applications approved
by your organisation within the last 12 months?
What is the monetary value of mortgages granted by your
organisation within the last 12 months?
What is the current asset value of your mortgage
portfolio?
What proportion of new mortgage business from existing
customers comes from the following sources?
Please specify measurement method i 1
Volume of new business by number of applications ' '
Volume of new business by value of applications |
Direct %
Via Intermediary %
What proportion of new mortgage business from new
customers comes from the following sources?
Please specify measurement method \ 1
Volume of new business by number of applications ' '
Volume of new business by value of applications | |
Direct %
Via Intermediary %
What is the maximum loan to value ratio on which you
offer mortgage advances? %
If purchase price is lower than valuation do you calculate
the loan to value ratio on (i) advance:purchase price or
(ii) advance:survey valuation figure?
5





Email address (if applicable)
Company Information
Company name
Address of registered office
End of Section 4: Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey document. Please
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Application Data
Introduction
The research is now in phase two, where mortgage application data is being collected
and analysed. The objective is to compare the mortgage application process and
lending outcomes based on the method of credit decisioning. This will enable a
comparison of empirical, judgmental and combined decisioning systems.
The research will examine accounts which meet the criteria of being "resource
intensive". These will include default, arrears and early redemptions. Analysis will be
undertaken in order to determine which variables are most strongly correlated with the
various categories of resource intensive accounts. To gain a perspective on which
variables should be considered in the analysis a wide variety of mortgage application
forms were examined in order to identify the data which is available.
Overview of Application Data
What is immediately apparent is that the mortgage application form often has multiple
roles which may include;
• Assessing credit risk
• Marketing tool for products/cross sales
• Providing additional security features
• Meeting mortgage code requirements
This review of application data categorised the information gathered within the
following categories; (i) applicant, (ii) financial, (iii) employment, (iv) property and
(v) product characteristics. The focus was on the information which could be
analysed with a view to contributing to the credit decision. Supplementary
information such as name of solicitor etc. was ignored. Assuming a sole applicant the
average number of characteristics gathered by organisations was 51. The maximum
was 64 and the lowest number recorded was 40. These figures of course exclude
credit bureau information which would provide additional variables. The figures
stimulate discussion as an average credit scorecard may contain 20 - 30 variables, and
therefore questions arise surrounding the value and purpose of such comprehensive




The combination of basic information and some additional security variables was
common. Areas of differentiation include:
Gender variable: some lenders do not explicitly gather the gender variable, rather if
they use it in analysis they must make an implicit deduction based on name and title.
This can cause confusion where for example the title is Professor and the name
common to both genders albeit with spelling variations, e.g. Lynn, Lyndsey etc.
Relationship variable: Reflecting trends this is tackled from a variety of
perspectives, perhaps to address the limitations of raw data. Rather than simply
asking for marital status, several lenders ask for relationship between applicants. This
perhaps reflects the fact that "married" does not necessarily mean to each other.
Dependants variable: Variance exists between lenders. Some request only numbers
of children explicitly. Other request age of children. The question arises as to how
this data is actually used. Unless this data is combined in some way with a household
expenditure index to calculate affordability, its inclusion in the application form may
be for marketing purposes. Reflecting demographic changes several lenders now
ensure that they identify not only children but other dependants (presumably elderly
relatives).
Financial Characteristics
Very basic data is gathered via the application form. This suggests that credit bureau
data is considered a valuable source of financial information, and supplements the
data collected on the application form. Obviously where the applicant is an existing
account holder additional valuable information on account behaviour is also available.
The application forms do not all contain a supplementary section which allows the
collation of financial information in a pre-determined format. Very little data is
gathered on the assets of the applicant, the focus is on liabilities.
Credit card variable: Several lenders gather balances, limits and monthly payments.
This allows credit card debt level to be considered relative to card limit, which has in
the past been correlated to propensity to default. By explicitly requesting such
information presumably an "honesty check" is being carried out. Others may gather
such data via credit bureau reports.
Loans/other outgoings: Lender, type of loan, amount outstanding and typical
monthly payments were commonly gathered. The prompts around type of loan
included, mortgage, overdraft and hire purchase agreements. Many lenders (68%) ask
explicitly about maintenance commitments, and seek to identify those which are
voluntary and those which result from Court Order.
Affordability: It is clear that the application form is not the medium by which
affordability is calculated. Whilst basic income details are gathered (see employment
section), only the most basic of expenditure details are commonly gathered. This
confirms that despite a large number of variables being collated on the application
forms, they are augmented by many more from additional sources which increases the
number of variables being considered beyond the mean of 51 identified.
Employment Characteristics
Employment Status: Again demographic changes reflect the new status of contract
worker. Several lenders ask explicitly about the terms of the contract, the date the
contract is due to be renewed, and whether/how often the contract has been renewed
in the past.
Income'. Acknowledgement of new remuneration structures is evident from the
categorisation of income source. Basic income is isolated from guaranteed other
income, regular income, commission income and any other income. Such data may
provide valuable avenues for analysis. The proportion of income received from DSS
is also considered useful to a few lenders. This data collection may be for analytical
purposes for a proportion of lenders, and risk assessment by others who have been
gathering income data in this format for longer.
Other Benefits: Information is requested by some lenders on other employment
benefits. This information would require to be augmented with details about
certainty/terms of benefits in order to be of real value to the credit assessment. It is
likely that the impact of other benefits would be in relation to calculation of
affordability, should the other benefits mitigate some household expenses.
Pension Arrangements'. Several lenders sought confirmation of pension
arrangements. Useful for marketing purposes, and potential impact on type of
product selected.
Property Details
Property Type: Increasingly, data is being collated on type of property (93% of
respondents). Property type has been found to be correlated to default in some
studies. This data is being augmented by number of bedrooms and in some cases
number of storeys. Data such as construction which is collected by 56% of lenders at
application stage, is most likely to be considered by others on receipt of the valuation.
Insurances'. This section is used by many as an opportunity to cross sell insurance
products such as building and contents insurance. Lenders have heeded the CML and
government initiatives with 83% "flagging" the subject of Mortgage Payment
Protection Insurance at this stage. Lenders are asking not only if applicants wish
cover, but are emphasising the need for cover by asking explicitly what arrangements
exist to meet the mortgage payments in the event of accident, illness, unemployment
etc. The potential relationship between existence of MPPI and likelihood of default
also means that many lenders are currently using this data in analysis. As a rich data
source it may require to be augmented by information on how the MPPI product came
to be in place (sought or sold). This would enable the consumer behaviour/risk
profile aspects of those who have MPPI to be considered.
Product Details
Very standard across all lenders. General collation of data on type of product, term,
source of deposit etc.
Conclusion
The extensive volume of data being gathered has a broad range of implications. With
a focus on customer service and speed to decision, organisations must critically
evaluate their usage of data. The multiplicity of roles which the data must meet should
be objectively examined regularly. This requires a variety of organisational
perspectives be addressed, with marketing, credit risk, and other departmental
representatives reviewing their requirements. Whilst the credit decision can be made
on a limited number of variables, organisations recognise that drivers of default may
vary over time. The volume of data gathered allows the retrospective evaluation of
variables in order to examine the existence and strength of relationships over time.
The focus of such analysis may examine not only default but other arrears and early
redemption indicators. It is this iterative loop that provides improved knowledge
about the truly valuable data which must be gathered at the credit assessment stage.
Appendix M

















Time in present employment
Pension source
Occupation status

















Type of accounts held
Other assets (type and value)
Credit card
Cheque card

















Number of credit searches
Current status (up to date/arrears)
Arrears causality code
Default on previous mortgage
Date most recent CCJ
CCJ satisfied
Referred to credit assessor









Further to previous communication, you are invited to take part in an industry wide
survey of mortgage lenders. All members of the Council of Mortgage Lenders are
asked to provide information relating to mortgage performance. This data will
enable industry performance figures to be "benchmarked", providing a useful
database for participants to share.
The data gathered and all research output will be wholly confidential, and no
organisation will be identifiable within the research output. Participants will obtain
an analysis report, and individually tailored information of their position
benchmarked against other lenders. The added dimension to this survey, is that the
method of credit decisioning will be considered. This allows a unique comparison of
performance related to the method of credit decisioning.
Your participation helps to ensure that the results are robust. The more organisations
that participate, the more valuable the results will be. Whilst I appreciate that time
constraints exist, I would be most grateful if you would spare time to complete and
return the survey document by 7th January. If you are unable to meet that deadline,
please let me know a preferred response date. Do not hesitate to contact me if you
have any queries regarding any aspect of the research.
May I thank you for your co-operation, and also wish you "all the best" over the
festive season. I look forward to sending you the findings in the New Year.
Yours sincerely,
Ann MacNeill











The contents of this report are drawn from a confidential survey of UK mortgage lenders.
Your performance has been benchmarked against other participants. Due to the diverse
nature of financial services organisations, and the variety of delivery channels utilised in
mortgage lending it is impossible to draw absolute conclusions from the data. However as a
pilot survey, the results provide some interesting observations, which will provide
participants with an overview as to how they compare with other lenders.
What is most encouraging is that lenders obviously maintain good quality management
information. Recent improvements in the quality and quantity of data available, allows
detailed analysis of business performance. Early identification of trends ensures that the pro¬
active analyst is equipped to advise management on movements within the portfolio.
Additionally, maintaining good quality data allows new areas to be explored, which in turn
may offer new insights into mortgage risk management.
The results provide an overview of some key performance measures in risk, process and
customer service. You will see a surprising range of values in many fields, illustrating the
diversity amongst lenders. The raw results are provided, and some comments are made to
explain unusual occurrences within the data. However the report does not make any attempt
to quantify an ideal "target range" for any area. It would be inappropriate to do so, as one
lender's optimum figure could be an unrealistic target for other lenders.
The results are also presented in a way that relates the outcomes with regard to whether the
lender uses credit scoring in reaching a lending decision. This data is included, as this
benchmarking survey is part of a larger research project, which examines mortgage credit
scoring. Again whilst the results are interesting, it is inappropriate to conclude that the
differences exist exclusively as a result of credit scoring being used.
When considering the results it is useful to be aware that a limitation of the survey, is the low
response rate. The final number of usable responses received from lenders was twenty-three.
This response rate amounts to 19% of the whole population. Whilst this is lower than desired,
it is not untypical of survey response rates generally. Several reasons have been provided for
the low response. Many organisations confirmed that much of the data was "too sensitive"
for release. Whilst others confirm that they are commercially involved with a variety of other
Benchmarking Consortia at present.
It is hoped that these survey results will be useful to you. Many thanks for your participation
in the research survey.
Section 1: Risk Measures:
1.1 Arrears levels:
Percentage of mortgage accounts not up to date 12 months after drawdown.
17 lenders provided information on arrears levels. The results reported below exclude one
response which stated that the level of arrears 12 months after drawdown was 97.5%. This
may or may not be a valid response, but as it was an "outlier" when related to the other data it
was excluded from the analysis. The figures below indicate the range of data, a mean value
and your ranking. Rankings are from 1 (lowest) to 16 (highest).
Minimum Maximum Mean Your value Ranking (16)
0.002% 22.60% 5.98% 716
1.1.1. Arrears levels related to Credit Decisioning
When the level of arrears is related to the method of credit decisioning, we see that the lowest
arrears are maintained by those that do not use credit scoring. Whilst this is an interesting
observation, issues of prudence, profitability and credit policy require to be debated before
any actual conclusions could be reached.
% of accounts not






0 - 0.99% 60% (6) 16.66% (1)
1.00%-9.99% 20% (2) 33.33% (2)
10% and above 20% (2) 50.00% (3)
100% (10) 99.99% (6)
1.2 Breakdown of arrears
Breakdown of arrears based on number of instalments in arrears
The table, which follows on page four, provides results in line with expectations, in which the
levels of arrears decrease in line with seriousness increasing. The exception however is the
figure for five to nine months in arrears, which shows an unexpected increase. A single
lender showing 18% arrears at the five to nine month stage is the cause of this anomaly. .
When this lender is removed from analysis, the adjusted maximum is 9% and adjusted mean
is 1.24%, which supports the general trend.
Breakdown of arrears based on number of instalments in arrears (contd.)
Instalments Minimum Maximum Mean Your value Ranking
0-0.99 0 98.40% 31.51% /14
1-1.99 0 51.00% 10.36% /16
2-2.99 0 33.00% 4.23% /16
3-3.99 0 9.00% 1.36% /16
4-4.99 0 5.00% 0.96% /16
5-9.99 0 18.00% 2.30% /16
10 + 0 3.00% 0.48% /16
1.3 Definition of arrears
Twenty-three organisations provided a response. Interestingly, a significant number of
organisations (30.4%) considered that arrears exist at any monetary value. This perhaps
reflects new trends in arrears management where organisations seek to track arrears
maturation patterns across the portfolio. The majority of lenders, 47.8%, define arrears at 1 -
1.99 instalments outstanding. Only one lender considered that an arrears position
commenced at the point 2 - 2.99 instalments outstanding. The remaining organisations used
a variety of alternative methods including an assessment of the "relationship having broken
down". Two lenders used financial values, one a proportion of the monthly repayment, and
the other a small financial amount.
1.4 Level of arrears across the portfolio
Level of arrears as a percentage of portfolio value
All lenders provided data on the overall level of arrears across their portfolio. The following
confirms the range, mean value and ranking of arrears "as defined by individual lenders".
The ranking is from 1 (lowest arrears) to 23 (highest arrears).
Minimum Maximum Mean Your value Ranking (23)
0.01% 8.00% 2.02% /23
Some interesting observations are provided which shows that banks generally have lower
arrears figures at the portfolio level. The table below details Banks as a proportion of Bank
respondents etc.
Organisation Type
Portfolio Arrears Bank Building Society Other
0 - 0.99% 66.66% 30.77% 50.00%
1 - 1.99% 16.66% 30.77% 0
2% and above 16.66% 38.46% 50.00%
99.98% 100.00% 100.00%
1.4.1 Level of portfolio arrears related to method of Credit Decisioning
Analysis of arrears across the portfolio, shows that those who input a score value, maintain






0 - 0.99% 56.25% (9) 14.28% (1)
1 - 1.99% 18.75% (3) 28.57% (2)
2% and above 25.00% (4) 57.14% (4)
100.00% (16) 99.99% (7)
1.5 Definition of default
Of the twenty-three respondents 52% considered an account to be in default at 1-1.99
instalments in arrears. This is similar to the earlier responses on definition of arrears. It
would therefore seem that at a portfolio level, the terms arrears and default may be used
interchangeably in some organisations. Just over 17% identified default at 2 -2.99
instalments with a further 13% defining default at 3 - 3.99 instalments. Of the remainder
"relationship broken down" and a variety of financial values are used to determine the point
at which an account is considered to be "in default".
1.6 Level of default across the portfolio
Level of default as a percentage of portfolio value
Only one lender failed to provide data on the level of portfolio default, hence the ranking
values below range from 1 (lowest) to 22 (highest).
Minimum Maximum Mean Your value Ranking (22)
0 7.00% 2.03% 122
Again some additional analysis was undertaken based on organisational type as illustrated
below. Due to the fact that the terminology may be being used interchangeably the results
almost mirror those of the arrears analysis, with banks more commonly holding lower levels
of portfolio default.
Organisation Type
Portfolio Default Bank Building Society Other
0 - 0.99% 50.00% 33.33% 50.00%
1 - 1.99% 16.67% 33.33% 0
2% and above 33.33% 33.33% 50.00%
100.00% 99.99% 100.00%
1.6.1 Level of Portfolio Default related to method of Credit Decisioning
In accordance with the earlier observation regarding portfolio arrears, it seems that lenders
maintain higher levels of portfolio default when they have access to credit scoring. This
further analysis shows that the terms arrears and default are not wholly interchangeable. This






0 - 0.99% 46.67% (7) 28.57% (2)
1 - 1.99% 20.00% (3) 28.57% (2)
2% and above 33.33% (5) 42.86% (3)
100.00% (15) 100.00% (7)
1.7 Non criteria lending
What proportion of mortgages approved are outwith your published criteria
Twenty-two organisations provided a response on non-criteria lending. Of the twenty-two
that responded three did not measure levels of non-criteria lending. In view of this the
rankings below are based on nineteen lenders. Rankings are from 1 (lowest level) to 19
(highest level).
Minimum Maximum Mean Your value Ranking (19)
0 35.00% 8.42% 719
1.7.1 Non criteria lending related to the method of credit decisioning
Interestingly some differences are observed when analysis is conducted relative to the
decisioning methods. Those that credit score appear to restrict the level of outwith criteria
lending to a maximum of ten percent. This may support the belief that the scoring system
allows overall risk to be measured more accurately. Thus portfolio exposure may be







0 - 4.99% 33.33% (4) 42.86% (3)
5 - 9.99% 16.67% (2) 42.86% (3)
10 - 14.99% 25.00% (3) 14.28% (1)
15% and above 25.00% (3) -
100.00% (12) 100.00% (7)
Section 2: Process Measures:
2.1 Acceptance Rates
Level of applications converted to mortgage accounts
What is most interesting in the table, which follows, is the substantial range between
minimum and maximum levels of conversion. No additional data about market focus, or
customer profile is available to provide an explanation as to why such differences might
occur. Organisations must of course consider the processing costs and reasons why such
large numbers of applications fail to convert to "accounts on the books". The ranking is
from 1 (highest conversion level) to 23 (lowest).
Minimum Maximum Mean Your value Ranking (23)
22% 98% 72.27% /23
2.1.1 Level of applications converted related to method of credit decisioning
The method of credit decisioning appears to have no strong relationship with the level of
applications which convert to completions. This may suggest that the method of decisioning
is not having an overt influence on the applicant profile. The majority of organisations fall in
the mid range between 50 - 80% completions. This contrasts with earlier published figures
(1997) which suggested that the level of declines was much higher, with up to two out of
three applicants for mortgage facilities being declined. Despite additional analysis being










0 -49.99% 12.50% (2) 14.28% (1)
50 - 69.99% 6.25% (1) 57.14% (4)
70 - 89.99% 56.25% (9) 14.28% (1)
90% and over 25.00% (4) 14.28% (1)
100.00% (16) 99.98% (7)
2.2 Enquiry conversion rates
Several lenders do not gather data on the levels of enquiries which convert to formal
application stage. The table which follows provides range, mean and ranked values on the
nineteen lenders that responded. Rankings are from 1 (highest conversion levels) to 19
(lowest).
Enquiry conversion rates (contd.)
Minimum Maximum Mean Your value Ranking (19)
16% 80% 43.95% /19
Only seven lenders confirmed that they collate data which examines the reason for non-
conversion. Despite this low number a wide range of reasons exist. These could potentially
inform the organisation as to its product offering and processes. Reasons for enquiries
failing to proceed to application stage include the following;
□ products not meeting needs
□ lending criteria
□ withdrawn
□ declined at initial interview
□ shopping around
□ property does not meet criteria
□ customer does not fit target market
□ lost to competitor
□ indemnity requirements
2.3 Approval Time
Length of time from application to "agreement in principal
The table, which follows, provides numbers and percentages of respondents, related to time
to agreement in principal (AIP) being offered. As you can see the majority reach AIP
between one hour and one day. A significant number do reach a decision in less than one
hour.
less than 1 hour 1 hour - 1 day 2-5 days 6 days- 1 month
%of
respondents
26.1% 47.8% 21.7% 4.3%
No. of
Respondents
6 11 5 1
2.3.1. Approval time related to method of credit decisioning
Perhaps confirming the process benefits believed to be delivered by scoring, those with
access to credit scoring process a higher proportion of mortgages to AIP stage, within one
hour. Just under 86% of those with scoring reach agreement in principal, within one day.
Interestingly the only organisation outwith the six day AIP criteria, also has access to credit





Less than one hour 18.75% (3) 42.86% (3)
One hour - one day 50.00% (8) 42.86% (3)
Two - five days 31.25% (5)
6 days - one month 14.28% (1)
100.00% (16) 100.00.% (7)
2.4 Time from application to offer
All twenty-three organisations responded with information on time to offer. Only two
produced a formal offer within 2-5 days. A further twenty organisations (87%) produced
offer papers in a time period of six days to one month. A single organisation confirmed that
time to offer was usually in excess of one month.
2.5 Customer Satisfaction
Frequency of measurement of satisfaction
The most common method for measuring customer satisfaction was by random sampling.
Fourteen organisations (61%) confirmed they random sampled. Of those that did so, the
most popular timing for conducting the sampling was quarterly, which was reported by 30%
of respondents. Four organisations (17%) sampled monthly, with the others citing various
alternative timings.
Of those that do not carry out random sampling, five organisations (22%) measure customer
satisfaction on every application. The remaining four organisations carry out no
measurement of customer satisfaction.
The satisfaction results were then viewed relative to whether credit scoring is in place or not.
This illustrated that all organisations which conduct credit scoring, do measure customer
satisfaction by some method. The four organisations which do not measure satisfaction, do
not have credit scoring. Whilst no relationship is proven, it may be reasonable to suggest that
the scoring organisations have levels of technology in place which make measurement of
satisfaction a more manageable task.
2.5.1. Measurement of Introducer Satisfaction Levels
Twenty of the twenty-three respondents accept new business which is introduced by
mortgage intermediaries. Of those that accept business 50% confirm that they measure
intermediary satisfaction levels. No trend in frequency of measurement can be identified,
which frequencies being reported as follows:
Frequency of Measurement Number of organisations Percent






2.5.2 Measurement of introducer satisfaction related to method of credit decisioning
All organisations in which a credit score forms a part of the credit decision accept
intermediary introduced business. When the measurement of intermediary satisfaction is
related to whether the organisation uses a credit score, it becomes clear that the scorers
conduct more analysis of satisfaction levels. As stated in section 2.5, it may be that levels of














Section 3: Background Information:
3.1 Decisioning Method
This benchmarking survey supports a broader research project, which examines the
application of scoring technologies to mortgage lending. Information was sought on the role
of credit scoring (if any) in the respondent organisations. Of those who responded almost
seventy percent continue to make lending decisions with no input from a credit score. Of
the twenty-three respondents, only seven (30.4%) use credit scoring to assist with mortgage
decisioning.
3.2 Volume of business
Number of mortgages approved in previous 12 months
The following ranking provides the number of applications approved, and assumes position 1
is the highest number approved, running through to 22 the lowest number. One lender failed
to provide the number of mortgages approved.
Minimum Maximum Mean Your value Ranking (22)
428 104,000 20,075 122
The following ranking provides the value of applications approved, and assumes position 1 is
the highest value approved, running through to 23 the lowest value. All lenders provided the
value of mortgages approved.
Value of mortgages granted in previous 12 months
Minimum Maximum Mean Your value Ranking (23)
£7,600,000 £938.8 million £40.8 million /23
3.2.1. Decisioning Method related to volume of business
Further analysis examined the relationship between volume of business and utilisation of
credit scoring. This analysis supports earlier findings, in which low volumes of business
were cited as being a main reason for not using credit scoring. As can be seen from the table










0 - 4,999 66.66% 0
5,000 -9,999 13.33% 0
10,000- 104,000 20.00% 100%
99.99% 100.00%
3.3. Source of business
Organisations provided information on the proportion of mortgage business coming from
both existing and new customers. This was further segmented to examine whether the
business was coming via intermediaries or "direct" to the lender. The tables which follow
look firstly at results relating to existing customers, and then at "new" customers. Not all
lenders were able to provide information on sources of business.








0 -29.99% 0 0
30 - 59.99% 3 15%
60 - 99.99% 9 45%
100% 4 20%
not measured 4 20%
100%







0 -29.99% 6 27.27%
30 - 59.99% 8 36.36%
60 - 99.99% 5 22.73%
100% 3 13.63%
99.99%
3.3.3. Volume of new business from intermediaries related to Credit Decisioning
Having examined the direct business, some additional work was done looking at the lending
organisations and the levels of business received via intermediaries. As can be seen below
many lenders receive a substantial proportion of mortgage business via intermediaries. For
the purpose of this analysis new (non-customer) business received from intermediaries is
related to the method of decisioning. What is most interesting is that those who use credit
scoring receive a higher proportion of new business from intermediaries than those who do
not. This fact is perhaps surprising, as there is a perception that intermediaries are not often








0 % - 29.99% 40% 0%
30% - 59.99% 20% 14%
60% plus 40% 86%
3.4 Maximum LTV ratio
Responses on maximum LTV ratio, ranged from a lowest maximum LTV of 80% to the
highest LTV on offer of 125%. The majority of respondents (70%) confirmed a maximum
LTV of 95%.







80 - 89.99% 6.25% -
90 - 99.99% 81.25% 57.14%
100% 6.25% 42.86%
101% and above 6.25% -
100.00% 100.00%
Again, in accordance with the risk management benefits believed to be achievable with credit
scoring, a higher proportion of scoring organisations offer higher LTV ratios. However
another interesting anomaly in the data is that the only lender lending in excess of 100% is
not using credit scoring. These could of course be specialised cases such as negative equity
etc. where credit policy rules are dominant over credit risk rules.
3.5 Calculation of LTV
In order to clarify current industry practice, lenders were asked how they calculated LTV.
Twenty-one respondents confirmed that they calculated LTV on the lower of the purchase
price or the survey valuation. The remaining two lenders calculate LTV on the survey
valuation regardless of purchase price. Both of the lenders using the survey valuation figure
in all cases do not currently use credit scoring as part of the decisioning process.
